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COST SHARING UNDER COMPLEX FEDERALISM:
WELFARE REFORM COST NEUTRALITY
CALCULATIONS

Robert G. Lovell, D.P.A.
Western Michigan University, 1996

The American system of welfare for families with children is a partnership
between the federal and state governments.

Under this partnership, the federal

government establishes the basic eligibility policies for the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program, the principal program providing cash assistance
to poor families. States determine payment levels and administrative policies. Costs
are shared through a formula reflecting each state’s ability to pay.
To encourage policy experimentation by the states, a section of the act creating
the AFDC program allows the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services to waive some provisions. This became a critical welfare reform tool in
1987. The Secretary attaches certain conditions to waivers, including one limiting
federal expenditures to the level expected without the demonstration policies. This
condition is called “cost neutrality.” Demonstration waivers, and, in particular, the
role of cost neutrality, are the subject of this dissertation.
Waivers are found to provide the basis for an unstable compromise between the
federal government’s desire for a uniform national AFDC program and the states’

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

desires for maximum local flexibility. Despite intense efforts over the last two years
to find agreement on more fundamental changes, reforming welfare one state at a time
through waivers remains the national policy, supported grudgingly by Democrats and
Republicans at both the state and federal levels.
Cost neutrality is found to be a novel and significant aspect of federalism. It
protects federal financial interests while encouraging considerable state policy
ingenuity, but it inhibits states from carrying out certain demonstrations. Results may
provide an early indication of a project’s success or failure.

Early results from

Michigan became part of the national welfare reform debate in 1994.
The methodology adopted for computation of savings or excess costs from
waiver demonstration projects, as applied to preliminary results from Michigan’s To
Strengthen Michigan Families demonstration, is reviewed. Resampling was utilized
to estimate the statistical variation in Michigan’s reported savings, showing a high
level of uncertainty in the results. Implications for the political and practical uses of
such results are discussed.
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CHAPTER I

THE CONTEXT OF STATE WELFARE REFORM

Welfare in America

The American system for ensuring a minimum level of financial well-being for
families with children is a partnership between the federal and state governments. Under
this partnership, the federal government establishes the basic policies for the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program,1 the Food Stamps program2 and the
Medicaid program3 (see Figure 1). States are permitted to choose among some options,
reporting most of their choices to the responsible federal agencies for approval. The states
set payment levels (within some federal limits).

Administrative costs for the three

programs are shared equally. The federal treasury pays all benefit costs for Food Stamps

!AFDC provides cash grants, job training and related services to poor families
with children; the Department of Health and Human Services' Administration for
Children and Families is the responsible federal agency.
2The Food Stamps program provides poor families with coupons redeemable
for food and gardening products; the Department of Agriculture's Food and Consumer
Service is the responsible federal agency.
3Medicaid provides health care to poor people; the Department of Health and
Human Services' Health Care Financing Administration is the responsible federal
agency.

1
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Federal Law
Social Security Act
Title IV-A (Aid to Fam ilies with Dependent
Children o r A FD C , Section 1115)
Title IV -D (Child Support)
Title IV -F (Job Opportunities and Basic
Skills, o r JOBS)
Title X IX (Medicaid)
Food Stamp Act

Departm ent o f Health and Hum an Services
(DHHS)
A dm inistration for C hildren and Fam ilies
(ACF)
H ealth C are Finance Adm inistration (HCFA)

State Law
Social W elfare Act
Annual Budget
Appropriations
B oiler Plate
Executive Orders

M ichigan Departm ent o f Social Services (MDSS)
Central Office
County Departm ents o f Social Services
D istrict Offices

D epartm ent o f A griculture
Food and Consum er Service (FCS)

Federal Regulations
Section 1115 Approval Policies and Conditions

Program s Adm inistered by DHHS
M edicare
Supplemental Security Income

State Plans for Federal Program s
State Policies
State Procedures
County Procedures
D istrict Office Procedures

Program s Adm inistered by MDSS
Aid to Fam ilies with Dependent C hildren (AFDC)
Food Stamps (FS)
M edicaid (MA)
State Fam ily Assistance (SFA)
State M edical Assistance
State Disability Assistance

Figure 1. Michigan Welfare Administration.
and at least half of the benefit costs for AFDC and Medicaid; the exact federal share
depends on a formula which considers the relative wealth of each state.
Since 1962, states have been able to request authority to operate a
demonstration project designed to test the effectiveness of alternative policies not
otherwise permitted under federal law. More than half of the states have done so. The
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federal government will not match state expenditures for such demonstrations beyond
the expected cost of federal programs in the absence of the demonstration. This
condition, called cost neutrality, has significant technical dimensions and policy
implications not previously explored in the literature.
This dissertation4 begins this exploration with a review of the cost neutrality
requirement, then focuses on its application to Michigan’s 1992 demonstration, called
To Strengthen Michigan Families.5 Chapter II discusses recent national welfare
reform initiatives. Michigan’s cost neutrality results for the first 30 months of its
demonstration project are reviewed in Chapter III. Chapter IV contains the research
design. Chapter V reviews the AFDC program, its demonstration programs, and the
cost neutrality requirement in particular. It places this relatively new concept of cost
neutrality within the context of the literature of federalism. The technical details of
cost neutrality calculations are discussed in Chapter VI. Chapter VII contains findings
concerning Michigan’s cost neutrality results. Chapter VIII draws conclusions on the
significance of cost neutrality and its implications for federalism.

4The author, as Director of the Staffing and Program Evaluation Division of
the Michigan Department of Social Services, has responsibility for Michigan’s cost
neutrality calculations. Since July, 1994 assistance has been ably provided by Deborah
S. Meizlish, a Governor’s Management Intern assigned to the division.
5Acronyms are a fact of life in welfare administration. Programs are frequently
given awkward names that yield felicitous acronyms, but only gubernatorial preference
explains To Strengthen Michigan Families, or TSMF, which seems felicitous neither
as full name or acronym.
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History of AFDC Waiver Cost Neutrality

The AFDC program was created by the Social Security Act’s Title IV-A in
1935. As originally enacted, AFDC was intended to be a nationwide system, uniform
except for payment levels (Douglas, 1939, pp. 194-95). Thus, there appeared to be no
need to permit states to experiment with alternative policies. By September, 1961 this
perception had changed. The Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Public Welfare of
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare called for “A long range program
of support for research and demonstration programs” to be carried out by the states
and by social agencies or institutions of higher learning (Stevens, 1970, p. 631).
The Social Security Act was amended on July 25, 1962 to include Section 1115
[42 U.S.C. 1315] (West, 1991, p. 528). This section permitted the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare (now, the Secretary of Health and Human Services) to
grant waivers of provisions of Section 402 of the Social Security Act, covering
eligibility and payment levels for AFDC.
Michigan, along with several other states, used the waiver process to operate
a variant of the Work Incentive (WIN) welfare-to-work program when Congress
passed this initiative in 1981.

Evaluations of these programs were completed

(Babcock, 1989; Michigan Department of Social Services, 1989; and Gueron & Pauly,
1991), but cost neutrality calculations were not required. These waivers were limited
to WIN itself, and thus were not an attempt at comprehensive welfare reform.
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) admitted in 1987 that
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5
prior to creation of the [Interagency Low Income Opportunity
Advisory, or ILIOAB] Board [in 1987], the process was hollow and
ineffective, discouraging states from even trying demonstration
projects. Exercise of this waiver authority tended to be fragmented
among the separate agencies dealing with public assistance.
Approvals were considered under separate criteria.

This process inhibited state

creativity in developing multi-program demonstration projects (DHHS, undated and
unpaginated; approximately 1988). The length of time needed to obtain approval was
also an issue. In 1982, Undersecretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services David B. Swoap wrote (p. 123) that Secretary Richard Schweiker has initiated
a “fast track system to facilitate review of secretarial discretion requests.” However,
the waiver process was not then at the center of welfare reform efforts. Swoap (pp.
125-26) emphasizes deregulation, technical assistance and block grants as the principal
paths to reform.
The ILIOAB was created by President Reagan on July 20, 1987 “to accelerate
efforts to make America’s welfare system more effective” (Department of Health and
Human Services, undated, approx. 1988). Members included six departments and
several executive office agencies. It accepted and passed judgement on state applica
tions for waivers of regulations under the AFDC, Food Stamps, Medicaid and other
welfare programs. One set of policies and procedures applied to all proposals.
As a result, proposals from thirteen states were approved in the next eighteen
months. Provisions from some of these proposals presaged provisions of the Family
Support Act enacted on October 13, 1988 (see Chapter II). It would not be accurate,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

however, to say that these demonstration projects provided information about the
effects of the demonstrations’ provisions suggesting that they would be effective. As
of January 1993, few evaluation reports were available from any of them (DHHS,
1993a, p .l). Rather, as Mead (1992, pp. 195-98) observes, research initiated by
economists Mary Jo Bane, David Ellwood and June O’Neill on the length of time
families remain on welfare influenced the debate.

Studies by the Manpower

Demonstration Research Corporation of workfare programs in the early 1980s were
also influential. These studies showed that families spent an average of 6.6 years on
AFDC in multiple spells, and that workfare programs could have some effect on
reducing this level of dependency. Thus, the Family Support Act emphasizes employ
ment programs, setting goals for participation for those remaining on AFDC.
The ILIOAB applied three criteria in reviewing state demonstration
applications. First, the proposal “must have a chance of reducing welfare dependency
while continuing to meet the needs of the population the program was intended to
address.”
Second, total federal costs for AFDC, Food Stamps and Medicaid in each year
of the demonstration must not exceed those which would otherwise have occurred.
The congressional authors of Section 1115 believed it necessary to include protection
for the federal government from possible additional costs from policy demonstrations
initiated by the states. Paragraph (b)(2)(B) says that states may “use to cover the costs
of the project such funds as are appropriated for payment to such State with respect to
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the assistance which is, or would, except fo r participation in a project under this
subsection, be payable to individuals...” (emphasis added). However, this language
was not cited by DHHS in support of this requirement. Instead, only the country’s
fiscal situation was cited.
Third, there must be a sound evaluation plan. Although other options would
be considered, the Board preferred an evaluation with an “experimental design,” which
generally means random assignment of families to control and experimental groups.
The experimental design was also expected to support the cost neutrality requirement.
With variations and elaboration, these criteria remain in place as of this writing.
The cost neutrality requirement was also applied to waiver applications prior
to establishment of the ILIOAB, with separate accounting required for each program
affected. This made comprehensive demonstration proposals impracticable from a
fiscal standpoint. While including all affected programs was a major improvement,
the requirement, as posed by the ILIOAB, still included annual accounting, thus
inhibiting states from pursuing demonstration projects likely to incur higher early costs
to achieve later savings.
In his 1992 State of the Union address, President George Bush said about
renewed interest in waivers, “We are going to help this movement. Often, state
reform requires waiving certain federal regulations. I will act to make that process
easier and quicker for every state that asks our help,” (DHHS, 1993a, p .l). This short
paragraph was enthusiastically received by the Congress and the voters. This approach
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shifted the responsibility (or opportunity) to propose reforms to the states. As part of
the promised simplification, the requirement of annual cost neutrality was removed
by the Bush administration at some point prior to August 1992.

Demonstration

projects were required to be cost-neutral only over the life of the project. AFDC
demonstration projects were approved for nine states during the Bush administration,
including Michigan’s, entitled To Strengthen Michigan Families.

Three of these

states, Wisconsin, New Jersey and Maryland, had also received waivers during the
Reagan administration, so the unduplicated count of states with AFDC waivers reached
nineteen.
Both before and after a short-lived national welfare reform proposal announced
June 14, 1994 (see Chapter II), the Clinton administration also supported reform
through state-by-state waiver demonstration processes (even though Arkansas had not
used this approach while the President was its governor). In February 1993 President
Clinton promised the National Governors’ Conference “relief from the cumbersome
process” of waiver approval. Draft policies were announced on August 18th (DHHS,
1993b).
In a letter to Michigan Governor John Engler (and presumably sent to all
governors) only a month following the announcement of the President’s welfare reform
proposal, Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala gave nearly equal
emphasis to the Clinton administration’s record of granting waivers to fifteen states as
she gave to the proposal. Nine of these were new (including Arkansas), bringing the
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total to 28 different states with waiver projects. Wisconsin led the pack at this point
with four different demonstrations.
Responding to questions about the criteria used to evaluate waiver requests, on
September 27, 1994, DHHS completed the process begun in February of the preceding
year by finalizing its internal policies for granting waiver approval (1994, Federal
Register Vol 59, No. 186, pp. 49249-51). Cost neutrality remained a feature of all
approvals because “The Department’s fiduciary obligations in a period of extreme
budgetary stringency require maintenance of the principle” (p. 49250). The Bush
policy of assessing cost neutrality over the life of the project was reiterated, and the
possibility of alternate budget neutrality arrangements was suggested, but no examples
were given. Mary Jo Bane, Assistant Secretary for the Administration for Children
and Families of the Department of Health and Human Services, suggested in 1995 that
the cost neutrality requirement plays another role in the waiver approval process; since
the federal purse is protected, the federal government does not carry out a complicated
review of state demonstration budgets.

DHHS continues to receive, review and

approve AFDC waiver requests as this is written. Waivers permitting Connecticut to
limit AFDC payments to employable adults to 21 months, with extensions when good
faith efforts to obtain employment fail, were announced in a December 18, 1995 press
release from DHHS (Kharfen, 1995), which also cited approval by the Clinton
administration of “50 demonstration projects in 35 states.”
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Obtaining Welfare Reform Waivers

By law, then, the Secretary of Health and Human Services may waive most
AFDC program requirements when the state requesting the waiver is willing to meet
certain conditions.

The two most important conditions are the completion of a

comprehensive evaluation and the limitation of federal costs to the level at which they
would have been absent the waivers. The second condition is usually called “cost
neutrality,” and limits the states’ waiver projects to those for which the states can
assume all financial risk.
If a state wishes to modify a federal policy, it applies for a waiver. The federal
agencies review the request, and a process intended to reach a negotiated agreement
on the final policy changes begins. Shortly after President Bush's speech, Michigan
chose to pursue welfare reform through these waivers. The negotiation process began
in June with the Governor's welfare reform proposal, “To Strengthen Michigan
*

Families,” or TSMF (Engler, 1992). The negotiations were completed by FAX to and
from Air Force One as it flew the President to Detroit for a campaign appearance;
announcement of TSMF became a major part of the governor's and the president's
campaign speeches.

Cost Neutrality

Two significant conditions are imposed by the federal agencies in granting
waivers: a comprehensive evaluation of the implementation, results and ratio of costs
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to benefits must be completed by an independent evaluator, and a determination must
be made of the relative costs or savings resulting from the policy changes. The second
condition is called "cost neutrality." The technical details of cost neutrality determina
tion are discussed in Chapter VI, while its fiscal and policy implications are discussed
in Chapter V.
The Department of Health and Human Services prefers that an experimental
research design be implemented in one or more sites to meet both the cost neutrality
and evaluation requirements, but will accept a quasi-experimental6 design. Families
in the research design sites receive either the new, or experimental policies or the old,
or control policies. The families in the study sites must resemble all families assigned
to the experimental policies throughout the state. Many states limit the assignment of
experimental policies to families in the study sites. Michigan, however, implemented
its experimental policies statewide except for those families in the study sites assigned
to control policies for research purposes.7
Michigan's design is not formally an experimental design because it is based
on observations made at four study sites not chosen at random, but rather chosen

6In general, an "experimental design" is characterized by randomized
assignment of individual families to either the previous (or control) policy or to the
new (or experimental or waiver) policy. Quasi-experimental designs use one of a
number of assignment schemes which approximate this random assignment; for
example, control policies might be assigned to some locations and experimental
policies to others.
7An exception was also made for a continuing study of another set of
experimental policies; see below.
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purposively to match the state as a whole on several characteristics thought important
to the possible performance of the waivers—race, number of children, fraction living
in Wayne County (where Detroit is located), and fraction employed. This design was
selected to avoid the possibility of an atypical sample of locations appearing in a
random sample of four locations from a group of over 100 possible locations. Despite
this feature, the federal government and the state treat the resulting samples of control
cases and experimental cases as if they were a single simple random sample of all
Michigan AFDC cases. (See The Federal Cost Neutrality Formula below.)

Interaction With State Welfare Programs

In addition to AFDC, Food Stamps and Medicaid, some states, including
Michigan, also offer a program covering families with children who are poor enough
to qualify for AFDC, but fail a technical requirement. Generally, these families also
receive Food Stamps, and the children usually qualify for Medicaid. Adults in these
families usually do not qualify for Medicaid; Michigan also offers limited medical
coverage for these individuals.

In Michigan these programs are called State Family

Assistance (SFA) and State Medical Assistance (SMA).
In general, administrative costs for AFDC are shared equally by the states and
the federal government, although the federal government pays none of the cost of
administering supplementary state programs like Michigan’s State Family Assistance
program. Cost sharing rules for benefits paid to families vary by program. All benefit
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costs for Food Stamps are paid by the federal government. Benefit costs for AFDC
and Medicaid are shared by the states and the federal government through a formula
designed to reflect each state's ability to pay.

Two Common Groups of Waivers

States have carried out demonstration projects requiring waivers of many
different federal policies, but two groups of waivers are frequently requested. First,
states often seek waivers to eliminate the hundred hour and work quarter rules
described above. These waivers effectively transfer families failing these requirements
from a program which is entirely state funded (SFA in Michigan) to AFDC, a program
for which the federal government will pay at least half of all costs.8
The other frequently sought set of waivers involves the way in which income
earned by families on welfare is considered when grant levels are determined, called
the income disregard policy.

Federal law is complex and seems to discourage

employment lasting longer than four months (see Table 1). In 1992, Michigan sought
and received waivers of the hundred hour rule, the work quarter rule, and the income
disregard rules. Waivers were also received regarding treatment of children’s earnings
and savings, but these were expected to have relative small effects.

8Even when grant levels are equal under AFDC and the state program, as in
Michigan, other minor differences in medical coverage and job training requirements
may exist.
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Table 1
Michigan AFDC Grant Determination for Families With Income

Results for a family consisting of two children and one adult living in Wayne
County and earning $402 per month, the average wage of those with earnings in
Fiscal Year 1991:
Both Policies

Before
First 4 Months
Employment of Employment
AFDC Grant
Earned Income
Total Income

Experimental
(New) Policies

Control (Old) Policies
Subsequent 8
Months of
Employment

Thirteenth and
All Subsequent
Months

All Months

$459

$362

$268

$238

$297

$0

$402

$402

$402

$402

$459

$764

$670

$640

$699

As Table 1 shows, families receiving the control policies have $764 - $699 =
$65 per month higher incomes in the first four months of employment, gaining $260
over families covered by experimental policies.

Families receiving experimental

policies regain $232 of this difference in the next eight months of employment. They
have more total income over the first thirteen months (by $31) and remain ahead
thereafter. Including the value of Food Stamps coupons received by the family (which
varies inversely with the family's total income) would have only minor effects on these
calculations.
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The Standard Federal Waiver Cost Neutrality Calculation Method

When, as in Michigan, the research design is considered equivalent to two
simple random samples of all AFDC cases (one covered by old policies and the other
covered by new policies), a standard formula for calculating any excess federal costs
or savings incurred is specified by DHHS. The formula is complex, but upon
reflection and study (see below), the heuristic used makes intuitive sense and should
fairly reflect both costs or savings. The strategy adopted by the formula's designers
is to determine separately the costs to the federal government of serving the families
in the research sites under the control and experimental policies, then to project these
costs statewide. The difference is then excess federal costs or savings. Both the direct
cost of benefits and the cost of program administration are included in the calculation.
If this calculation shows that excess federal costs have been incurred, the state must
reimburse the federal government.
The number of families involved in the research design is generally small. In
Michigan, about 12,000 active cases (6,000 control and 6,000 experimental) are
included in the four research sites selected, about five percent of the state's total
AFDC caseload.
In some states (Wisconsin and New Jersey are examples), all families covered
by the waiver are in the research design. In these cases, the state's potential liability
for excess costs is limited. However, Michigan, California and a few other states have
implemented their waiver policies statewide, greatly increasing their risk. For these

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

states, cost neutrality calculations have significant financial implications. In all states
with waivers, the cost neutrality calculations have political significance because one
important factor considered by the voters in evaluating welfare reform proposals is cost
reduction.
Despite the importance of the formula, its statistical characteristics, in
particular its sampling uncertainty, have not been determined.

Without such

determination, the formula chosen cannot be compared with possible alternatives, and
the adequacy of the sample used in the research design cannot be evaluated. More
importantly, the usefulness of the resulting value in policy discussions is not known.

Estimating Administrative Costs

Benefit costs are easily computed for the control and experimental groups in
the research sites.

In Michigan a marker was added to each case record in the

statewide database indicating which policies (control or experimental) applied to that
case. Totals were then obtained as needed. Administrative costs are more difficult to
estimate. In Michigan, costs for supervisors, clerks, managers, accountants, and other
similar support staff are assigned to programs in the same proportion as the costs for
assistance payments workers (the workers who serve welfare recipients directly,
determining eligibility and grant levels).
When an assistance payments worker is responsible for administering only a
single program, this cost assignment is straightforward. In most cases, however, the
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worker may be assigned to any of several programs at any time, perhaps including
both federal programs and state programs. Some workers may be assigned to both
families receiving control policies and families receiving experimental policies. If each
worker kept a detailed log recording all work done by program and time spent, cost
assignment would again be straightforward. This approach, however, is cumbersome,
error prone and expensive compared to available alternatives.
The simplest alternative is to require a sample of workers on a sample of days
to keep logs. However, experienced time study administrators believe that, done
infrequently, logs tend to be forgotten until the end of the day or of the week, then
completed from memory. Reliability may be very low.
Flat rates, familiar to auto repair shop customers, are another approach. With
this method, standard time values (determined through a one-time study) are assigned
to all tasks and the numbers of each task completed are reported. Sampling may be
involved; hence, only samples of workers or days may be accounted for. Welfare
administration involves many complex tasks, however, and determining the flat rates
and maintaining their accuracy as policies change would be a formidable task.
Random moment time studies offer another alternative. With this approach,
an observer approaches a worker at a randomly-selected time and asks detailed
questions about the type of work being done at that moment. Observations are totaled
by cost allocation category and costs assigned proportionally. This approach also has
shortcomings; it requires staff dedicated only to this purpose (the observers).
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Furthermore, many observations record only overhead costs like breaks or general
training, workers may not be at the expected location at the time of observation, and
workers may change their behavior as they see the observer approach.
Random moment sampling has strengths as well. When the task performed is
recorded as well as the program supported, analysis can yield flat rates for major tasks
counted through other systems. Further, even though a worker may sometimes alter
behavior briefly when the observer approaches, the bias introduced seems less than the
bias resulting from attempting to remember complex activities performed hours or days
ago. Additionally, it can be easily and quickly modified to reflect policy changes.
Finally, reasonable assumptions about the nature of the changes made may be
found agreeable to both the federal and state analysts, permitting estimates of
administrative cost changes to be made from existing data--usually staffing, salary and
caseload reports.
Through experience, Michigan has come to rely on random moment time
studies for cost and staffing allocation purposes. Such a study was used to determine
administrative costs for the first three years of TSMF,9 including the time period
covered by the statistical analysis included in this study.

The effect of random

fluctuation in time study results must be taken into account when determining the

9A second, statewide time study of assistance payments workers also plays a
minor role in determining the administrative cost for the families receiving control
policies in the pre-existing study of welfare job training.
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statistical characteristics of the cost neutrality estimate. The adequacy of the random
moment sampling plan adopted in Michigan is a secondary topic for this study.

Costs and Savings From Child Support Policy Changes

Court-ordered child support in excess of $50 per month is considered as income
to custodial parents on AFDC when it is paid, and, as such, reduces AFDC benefit
costs. Consequently, both the state and federal governments have a strong interest in
expanding child support collections. In 1992, Michigan proposed several enhancements
to its child support collection efforts, including: (1) requiring non-custodial parents
to inform new employers of their obligations so that wage withholding can begin
immediately; (2) requiring Michigan hospitals to record paternity acknowledgments at
birth; (3) requiring non-custodial parents not meeting their obligations to participate
in a job training program or a community service project; (4) imposing sanctions on
custodial parents receiving assistance, including AFDC, if they fail to cooperate with
child support efforts; and (5) reporting child support obligations to credit bureaus.
Only the fourth item required a federal waiver, but the Department of Health
and Human Services agreed to attribute all child support increases achieved after the
start of TSMF (in excess of those already anticipated) to that waiver, and thus to be
considered in the cost neutrality calculation (Barnhart, 1992, pp. 10-11).
Measuring these increases proved difficult, however. Because child support involves
court orders and parents living in different parts of the state, random assignment was
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considered impractical. Agreement was reached to project child support collections
and off-setting administrative costs five years (the original period authorized for the
demonstration) into the future, based on results from the past five years. Although
statistically risky, this arrangement appeared otherwise to be a boon to the state.
The changes sought required legislative action, however, which did not occur.
When it became apparent that legislative agreement would not be forthcoming, the
department Director, Gerald H. Miller, asked to have child support withdrawn from
the cost neutrality calculation (1994). Permission to do so was granted by telephone
and confirmed by return letter (Lovell, 1995a).
This may have been fortuitous for Michigan. The underlying model used to
project child support collections and administrative costs absent reforms was not
sophisticated. In essence, the average rate of increase for the five years preceding the
beginning of TSMF was determined and used to project future collections. A much
more sophisticated model was developed for evaluation and cost neutrality purposes
in the 1987 New Jersey REACH demonstration (Garasky & Barnow, 1992, pp. 63031). Before the demonstration was completed, the Family Support Act of 1988 was
implemented, and the federal government concluded that the model no longer projected
costs (absent REACH) accurately, and reopened cost neutrality negotiations. To a
large extent, the model was abandoned in favor of a negotiated cost neutrality
agreement.
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Problem Significance

The results of the cost neutrality calculation have financial, political and policy
importance. The requirement that the federal treasury incur no additional costs from
state waivers means that states must reimburse the treasury for all excess costs. In
Michigan's case, at least, there is no appropriation in the Department of Social
Services' (MDSS's) budget for this potential expense; any costs incurred will be
heavily scrutinized by both executive and legislative agencies. Further, these costs
could become a substantial budgetary problem when reforms are implemented
statewide, rather than limited to a few demonstration sites, as Michigan has done. In
Michigan, AFDC, Food Stamps and Medicaid (the programs covered by demonstration
waivers) cost about $4 billion per year, so the risk to the state is significant.
The voting public expects welfare reforms to save money. Governor Engler
has attached much importance to the small savings (about $100 million out of $8
billion spent) achieved in the first year of Michigan's reforms.
Finally, the purpose of demonstration waivers granted to states, from the
federal viewpoint, is to test possible national policies. While the outcome side of the
cost-benefit analysis will be completed by an independent evaluator, costs must be
provided by the state. The cost neutrality calculation provides the most convenient
source, and possibly the only source, of comparative costs for old and new policies.
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CHAPTER II

WELFARE REFORM, 1988-1996

AFDC Reform From 1935 Through 1987

The Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program has been the object of reform
efforts since its inception in 1935. (ADC became Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, or AFDC, in 1950 when mothers were added to the grant. Both names are
in common use today.) This is not surprising because AFDC was itself a radical
reform of the welfare system in place prior to passage of the Social Security Act in
1935. It replaced a polyglot mixture of state and local programs, overwhelmed by the
Great Depression (Dilger, 1989, pp. 51-57), with a somewhat uniform program. Its
final form was the result of a compromise in Congress between liberals, who wanted
an all-federal program, and conservatives who opposed one. State-to-state uniformity
was to be reinforced through the lure of federal matching money. Although payment
levels were set by the states, eligibility rules were set at the federal level, so it was
inevitable that they would be viewed as too restrictive by some and too lenient by
others. Overall, the result was a substantial transfer of power over welfare programs
from the states to the federal government.

22
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Welfare provisions of the Social Security Act, including AFDC, echoed four
features in common with the English Poor Laws. These features had also generally
governed American public welfare prior to the Great Depression (Dilger, pp. 51-57;
and Handler, 1995, p. 3): (a) a largely decentralized administrative structure was
established; (b) local residency was a requirement; (c) children and the able-bodied
adults were expected to work while the mentally and physically incapacitated were not;
and (d) an attempt was made to distinguish the “deserving poor,” who received cash
grants, from the “undeserving poor,” who did not.
Handler (1995, p. 14) notes that the Royal Poor Law Commission Report of
1834 added two principles which resonate in the U. S. today: (1) “poverty is caused
by urbanization, immigration, and intemperance while ‘pauperism’ is caused by
welfare;" and (2) those on welfare should be worse off than the lowest paid worker
(the so-called “doctrine of less eligibility”). The first principle is reflected in the
theory that welfare creates dependency, while the second effectively caps payment
levels.

Radical Decentralization Proposals

Variations on these features have formed the basis for regular welfare reform
efforts in the intervening 60 years. Handler (p. 2) argues that four factors, whether
real or merely perceived by the public, trigger welfare “crises,” leading to demands
for reform. The first factor is increased public costs, while the remaining three are
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moral issues—threats to the work ethic, threats to family values (extramarital sex,
illegitimacy and absent fathers), and threats to the social order.
Since the liberal-conservative compromise in 1935, five significant attempts
have been made to settle questions of decentralization by placing all responsibility and
authority for family welfare programs at either the state level or at the federal level:
1. The Family Assistance Program was introduced by President Richard M.
Nixon in 1969. This plan would have replaced AFDC with a national minimum
income based on family size. It was defeated twice, in 1970 and 1971. Opposition
came ftom liberals who found the proposed payment levels too low and conservatives
who found them too high (Aaron, 1973, pp. 22-24). The result would have been a
complete transfer of power over programs for poor families with children to the
federal government.
2.

Democratic presidential candidate in 1972 and U. S. Senator George

McGovern proposed, as part of his campaign, that each citizen receive a “Demogrant”
of $1,000, with costs covered by a 33-1/3 percent income tax surcharge.

This

proposal ended with the re-election of President Nixon (Aaron, p. 27). Again, the
result would have been a complete transfer of power over programs for poor families
with children to the federal government.
3. President Jimmy Carter proposed the Better Jobs and Income Program in
1977. This plan would have federalized AFDC and resulted in 1.4 million federally
created jobs and job-training slots. It combined a national minimum income based on
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family size with a requirement that able-bodied clients either work or be enrolled in
job training. It was opposed by conservatives who objected to the cost and feared the
publicly-created jobs would compete with private industry, and by liberals who felt the
grants were too low and objected to the “workfare” provision. This opposition could
not be overcome, and the plan was defeated in 1978 (Trattner, 1994, pp. 356-58).
4. In his 1982 State of the Union message, President Ronald Reagan proposed
the “New Federalism.” Under this proposal, the federal government would accept full
responsibility for the Medicaid program while AFDC and Food Stamps would be the
responsibility of the states. It found little support, and died in Congress (Trattner, pp.
365-66).

This proposal would have redistributed power over programs for poor

families with children, leaving health care entirely with the federal government while
income maintenance would be wholly a state responsibility.
5.

In 1995-96, first the Republican Governors’ Association, the House

Republican caucus, and then the National Governors’ Association proposed that block
grants be given to the states to operate the AFDC and Medicaid programs under
policies developed in each state. The success of state waiver demonstrations and the
onerous burden of the waiver process were cited as reasons for adopting this proposal.
Its fate is unclear as of this writing. The power shift from this proposal is likely to
change with time.

Much of the discussion in Congress has concerned what

restrictions, if any, should be placed by Congress on the states’ implementation of
these block grants. Clearly, Congress is tempted to apply restrictions and, if enacted,
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there will always be a temptation for future Congresses to add or modify restrictions.
States could eventually find themselves with less control over programs for poor
families with children than they have at present.
Handler argues, however, that programs for the “deserving poor,” such as
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) which serves the indigent aged, blind and disabled
are considered rational, and can be successfully administered at the federal level.
Programs for those perceived to be the “undeserving poor” (the “deviant poor” in
Handler’s terminology), such as AFDC, are “morally ambiguous” (p. 90) and are
assigned to the local level because “moral conflicts are felt most keenly in local
communities and these communities want to keep control over deviant behavior” (p.
7). Therefore, legislators devolve decision making for these programs downward to
avoid conflict, a view consistent with Peterson’s legislative theory of federalism (see
Chapter V). From this viewpoint, attempts to centralize AFDC at the federal level are
doomed to political failure, and Congress will generally avoid setting restrictions once
a block grant is in place. Still, since the states’ competitive incentives to keep taxes
low make funding at the state level problematic, the compromise reached in 1935 as
modified by the waiver process may be the only point of equilibrium, albeit a very
uneasy one.
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Incremental Reform

As shown above, radical reforms of AFDC’s administrative structure have been
unsuccessful. By contrast, the other features of AFDC (residency requirements, work
expectations, and determining who belongs among the “deserving poor”) have under
gone regular change, though largely incremental in character.
The exception to incrementalism is residency. Despite a history extending from
the Plymouth Colony in 1642, the U. S. Supreme Court in 1969 declared residency
requirements for AFDC unconstitutional in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618
(Trattner, p. 21 and Stevens, 1970, p. 875). This decision reduced state power over
programs for poor families with children without clearly adding to federal power. It
ended all state residency requirements and began a series of reform attempts by states
with grant levels higher than those in neighboring states to avoid becoming “welfare
magnets,” i.e., attracting welfare recipients from other states. The existence of the
magnet effect was established analytically by Peterson and Rom (1990, pp. 79-80),
who proposed a national minimum benefit as a solution (p. 120). .
The definition of the “deserving poor” received two important incremental
changes. First, support for single parents of eligible children was added in 1950.
Second, support for two parent families was made a state option in 1961. (In 1988,
states were required to offer this coverage for at least six months each year; see the
discussion of the Family Support Act below). The final effect of these changes was
to increase federal control of AFDC.
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Work expectations also underwent incremental changes. In 1967 Congress
created the Work Incentive Program, or W. I. P. As Trattner (p. 331) observed,
i

Whereas mothers’ pensions and the Social Security Act had stressed the
needy child’s right to public support and to a mother’s care, this
measure affirmed the right to remove that child from the welfare rolls
and to force his or her mother to work outside the home for such
support.
W.I.P. was the stick, but a carrot was also added. Until 1967, AFDC benefits
were reduced dollar-for-dollar when a recipient went to work, after reasonable
expenses of employment were deducted. As a result, an AFDC recipient had no
financial incentive to seek work. Under the 1967 reforms, a working AFDC recipient
would be allowed to keep the reasonable costs of employment as before and, in
addition, the next $30 earned each month. Further, his or her AFDC grant would be
reduced by only two-thirds of the value of any remaining pre-tax earnings (Burtless,
1989, pp. 128-9 and Mead, 1986, p. 105). This provision is commonly called the
“thirty and a third disregard.” Overall, these changes increased federal control of
AFDC. States still had some discretion, however, and a combination of exemptions
for parents of young children and slow development of job training programs softened
the impact of this change.
W .I.P. was renamed WIN and became known as WIN I when the Talmadge
Amendments to the Social Security Act were enacted in 1971. This legislation created
WIN II by repealing the states’ authority to determine who would be referred to job
training programs. All adult AFDC recipients were required to register for WIN II,
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except single parents of children under six. States not placing at least 15 percent of
registrants in jobs or job training were subject to loss of some federal matching money.
Once again, the federal government’s control of the AFDC program increased.
In 1981, the “thirty-and-a-third disregard” was reduced to apply only to the
first four months of employment. In the eighth through the twelfth months all income
earned above reasonable work expenses plus $30 was budgeted against the AFDC
grant. After the twelfth month, only work expenses (up to a maximum of $75) and
day care expenses were disregarded. Using a complex federal provision allowing
separate “need standards” and “payment standards,” a state could optionally allow
working recipients to keep up to 20 percent of earnings, but this procedure also applied
to such unearned income as disability payments. Including unearned income added to
the expense of the policy (later named “fill the gap budgeting”) without encouraging
additional work, making this provision less attractive to states.
States were granted authority to make minor changes in their WIN programs,
which were then called “WIN Demonstrations” or “WIN Demos.” Michigan chose
this option (Michigan Department of Social Services, 1989), and broadened the
categories for mandatory participation in WIN. However, compared with required
changes in income disregards, required coverage of two parent families and similar
new federal requirements, “WIN Demos” were based on minor increases in state
flexibility. Once again, the overall effect of change was to increase federal control of
AFDC.
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In 1987, President Ronald Reagan encouraged a different form of incremental
change through the creation of the Interagency Low Income Opportunity Advisory
(ILIOAB), as described in Chapter I. Rather than attempting to improve AFDC
through incremental policy changes to be applied nationally, individual states were
encouraged to make policy changes which would apply only at the local or county
level. These changes would not necessarily be limited or incremental in scope. As a
result, proposals from thirteen states were approved in the next eighteen months. As
noted in Chapter I, provisions from some of these proposals presaged provisions of the
Family Support Act enacted on October 13, 1988 (see below). However, most were
implemented after the Act was adopted.
President Reagan’s ILIOAB initiative reversed the 37 year trend of incremental
changes which increased federal power over programs for poor families with children.
States were empowered to suggest and implement their own reforms.
The greater rationality imposed on the waiver process by the ILIOAB may
explain the sudden burst of enthusiasm by the states for welfare experimentation, but
the increasing professionalism of state governments may also have been a contributing
factor. Writing in 1967, North Carolina Governor Terry Sanford said that the “states
are indecisive, antiquated, timid, ineffective, non-responsive, uninterested in their
cities, and unwilling to face their problems” (p. 1). While this description is extreme
and unlikely to have applied uniformly to all states, it does suggest that the
environment was not ripe for state-initiated welfare experiments. It may also provide
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a partial explanation for the steady erosion of state control over AFDC.
Public administrator Carl W. Stenberg, writing in 1996 (pp. 39-42), notes some
of the major reforms undertaken since by the states: new constitutions, longer terms
for governors, reelection for governors, additional legislatures which meet every year,
less fragmentation for legislative committees, and professional staff for legislatures.
By 1992, David Osborne and Ted Gaebler noted, “many state and local governments
are not only more effective than the federal government, but more progressive as well”
(p. 277). Thus, the environment had changed radically between 1967 and 1992, and
state welfare innovation became at least possible.

The Family Support Act of 1988

By 1988, Congress and President Reagan were ready for an approach to
welfare reform with a scope somewhere between the incremental changes and the
grand redesigns proposed by Nixon, Carter and Reagan himself. Further, as Handler
notes, the liberal orthodoxy had shifted from the belief that it is unfair to require
welfare mothers to work to the belief that they should be expected to work (pp. 28-29).
One result of these major shifts in viewpoint was the Family Support Act.

As

Reischauer describes it:
The passage of the Family Support Act was accompanied by an
outpouring of enthusiastic rhetoric and hyperbole to the effect that it
represented landmark legislation, a policy revolution, and a radically
new approach to the welfare problem. A more dispassionate judgement
would conclude that the changes made by this legislation were quite
modest. While they represented important shifts of policy emphasis and
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direction, they will not, by themselves, provide long-run solutions to
the nation’s problems of poverty and dependency. Future administra
tions and Congresses will thus be compelled to revisit the same policy
battleground (1989, p. 11).
Major changes to AFDC included (Staff of the National Governor’s
Association, October 5, 1988, unpaginated) the following:
1.

The Job Opportunities and Basic Responsibilities (JOBS) program and

eligibility requirements were established, replacing WIN II. While exceptions were
made for pregnancy and single parents with children under three years old, most
healthy individuals working less than 30 hours per week were required to participate.
States were required to provide certain services to AFDC recipients under JOBS,
including an initial assessment, an employability plan, high school completion or
General Equivalency Diploma (GED) classes, job skills training, job readiness
activities, and job development and placement. In addition, two of the following were
required: job search, on-the-job training, work supplementation, or Community Work
Experience Program (CWEP) or a comparable state-designed work program.
2. The federal matching rate was set at 90 percent for JOBS expenditures up
to a state’s 1987 WIN allocation. Expenditures above this level were matched at the
AFDC matching rate (which varies by state and by year) or 60 percent, whichever is
greater.
3. This matching rate was to be reduced to 50 percent if participation rates (of
eligible AFDC families) did not meet a targeted level. For single-parent families, the
level started at 7 percent for 1991, then rose gradually to 20 percent for 1995. The
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targets for two-parent families started at 40 percent for 1994 and rose to 75 percent for
1997.
4.

The matching rate would be also be reduced unless 55 percent of

expenditures were made to support job training for parents under 24 years old and not
enrolled in high school or possessing a high school diploma or GED; to support
training of parents whose children are within two years of ineligibility; or to support
training of parents who have received AFDC for more than 36 of the preceding 60
months.
5. All states were required to offer AFDC to two-parent families. States not
currently offering this option could choose to offer it for a limit of six months out of
twelve. States already using this option (previously permitted only on a full-year
basis) could not change to part-year coverage.
6. The maximum value of the standard earned income disregard for workrelated expenses was increased to $90.
7. States could require minor parents to live with their own parents in order
to receive benefits.
Although changes were also made to child support provisions, day care funding
and Medicaid, the overwhelming emphasis of the Family Support Act was on
employment training for adults receiving AFDC. Significantly, there were no targets
for employment, and no time limits for receipt of benefits for most families. The
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problem of illegitimacy was addressed only through the relatively weak provision
permitting states to require minor parents to live at home.
The Family Support Act did provide measurable targets for participation in
training programs, once again increasing federal control over AFDC.

Michigan

initially adapted its WIN demonstration program to meet the demands of JOBS. In
1991 it was augmented by Education Designed for Gainful Employment (EDGE), a
program designed to integrate basic education with job training through involving local
school districts. EDGE was succeeded by Work First, a program emphasizing the
search for a job over training through involving the Private Industry Councils and the
Service Delivery Areas formed under the Job Training and Partnership Act (JTPA).
These efforts produced Fiscal Year 1995 monthly average job training participation
rates of 21.8 percent for one-parent families and 50.08 percent for two-parent families,
sufficient to meet the JOBS targets of 20 percent and 50 percent.
The increasing targets meant that the Family Support Act would not be fully
implemented until 1995, seven years after passage. Welfare reformers would not wait
this long to address “welfare magnets,” employment, illegitimacy, and time limits.

Welfare Reform Waivers, 1989 - 1996

States resumed their pursuit of welfare reform through waivers shortly after
passage of the Family Support Act. Seven of the thirteen demonstration projects
approved by the Reagan administration were approved after the Family Support Act
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became law. The reasons for this continued state initiative immediately after a national
reform had been enacted are varied and complex. Taking a systems theory approach,
Donald F. Norris and Lyke Thompson (1995) identified five exogenous factors
pushing welfare reform to agenda status in the states (pp. 217-20):
1. “Who uses welfare, why, and for how long” (p. 217) gave the problem
political saliency. Conventional wisdom painted a very negative picture of the typical
welfare recipient, including multi-generational use, long term dependency, large
families, many children born while on welfare, many teenage mothers, and many
illegitimate births.
2. The prevailing public opinion was that the welfare system was broken and
must be fixed.
3. The welfare debate became more ideological. Conservatives emphasizing
personal responsibility struggled with liberals pointing to economic victimization.
There was little middle ground to occupy.
4.

A slowing economy with rising federal spending and widening federal

deficits introduced a climate of budgetary restraint.
5. Apparent successes in some states led to emulation or competitive policy
development in other states.
In addition, Norris and Thompson identify seven internal factors whose
importance varied from state to state: (1) state budget deficits; (2) rising welfare
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caseloads; (3) ideology; (4) partisan politics; (5) illegal aliens; (6) citizen initiatives;
and (7) policy entrepreneurs (p. 221).
Most demonstrations approved by the Reagan administration included variations
on job training programs.

None of these demonstrations addressed the “welfare

magnet” problem, the problem of illegitimacy, or time limits for receipt of AFDC. To
encourage employment, Ohio demonstrated a mandatory work program, while
Maryland, New York, Washington, and Wisconsin tried variations on income
disregard policies, allowing working families to increase their total income. Thus, the
demonstrations approved during the Reagan administration can be viewed as extending
the Family Support Act.
In his 1992 State of the Union address, President George Bush said about
waivers, “We are going to help this movement” (DHHS, 1993a, p .l). His support led
to a total of 22 waiver projects in 16 states granted or pending between January 1,
1992 and January 19, 1993 (Wiseman, 1993, pp.23-25). One was Michigan’s To
Strengthen Michigan Families demonstration, implemented October 1,1992. By 1992,
asserts Mark Greenberg of the Center for Law and Social Policy (1994, p. 7),
It was generally known by those following the waiver process that
anything a state submitted would be rapidly approved so long as
agreement could be reached on evaluation design. It was generally
recognized that objections relating to wisdom, harm, constitutionality,
or any other factor played no role amidst the election year rush to
approve waivers.
None of these demonstrations included a time limit on receipt of welfare. To
discourage illegitimacy, four states (Arkansas, California, New Jersey, and Wisconsin)
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included a “family cap” demonstration eliminating additional payments when babies
are born to families on AFDC, and limits were placed or proposed on benefits for
minor parents in California and Vermont. Demonstrations in Illinois, Wisconsin and
Wyoming were designed to reduce the “welfare magnet” effect.

Five states

(California, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Virginia) proposed or implemented
“Iearnfare” demonstrations (requiring school attendance for children in families
receiving AFDC), joining Wisconsin’s demonstration begun earlier. Most included
variations on job training, income disregards or other measures to encourage
employment.
Despite introducing his own comprehensive welfare reform package (see
below), President Clinton also continued President Bush’s support for the waiver
process, considering them important in identifying ways to reform welfare and
determining their effectiveness (Clinton, 1993). President Clinton introduced his
Work and Responsibility Act in June, 1994. In a Report to the Nation’s Governors
(1994b, unpaginated) sent one month later, DHHS Secretary Donna E. Shalala
reiterated her Department’s “continuing commitment to state flexibility.”

As

evidence, she pointed to the approval of 16 demonstration projects since the beginning
of the Clinton administration, the expected approval of several more, and the
institution of a “streamlined review process to evaluate and act on waiver requests in
a timely and efficient manner, even with a dramatic increase in the number and
complexity of waiver submissions in the last year.”

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

This was followed on August 30 by a “Fact Sheet” on state welfare
demonstrations sent to Michigan DSS director Gerald H. Miller by DHHS Region V
Administrator Marion N. Steffy, (and presumably to all other state welfare directors
by their regional administrators). Demonstrations were described for 15 states. No
explanation for the discrepancy with Secretary Shalala’s count of 16 was offered, but
multiple demonstrations in some states may account for it.
The application and approval dates in the “Fact Sheet” do not clearly support
Secretary Shalala’s assertion that the review process had been streamlined.

The

average processing time for the first eight states was 5.6 months, with a range of 4 to
10 months. The last seven states averaged 5.3 months, with a range of 1 to 8 months.
No demonstration in this group was focussed on the “welfare magnet” problem.
Six states adjusted their job training program rules. Five adjusted their earned income
disregards to encourage work, while four others acted to require work or community
service. The problem of illegitimacy was addressed by five states, with three each
implementing family caps and limitations on teen parents (Arkansas implemented
both). Three states implemented time limits on receipt of AFDC.
On July 13, 1994 the federal judiciary entered the welfare waiver arena
(Greenberg, 1994, pp. 1-2). In 1992 California had been granted a waiver allowing
a reduction in benefits below the minimum levels in effect in May 1988. A waiver
was needed to avoid a financial penalty which would also affect the Medicaid program.
California asserted that this demonstration was intended to test the work incentive
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effects of grant reductions. A suit to block these grant reductions was filed in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Beno v. Shalala
(July 1, 1993, Civ. S-92-2135). The District Court refused immediate relief and
appeal was made to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (July 13, 1994, No. 93-16411).
The Circuit Court held (Greenberg, 1994, pp. 2-5) that:
1. Courts may review decisions made by the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services to grant waivers.
2.

The Secretary has the right to modify or reject waiver applications

submitted by states.
3. The Secretary must examine three issues in considering approval: (a) the
demonstration must have research value; (b) it must be likely to promote the objectives
of the Social Security Act; and (c) the number of families included in the
demonstration and the length o f the demonstration must be appropriate.
4. The Secretary must consider objections raised by other parties in granting
a waiver.
The Court then returned the case to the Secretary. The court did not reverse
the waiver decision itself, and did not rule on substantive objections to the grant
reduction. However, the case served as a warning to the Secretary that the review
process must be thorough, and established the precedent that the court would review
such decisions in the future.
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Interest in waivers continued throughout the congressional debates on national
welfare reform proposals made by the Clinton administration, House Republicans and
the National Governors’ Association (NGA). On July 31, 1995, at an NGA meeting
President Clinton announced a faster waiver review process. In August, Secretary
Shalala released a “Welfare Reform Demonstration: Special Application Form” for
states interested in waivers covering the areas of work requirements, time limits, teen
parents, child support/required work for non-custodial parents, or subsidized
employment. A checklist of possible policy demonstrations was provided for each.
States able to describe their waiver requests through these checklists could expect rapid
consideration from DHHS. According to the newsletter Welfare to Work (1995a, p.
1), the first application under this procedure came on August 2 from Florida,
requesting extension and modification of its existing teen school performance policy.
The waiver was granted on September 6. Subsequent waivers were reported by
Welfare to Work (1995a, p. 1, and 1995b, p .l) for Ohio (adjusting previous waiver
policies), Washington (time limits on AFDC receipt), Illinois (time limits on AFDC
receipt), and North Dakota (combine programs).
Welfare To Work (1996a) reported that the Clinton administration had granted
waivers to 37 states by February 5, 1996, despite complaints from several Republican
governors that the waiver process “is cumbersome and does not allow them sufficient
freedom to institute real change” (Vobejda, p. A10). New proposals were reported
by Welfare To Work (1996b) from Maryland (devolving welfare administration to
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county governments) and Indiana (changes to paternity establishment and required job
search and community work).
In October 1995, President Clinton reiterated his support for the waiver process
in a letter to the members of congress reported by Jennifer Dixon of the Associated
Press. Calling first for national welfare reform with tough work requirements, but
which does not harm children, he said failure to send such a bill to him for signature
would force him “to continue to end welfare through the waiver process, one state at
a time, until Congress gets it right” (Dixon, p. 3A).
Despite the limits set by Beno. this period represents a clear shift of control
over AFDC from the federal government to the states.

Much of the uniformity

achieved over the previous decades was eroded.

Criticism of Waiver Demonstrations

In his 1993 review article (p. 34), poverty researcher Michael Wiseman
evaluated this period through President Bill Clinton’s inauguration.
1. “Welfare reform continues to be an important political issue,” he contended
and accurately anticipated further waiver requests from the states.
2. “States cannot be expected to coordinate efforts at experimentation... ” he
added. “Without leadership, effort and time will be dissipated in demonstrations too
disparate for synthesis and too idiosyncratic for credibility... ‘Rigorous evaluation’
isn’t enough” to assure relevance and replicability.
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3.

“Welfare is complex,” he maintained.

“Perhaps the most significant

accomplishment of Reagan-Bush waiver policy has been the interagency coordination
achieved.” This precedent for coordination should not be lost, and coordination,
indeed, should be expanded.
This analysis was supported by Wiseman’s review of the 22 waiver projects in
16 states granted or pending January 1, 1992 through January 19, 1993 (pp. 23-25).
Extending his work by focusing on variations on a single reform theme, consider the
changes made to the standard AFDC earned income disregard policy. Eight of the 16
states proposed or implemented such a change. These changes are described in Table

2.
At first look, the states’ approaches to income disregards, taken as a group,
look promising. A variety of bases and percentages were proposed or implemented,
leading to an income increase for a family earning $340 in a month of $170 to $340.
Evaluation results will eventually be available for each demonstration project, and one
could hope to learn a great deal about the impact of disregards on client employment
try combining them. An analyst might, for example, combine the cost-neutrality
results from these demonstrations to look for a point at which AFDC benefit cost
decreases due to higher employment rates and the costs of higher disregards given to
families who would have worked even at lower disregard levels increases. This would
suggest an optimal disregard policy which could be adopted by Congress, or at least
become a popular waiver option.
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Table 2
Income Disregard Waivers Approved or Pending
January 1, 1992 - January 19, 1993

Work
Expenses

Base

Percentage

National/Months 1-4

$90

$30

33.33%

$193

National/Months 5-12

$90

$30

0.00%

$120

National/Months 13+

$90

$0

0.00%

$90

South Carolina

$0

$0

50.00%

$170

Private, for-profit
businesses may participate
in work experience.

California

$90

$30

33.33%

$193

Overall benefit reduction.

Vermont

$0

$150

25.00%

$198

Requirement to accept
subsidized employment
unless working.

Utah

$0

$100

45.00%

$208

Intake diversion program,
change in asset rules, cash
out Food Stamps.

Illinois

$0

$0

66.67%

$227

None.

Michigan

$0

$200

20.00%

$228

Requirement to sign a
social contract.

Wisconsin

$0

$200

50.00%

$270

Applies only to new
applicants under 20 years
old, changes to child
allowances.

New Jersey

$0

$0

100.00%

$340

Applies only to families
who have additional
children while on AFDC,
and are denied additional
AFDC benefits.

Location

Earnings*

Other Initiatives

♦Additional income before taxes and work expenses when a family earns $340 in a month by, for
example, working 80 hours (V4 time) at the federal minimum wage of $4.25/hour. Assumes no “fillthe-gap” policy is applied. Except for national policies, no time limits apply.
Sources: Wiseman, 1993, pp. 23-25, and Strawn, Dacey & McCart, 1994, pp. A-2 and A-7.
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Enthusiasm is tempered by the final column of Table 2, however.

Each

disregard option is accompanied by a different set of additional policy changes which
will confound any analysis. For example, the cost neutrality results for Michigan’s
demonstration disregard policies cannot be separated from the results of the social
contract implemented simultaneously and applied to the same set of study families.
(That is, the effect of the new disregard policy is fiillv confounded with the effect of
the social contract.)
This problem holds generally, because each state seeking waivers has
independently chosen a different set of demonstration policies. Neither DHHS nor any
other national body (for example, the National Governor’s Association or the
American Public Welfare Association) has attempted to coordinate these
demonstrations to allow valid, national inferences to be drawn, or to address national
objectives (Wiseman, 1995, p. 11; and Baillargeon & Cook, 1995, pp. 22-3).
Other complaints about the waiver process also emerged. Child advocates
warned that the federal role in providing an economic safety net for families was
eroding (Greenberg, 1995, p. 14), and the effects of the Family Support Act were being
obscured (p. 15). Waivers are limited only to the eligibility and payment provisions
of AFDC (Bane, 1995, p. 8). For example, Michigan has been unable to obtain
authority to become a payor for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) for AFDC
families, because this program is not covered by Section 1115 of the Social Act, the
source of waiver authority. As discussed in Chapter VI, the cost neutrality provision
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is the subject of considerable criticism, as is the cost of a comprehensive evaluation
(Baillargeon & Cook, p. 24). For his part, A. Sidney Johnson, executive director of
the American Public Welfare Association (1995, pp. 19-20), criticized the slowness
of the process and the requirement to rigorously evaluate provisions previously tested
in other states.

The Work and Responsibility Act of 1994

During his presidential campaign, Bill Clinton frequently promised to “end
welfare as we know it” (Whitman & Cooper, 1993, p. 30).

When he became

President, he focussed first on health care reform, arguing with many others that loss
of Medicaid was a serious barrier to those trying to leave AFDC through employment.
Political pressure, perhaps most significantly from Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
forced him to announce his welfare reform proposal before congress would agree to
act on health care. As chair of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Moynihan
would have considerable influence in the health care debate. As principal architect of
the Family Support Act, he was the Senate’s acknowledged expert on welfare. The
Senator’s threat to hold health care reform hostage to welfare reform eventually forced
the President’s hand (Jehl, 1994, p. A10).
The President chose a low-key venue to introduce his plan, selecting a June 14,
1994 speech to 250 people in a Kansas City, Missouri bank lobby (Jehl, p. A l). The
principal features affecting AFDC were (MDSS, 1994c, pp. 1-3):
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1. States would have the option to eliminate the special eligibility rules applied
to two-parent families that required limiting eligibility to families who have a recent
work history, but who are not working more than 100 hours per month. Michigan and
other states had obtained waivers allowing them to test this policy.
2. Minor parents would be required to live with a parent, legal guardian or in
another adult-supervised home.
3.

The minimum earned income disregard would be $120, indexed for

inflation; states could adopt more generous policies.
4. An automobile worth up to $3,500, indexed for inflation, would be exempt
from any assets test.
5. Up to $10,000 deposited in an Individual Development Account (IDA)
would be exempt from any assets test. An IDA must be used for education, first-home
purchase or business capitalization.
6. At their option, states could refuse additional benefits for children conceived
while the parent is on AFDC (that is, a child cap would be optional).
7. Parents born after 1971 would have a lifetime limit of 24 months’ AFDC
benefits. At their option, states could extend this provision to more families. Parents
exceeding this limit would be placed in a subsidized employment program.
The principal changes proposed for AFDC were available to the states as
waivers, and most were being tried in one or more states. As with the Family Support
Act, however, no results were yet available from these demonstrations. Once again,
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welfare innovations were adjudged politically successful before evaluation or cost
neutrality results were obtained.
Only the child cap and 24 month time limit could be considered radical
changes, and they were surrounded with exceptions and phase-ins to limit their impacts
on families and costs. The limited policy significance of the proposal lay in the firstever acceptance of a child cap and a time limit by a Democratic president. No action
beyond congressional hearings occurred, and with the Republican capture of both
houses of congress the following November, the plan died. As Douglas Jehl noted in
the New York Times (p. Al):
While a pledge to overhaul the welfare system was a central feature of
Mr. Clinton’s 1992 campaign for President, aides say he has no
intention of pushing hard for the passage of legislation this year. The
White House and most Congressional Democrats are determined to
focus their energy first on a health care overhaul.
Today’s announcement was instead in no small part an effort to insulate
a President facing sharp criticism from the right as he and his party
look apprehensively toward the mid-term elections in November.

The Contract With America

As they began the 1994 congressional campaign, House Republicans seized on
an unusual tactic. 367 of their candidates signed the “Contract with America,” a
broad-ranging package of promises to bring particular proposals to a vote in the House
of Representatives if their party should gain control (Gillespie & Schellhas, 1994, pp.
6-7). Republicans gained control of the House (and of the Senate, but the “contract”
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was not part of the Senate Republican’s strategy). The contract promised to make
fundamental changes in the way the House does business and

“to help repair a

fundamental disconnection between citizens and their elected officials” (p. 5).
Major provisions included (pp. 8-9): (a) requiring a 3/5ths majority vote to
pass any tax increase in the House; (b) voting on a constitutional amendment to require
a balanced budget and limit taxes; (c) preventing United States troops from being
placed under United Nations command; (d) requiring the loser to pay legal costs in
civil suits; (e) voting on a constitutional amendment to set limits on congressional
terms; and (f) reforming welfare.
The contract’s welfare reform proposal was called the Personal Responsibility
Act. It was a mixture of structural reforms and attempts at enforcing moral values (pp.
70-72). In the latter category was a prohibition on welfare payments to mothers under
18 years old with children bom out of wedlock. States could, at their option, extend
this limitation to mothers aged 19, 20 or 21. Savings from this provision were to be
given to the states as block grants to provide services other than cash payments to these
mothers.
Other provisions related to moral values included a “child cap,” or prohibition
of payment increases for children bom while their mothers were on AFDC, and a
requirement that fathers be identified unless rape, incest or physical danger were
alleged. These requirements, as Governor John Engler (1995b) noted, replaced liberal
micro management with conservative micro management, and reduced state power
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over the welfare system by reducing state options. Although these provisions were,
as in the President’s reform proposal, included in state waiver demonstrations, again
no results were yet available. Changes promoted because of their moral value are not
necessarily accompanied by a supporting cost analysis since their primary purpose is
to promote morally correct behavior, not to reduce costs. The requirement to find
suitable adult supervision for teen parents, for example, could be costly if paid
supervision similar to foster care were required for more than a small fraction of cases.
Some required structural changes also reduced state power. Recipients faced
an absolute five year time limit, after which no cash assistance could be provided. A
proportion of all AFDC cases were required to have a working member in the family,
with the proportion growing from 2 percent in 1996 to 50 percent in 2003.
The growth in program costs was capped at the increase in inflation plus the
increase in the general population, and the entitlement status of AFDC was ended.
That is, states were no longer required to provide benefits when appropriations were
exhausted. The effect on state control of welfare of these two provisions depends on
an individual state’s response to an unexpected rise in the AFDC caseload. If the state
wished to limit its costs by refusing or reducing benefits, it would have the power to
do so. However, if the state wished to provide benefits to meet demand, it could not
expect federal matching funds in doing so.
The major provision of the Personal Responsibility Act from the states’
perspective was one allowing a state to leave the AFDC/JOBS system and create its
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own welfare and work programs. Federal assistance would continue as a block grant,
but no matching state expenditures would be required. Although still bound by the
morality and work participation provisions described above, states would have
considerably more control over their programs than under existing law. This provision
would result in a dramatic transformation of the relatively-uniform, national AFDC
program into numerous different programs varying by state. In this case, no state had
previously requested comparable waivers, so this radical reform did not even have an
implementation example, much less any evaluation or cost neutrality data for support.
The principal argument made for this provision was “Recognizing that the best welfare
solutions come from the states, not Washington, DC, the Personal Responsibility Act
allows states to create their own work programs and determine who should participate
in them” (Gillespie and Schellhas, p. 73). That is, the Contract’s authors believed
that government closer to the problem will produce superior solutions.
The welfare reform proposals in the Contract with America were designed to
reduce federal expenditures by capping the growth in spending and by reducing the
need for welfare by demanding that welfare recipients work. The authors of the
contract estimated the savings at $40 billion over five years (Gillespie and Schellhas,
p. 74). Because a balanced federal budget was part of the Contract as well, the need
for cost savings became intertwined with the drive for welfare reform. The Contract
opened a long-running battle between the President and the Congress over the 1996
federal budget and plans to bring the federal budget into balance within seven years.
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This budgetary conflict dominated the political environment throughout 1995 and
early-1996, featuring numerous threats, acrimonious debate, acts of brinkmanship, and
government shutdowns. AFDC was only one of many fronts along which this battle
was fought; others included income taxes, the Earned Income Tax Credit, Social
Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and environmental protection.
A bill named the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995,
and containing the welfare reform provisions found in the Contract with America,
passed the House March 24, 1995, but it encountered resistance in the Senate (Toner,
1995, pp. A l, A17). The restrictions on payments to teenage mothers and the cap on
payments for children born on welfare were weakened in the Senate where they
became state options rather than national program requirements. The Senate also set
minimum financial commitments for states leaving the AFDC/JOBS system. Funding
for daycare programs was increased.

Most significantly from the view of states

seeking flexibility, the option to leave the AFDC/JOBS system was retained. The
Senate changes, then, added to the states’ authority. The maintenance of financial
effort requirement, added by the Senate, is properly viewed only as a speculative
decrease in state flexibility, since the House version was not yet law and current law
did require financial commitment by the states.
The Senate version of welfare reform received reluctant support from President
Clinton prior to its passage (Raum, 1995, p. 1A), because “After months of sometimes
bitter debate, we are now within striking distance of transforming the welfare system.”
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Amidst rumors that existing unfavorable analyses were being withheld, the Office of
Management and Budget agreed to review the impacts of the two versions of welfare
reform (Staff, 1995d, p. 1). When released November 9, 1995, this review estimated
that the House bill would increase the number of children in poverty by 2.1 million,
while the Senate bill would produce a 1.2 million child increase (Office of
Management and Budget, p. 9). This report fueled opposition from the political
middle and left, including the National Council of Churches, the Religious Action
Center of Reform Judaism, leaders of Conservative Judaism, African-American church
leaders, and the Children’s Defense Fund (Steinfels, 1995, p. A ll). The National
Conference of Catholic Bishops objected to time limits and child caps.
The House and Senate versions were reconciled, resulting in provisions of a
budget reconciliation act vetoed by the President on December 6, 1995 and in a
separate bill which passed both houses later in December (Pear, 1995, p. A l). As was
widely expected by that time, President Clinton vetoed it on January 9, 1996 (Pear,
1996a, p. A10), saying that the bill presented to him “was designed to meet an
arbitrary budget target rather than to achieve serious reform” (Clinton, 1996, p.2), a
clear signal that he wanted to separate welfare reform from balancing of the federal
budget.
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53
The Governors and Welfare Reform

Various state governors, particularly Engler of Michigan and Thompson of
Wisconsin, were active in the politics of welfare reform throughout the 1990s. For
example, the National Governor’s Association (NGA) sent a letter to its members on
December 21, 1992 announcing an “initiative to facilitate welfare reform at the
national and state levels. The initiative will bring together the Governors to develop
state and national strategies to transform the welfare system... ” (Florio and Carlson,
1992). In 1994, the NGA completed a comprehensive survey of state welfare reforms
(Strawn, Dacey & McCart, 1994). In December 1994, Governors Engler, Thompson
and Weld (of Massachusetts) were asked by Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich to
“prepare an outline of a plan that meets their requirements...” (Baiz, p. A6). Another
letter was sent by the NGA on February 23, 1995 to Representative Bill Archer,
Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, requesting that any block
grant options for AFDC include certain provisions and exclude certain others. They
requested exclusion of the “moral provisions” limiting payments to certain groups of
recipients, exclusion of employment targets, inclusion of funding adjustments
reflecting the cyclical nature of the economy, and inclusion of the right to withdraw
from waiver demonstration projects without incurring any cost neutrality liability
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(Dean, et al. 1995, pp. 3-4). However, as late as their July, 1995 meetings the NGA’s
members were unable to reach consensus on a full set of welfare reform provisions.10
As the 1995 national debate over welfare and the federal budget extended into
1996, compromise became the NGA goal.

Led by Governor Thompson and by

Nevada Governor Bob Miller, they began again to search for consensus at their
February meetings. Governor Miller emphasized, “We said we’d agree on everything
or agree to nothing” (Christoff, 1996a, p. 8A). Agreement was reached on a plan
including many of the structural reforms included in the congressional Republicans’
plan vetoed by the President. Agreement was thereby reached on block grants for
states, employment goals, and a five year limit. (Pear, 1996b, p. A9; and Christoff,
1996b, p. 1A). However, no legislation reflecting this agreement has been introduced
as of June 1996. On April 26, 1996, seven months and two government shut-downs
into fiscal year 1996, President Clinton signed a budget bill which contained no
welfare reform provisions (Pear, 1996c, p. A l).

10It is interesting to note the rise in .national prominence of Governors
Thompson and Engler as the welfare reform debate continued. Governor Thompson
became chairman of the NGA at the end of the July 1995 meetings, while Governor
Engler succeeded him as chair of the Republican Governor’s Association the following
January (Harmon, 1995, pp. 1-2). In Governor Engler’s case, at least, this rise was
due in part to relative mastery of the complexity of welfare (Christoff, 1996b, p. 7A).
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55
Conclusions

The Aid to Dependent Children program included in the Social Security Act of
1935 was clearly a radical reform of the state- and locally-directed Mothers’ Pensions
programs, transferring much authority over and responsibility for welfare for families
with children to the federal government.

Radical reforms have received serious

attention regularly since 1969. Plans have been proposed by Presidents Nixon, Carter,
Reagan, and Clinton, and by Presidential candidate George McGovern, the House
Republican caucus, and the National Governor’s Association. As noted in Chapter V,
a variety of plans have been proposed by researchers in and out of government. Most
of these proposals would have resulted in a radical shift of authority over welfare to
the states, and some would also have shifted the financial responsibility. To the extent
that these proposals specified policy changes, they seem largely unrelated to the
research available at the time. These policy proposals are often made prematurely
when relevant research results could be expected after a reasonable wait. This is
particularly perplexing when the demand for a balanced budget and the eventual
availability of relevant cost neutrality data are considered. So far, no radical reforms
have been enacted at the national level, although several are being tested through
waiver demonstration projects.
Meanwhile, many incremental changes have been implemented, either through
federal law or regulation, or through state waiver demonstration projects. On the
whole, federal authority was expanded under the changes made at the federal level.
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Most were enacted between 1950 and 1988. Beginning in 1987, the demonstration
projects shifted authority in small increments to the states, with financial responsibility
shifting as well through the cost neutrality provision.
It is impossible to predict the future of welfare reform. There is, however,
considerable evidence to support the hypothesis that welfare authority and
responsibility have reached an uncomfortable but stable point with the current system
of federal direction and state waivers. Costs are shared through long-established
formulae which reflect, at least roughly, the states’ relative ability to pay. Supporters
of state-designed systems and supporters of a single national standard can each find
features to disparage and extol. Some federal requirements can be waived, providing
flexibility and thereby making demonstrations to test new ideas possible.

Other

requirements cannot be waived, providing a stable national base policy. The current
system has few, if any, vocal supporters; nearly all stakeholders would make major
changes given the opportunity to do so. But there is no consensus for any single
package of changes. Reluctantly, there is more support for not making any single
major change.
This uneasy stability appears likely to continue at least through the 1996
presidential election. On May 4, 1996 President Bill Clinton released new regulations
for teen mothers on AFDC (Mitchell, p.l7A ). These allow states more flexibility in
encouraging teen mothers to live at home and remain in school, and require reports
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from all states on their programs for teen mothers.

The next day the following

exchange, clearly signaling political deadlock, was reported by the Detroit News:
The President said that if Congress sent him a “clean welfare reform
plan, that demands work, demands responsibility, protects children and
helps families stay together, I will sign it. Until then, I’ll keep working
to do everything in my power to reform welfare step by step and state
by state.” (Clinton’s welfare plan..., p. 10A)
Michigan Governor John Engler, chair of the Republican Governor’s Conference,
responded: “Bill Clinton and the liberals in Washington are still missing the point:
real welfare reform is overdue. We can’t reform welfare and break the cycle of
poverty one waiver at a time.”
Michael Wines of the New York Times (May 5, 1996, p. A15) reported that
the President appears positioned to take credit for any welfare reform bill he would be
willing to sign, and seemed not to have suffered from his vetoes. If this is the case,
Republicans are unlikely to seek a compromise before the November election. States
can then be expected to continue requesting and implementing waiver demonstration
projects.

Each such project faces the cost neutrality requirement, and hence

understanding the operation and implications of the requirement will remain important
to welfare policy developers and researchers.
Finally, even the advent of block grants may not end the importance of waiver
cost neutrality. Attempts in 1995 to convert the full Food Stamps program to a block
grant met with little support. Waivers and cost neutrality apply to Food Stamps as
well as to AFDC, so they are likely to continue to be significant features of the
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American welfare system even if AFDC is converted to a block grant program. Thus,
even if new forces push the federal government successfully to welfare reform,
waivers and cost neutrality will remain interesting aspects of federalism.
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CHAPTER III

WELFARE REFORM WAIVER COST NEUTRALITY
IN MICHIGAN, 1992-1994

Sampling Implementation

Michigan began its welfare reform demonstration, called To Strengthen
Michigan Families, or TSMF, on October 1, 1992. Waivers for the hundred hour
rule, the work quarter rule, and the federal income disregard rules were
implemented.11 Further, families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) or State Family Assistance (SFA) were told that the state expected, in return
for their welfare grants, that they would make good faith efforts to become
independent of the welfare system. Their commitment would involve at least 20 hours
of self-selected activity per week, chosen from a list of activities approved by the state
(Miller, 1992). This expectation is called the Social Contract, and was enforced
through expressing the intent o f the Department to refer those who did not comply
(and who were eligible for job training) to Michigan’s job training program

1W aivers were also received to allow the state to exclude all children’s
earnings in considering eligibility or benefits, to allow non-custodial parents to
participate in the AFDC job training program, and to allow for a job search period
exceeding three weeks prior to assessment for that program (Miller, 1992).
59
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immediately. Appropriations for the job training program were too low to serve all
eligible people, and sometimes all available funds were committed to volunteers. To
make the enforcement mechanism credible, a waiver was received to end a requirement
giving preference to volunteers.
With the exception of control cases needed for the TSMF evaluation and cost
neutrality calculations (and for a preexisting study of job training program options),
the experimental policies were applied to all cases statewide beginning on that date.
Four12 sites were selected for the evaluation and to provide data for the cost neutrality
calculation. (Selection was not random, but purposive; see Chapter VI.) Using the
same sites for both evaluation and cost neutrality provides administrative efficiencies
since a process for randomly assigning cases to control and experimental policies is
then needed in only one group of offices.

Combining these activities, however,

prevents their results from independently verifying or contradicting each other.
Families receiving AFDC or SFA on the project start date were randomly
assigned to control and experimental policies. Families subsequently found eligible
for AFDC or SFA were also randomly assigned to control and experimental policies
using a process based on the social security number of the grantee (there is always
exactly one grantee per case).

12Kalamazoo County, the Madison Heights district of Oakland County, and the
McNichols/Goddard and Schaefer/Six Mile Districts of Wayne County were selected.
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61
Results

Michigan’s cost neutrality calculations for the period from October 1992
through March 1995 showed that $77.5 million in state costs and $20.5 million in
federal costs were saved. These results are detailed in Table 3. Savings are shown as
positive numbers, while excess costs are shown as negative numbers and appear in
parenthesis.
Unfortunately, the federal formula produces few details concerning the sources
of these savings.

The formula can be described as simply a "black box."

mechanisms generating costs or savings are not illuminated.

The

The independent

evaluator (Abt Associates) reported reductions in AFDC benefits paid to families
covered by the TSMF policies in the first two years of the study (Werner and
Komfeld, 1994, pp. 51, 60-61; and 1995, pp. 61-65 and 73-75). This supports similar
results from the cost neutrality calculations. However, the cost neutrality calculation
is the only source of administrative cost data.

Benefit Costs

Estimates of the excess costs or savings resulting from Michigan’s welfare
reforms are the result of projecting the very small differences shown in Figures 2 and
3, and summarized in Figure 5, from the research sites to statewide proportions.
Figure 2 shows that, after thirty months, there is virtually no difference in the
differences are shown for Food Stamps, Medicaid and SMA.

SFA benefits are
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Table 3
Cost Neutrality Results for Michigan's Waivers, October 1992 - March 1995
Savings (Excess Costs) in $Millions

Federal

AFDC Benefits

$5.82

State

Total

$4,344

$10,165

AFDC Administration

($16.58)

($16.58)

($33.18)

Food Stamps Benefits

$23.25

0

$23.25

Food Stamps Administration

($9.64)

($9.64)

($19.28)

Medicaid Benefits

$31.32

$24.39

$55.71

($13.69)

($13.69)

($27.38)

Medicaid Administration
State Family Assistance Benefits

$0

$81.95

$81.95

State Family Assistance Administration*

$0

$3.88

$3.88

State Medical Assistance Benefits

$0

$2.84

$2.84

State Medical Assistance Administration

$0

Total for Benefits
Total for Administration
Grand Total

Not Available

Not Available

$60.39

$113.52

$173.92

($39.91)

($36.03)

($75.95)

$20.48

$77.49

$97.97

Source: Meizlish, 1995, pp. A3 and A5.

reduced by a relatively robust $325 - $103 = $222 per family as a result of the near
elimination of the program under the experimental policies. The virtual equality of the
AFDC benefit cost averages ($7,047 for control families and $7,020 for experimental
families) masks two effects which appear to have balanced: AFDC benefit costs were
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Michigan Cost Neutrality Results
Average Benefit Cost per Family Ever Served
October 1992 - March 1995

$6,000
$4,000

$2,000

AFDC

Food Stamps

Medicaid

SFA

SMA

Control |

$7,047

$3,667

$6,107

$325

$90

Exper. □

$7,020

$3,604

$5,957

$103

$82

Source: Meizlish, 1996, pp. A1-A5

Figure 2. Average Benefit Cost.
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Michigan Cost Neutrality Results by Quarter
Fiscal Years 1993 -1995
($Millions)
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$80
$60
$40

$20

■Hi

$0
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■ J r l- ] ; h

1

($20)
Quarter

93:1

Federal ■

9.058

2

3

4

(1.780) (5.114) (3.058)

94:1

2

3

4

0.411

(1.596)

4.418

24.743

2

3

4

State

□

10.043

9.294

76.212 76.380 77.487

61.033

60.088

Total

■

19.101

7.514

8.457 21.936 40.295 48.102 66.294 100.955 100.910 97.969

53.124

46.532

0.000

0.000

0.000

P a y b a ck -

13.571

24.994 39.884

95:1

24.530 20.482 (7.909) (13.556)

0.000

0.000

Figure 3. Average Administrative Cost.

49.698 61.876

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000 (7.909) (13.556)

increased by adding costs formerly paid under SFA, but they were reduced by some
other mechanism. As noted above, the cost neutrality formula does not identify this
mechanism, but the outcome evaluation indicates that more families combined work
with welfare under the experimental policies, and that AFDC participation may have
been reduced. These two outcomes were expected from the policy changes intended
to encourage recipients to work, and would result in a decrease in average benefit
costs. Food Stamps benefit costs are sensitive to total family income, so the savings
in that program should follow from increased earnings, and appear to do so.
The savings shown for Medicaid are not well understood. The argument above
explaining AFDC savings fails for Medicaid because families combining work and
welfare do not lose Medicaid eligibility.

Furthermore, families leaving welfare

because of increased income retain Medicaid eligibility for one year, so savings from
this group should be greatly attenuated until later in the experiment. Medical costs are
subject to greater variation than AFDC benefits, so one possibility is that the observed
difference is the result only of random variation. Examination of sampling variance
will evaluate this possibility.

Administrative Costs

Except for SFA, where administrative savings resulted from greatly reducing
program participation, administrative costs rose for all programs under the
experimental policies (see Figure 3). No estimate of SMA administrative costs can be
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made from the available data.13 The time study which provides the basic information
for Figure 3 is limited in its descriptive power.

If more extensive analyses of

administrative cost results were possible, the policy usefulness of the calculation would
be enhanced.

Statewide Total Costs

Statewide costs for all programs14 are needed in order to project results from
the experimental sites to statewide values. These costs must be for the cohort of
families participating in AFDC or SFA since the experiment began. Existing reports
are designed to measure costs incurred for all cases active during a specified period.
Costs for specific cohorts are not available, so these statewide totals must be estimated.
This problem was anticipated by federal staff in designing the cost neutrality
calculation, which implicitly provides formulae for making these estimates for all other
costs from statewide AFDC costs (which can be determined from existing reports).
The resulting totals are shown in Figure 4.
The ratios shown in Figure 5, representing the savings (ratio less than 100
percent) or excess costs (ratio greater than 100 percent) measured in the experimental

13The time study used for cost allocation does not permit administrative costs
to be estimated for either SMA or SFA. However, SFA administrative costs are
estimated from data available from another time study and caseload counts (MDSS,
undated).
14Statewide counts of families active for AFDC or SFA since the experiment
began would also permit projection to statewide costs, but these are not available.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Michigan Cost Neutrality Results
Estimated Statewide Costs
October 1992 - March 1995
$Millions
$3,000

$

2,000

--

$

1,000

--

Benefits H
Admin. H
Total
■

AFDC
$2,594
$389
$2,983

Food Stamps
$1,332
$267
$1,599

Medicaid
$2,201
$268
$2,469

SFA
$38

SMA
$30

Not Available

Not Available

$38

$30

Source: Computed from Meizlish, 1996, pp. A1-A5

Figure 4. Estimated Statewide Costs.
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Michigan Cost Neutrality Results
Experimental Costs as a Percent of Control Costs
October 1992 - March 1995
125%

100%

AFDC

Food Stamps

Medicaid

SFA

SMA

Total

99.61%

98.28%

97.53%

31.77%

91.41%

97.27%

Admin. HH

109.32%

107.78%

111.38%

Total

100.78%

99.75%

98.87%

Benefits ■

■

Not Available Not Available
31.77%

91.41%

109.45%
98.70%

Source: Meizlish, 1996, pp. A1-A5

Figure 5. Experimental Costs as a Percent of Control Costs.
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sites, may differ from unity (100 percent, the point at which control and experimental
costs are equal) by less than the expected statistical error. That is, there may be no
significant differences between control and experimental values, and the projected
savings shown in Table 2 may be illusory. If so, claims of success for Michigan's
welfare reform demonstration based on results from the first thirty months are
premature.

Political leaders naturally want to announce success, but such

announcements would prove embarrassing if subsequent data showed a reversal, even
if those subsequent results also were too small to be statistically significant. In other
words, incautious use of early results in a public, political environment may prove
problematic. Michigan's governor and social services director chose to take this risk
and made claims of success public.

Use of Cost Neutrality Results

Table 2 shows that the TSMF demonstration resulted in $173.92 million in
savings from reduced benefit costs. These savings were earned, in part at least,
through increased administrative efforts, resulting in administrative cost increases.
The result is a net savings of $173.92 million - $75.95 million = $97.97 million.
While this is only 1.4 percent of the total of $7.12 billion in expenses (see Figure 4),
the result challenges two common perceptions about the cash welfare system. First,
it is believed by many advocates for the poor that welfare reform resulting in cost
savings will be at the expense of the poor, but TSMF did not require grant or service
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reductions—in fact, service costs increased. Second, the “welfare bureaucracy” and
out-of-wedlock childbirth are often blamed by fiscal conservatives for the cost of
welfare, but TSMF used increases in that bureaucracy to generate net savings without
restricting benefits to illegitimate children or their mothers.
Cost neutrality results are intended primarily to measure and trigger repayment
of excess federal costs incurred as a result of a state’s demonstration projects. In
Michigan, computations for the April-June 1995 and July-September 1995 quarters
indicate that a repayment may be due eventually (see Figure 6). However, repayment
of early excess costs up to $50 million is deferred. As long as they remain below this
level, repayment does not begin until the eighteenth quarter of the demonstration
(January-March 1997).
It would be reasonable to expect that those responsible for preparing
Michigan’s budget would make use of cost neutrality results in their work. However,
budget-making requires planning for the future, while cost neutrality calculations
review past events.

At the earliest, cost neutrality results for Fiscal Year 1996

(October 1995-September 1996) will be available no earlier than November 15, 1996.
By that time budget planning will be underway for fiscal year 1998, which begins
October 1, 1997.
Michigan planners rely instead on caseload forecasting, a more familiar
technique (Drum, 1995 and Duncan, 1996). As Figure 7 shows, caseload trends since
the implementation of To Strengthen Michigan Families on October 1, 1992 show a
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Figure 6. Cost Neutrality Results by Quarter

Michigan Cost Neutrality Results by Quarter
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Michigan's AFDC Caseload
October 1992 - January 1996
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200.000
150.000

100.000

Families Without Earned Income

50,000

Families With Earned Income
0

Oct 92

O ct 93

O ct 94

Oct 95

Figure 7. Michigan AFDC Caseloads.
NJ

reasonably steady decline for cases without income and a slower but similarly-steady
increase in cases with income. The net result is a steady decrease in the caseload,
which is projected forward to estimate future budget needs. Savings from TSMF, if
any, result from caseload effects included in these trends and thus are included in the
budgeting process through caseload forecasting.
Cost neutrality does not play a direct role in the evaluation of welfare reform
demonstrations either.

Evaluations attempt to answer some of the questions

unanswerable through cost neutrality calculations. They focus on discovering particular
sources of change and on measures of change other than program expenditures,
including family income and participation levels. However, results from the two
approaches can provide some support for each other when they agree (as Michigan’s
do), or cast doubt on one another should they disagree. Both use the same samples of
families, so they cannot provide independent confirmation of each other.
The principal uses of Michigan’s cost neutrality results have been political. In
most cases, the use has been policy-oriented, to rally support for the TSMF approach
to welfare reform and for the Governor’s belief that the states should be even more
free to experiment. The effect of their repeated use has, however, enhanced the career
of Governor John Engler.

After two years, cost neutrality results indicated that

Michigan had saved a total of $101 million with TSMF. This number began appearing
regularly in Governor Engler’s public pronouncements, including national television
interviews (Stevens, January 13, 1995; Gallman, January 14, 1995; Koch, January 28,
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1995; Engler, January 31, 1995). The January 20, 1995 Detroit Free Press carried
a four-column photograph of the governor holding a graph describing cost neutrality
results during his testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee
(Montgomery, p. 6A).
Michigan’s cost neutrality results were met with skepticism from both the
political right and the political left. Lawrence W. Reed is President of the Mackinac
Center for Public Policy in Midland, Michigan.

The Center is a “think tank”

specializing in free market solutions to public problems, and it is influential in
Michigan politics.

In January 1995 Reed recognized Michigan Governor John

Engler’s welfare reform successes, but warned that “Replacing federal reform with
state reform will not go far enough, however, unless it further reduces the role of
government and makes assistance to the needy a private initiative” (emphasis in
original). David Whitman of U. S. News & World Report pointed out on January 16,
1995 that “his initiative had increased the proportion of AFDC adults who did some
work by only 1.7 percentage points and reduced the welfare roles by 1 percentage
point” (Welfare: The Myth of Reform, p.38).

Unpersuaded, Governor Engler

continued to cite the figure of $101 million saved throughout the 1995 welfare debate
(see Chapter II). His success in welfare reform and other policy areas, including tax
cuts and school finance reform, has led to speculation about a vice-presidential or
presidential candidacy in The Economist (“The next-,” 1996, p. 29), in Time (“If
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not,” 1996, p. 25), on the National Broadcast Company’s “Meet the Press” (“Engler
avoids,” 1996, p. 1A), and by the Associated Press (O’Brien, 1996, p. 6D).
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CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH DESIGN

Primary Research Questions

The primary research questions to be answered by this dissertation are:
1.

What are welfare waiver cost neutrality’s policy consequences? Cost

neutrality is designed to limit states’ options in proposing demonstration projects to
those they can afford without additional federal funds. Success in achieving this goal
and the kinds of demonstrations not proposed are reviewed.
2. What is its role in national welfare reform? National welfare reform and
waivers have interacted strongly since 1992; this interaction is discussed.
3. What place does it have in theories of federalism? The unusual features of
cost neutrality are examined.
4.

How do theories of federalism explain the reasons for imposing this

requirement?
5. How reliable are the estimates used? A measure of reliability is developed
and results for Michigan computed.
6. Is this reliability great enough to support the uses made of cost neutrality
results? Public and internal uses will be considered.
76
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Secondary questions are:
1. How does the use, by a governor and his/her top executives, of politically
sensitive data change when the idea of statistical uncertainty is introduced? A
percentile interval, similar to a confidence interval, was computed for Michigan’s
welfare reform savings and introduced into the policy stream. Use of the cost savings
results will be compared before and after introduction.
2. How can the statistical characteristics of results obtained with the federal
calculation method for welfare reform cost neutrality be determined?
3. What are the characteristics of results obtained with the current method?
Answering this question, and demonstrating a method with results from Michigan’s
welfare reform project, will provide future researchers a practical way to evaluate
alternative calculation methods, sample sizes and experimental designs.

General Methodology

Implementation

Implementation and use of Michigan’s welfare reform cost neutrality
calculations are traced here through internal documents, published reports and
newspaper accounts. Since the author is an employee of the Michigan Department of
Social Services, use of verbal information, except by explicit permission, would
present ethical questions and inhibit exercise of his duties, and so is excluded.
However, all final decisions and actions appear in written documents, and all relevant
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materials are public under Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act. Thus, authors of
these documents have no expectation of privacy. Permission was obtained from the
Michigan Department of Social Services before beginning this work, and colleagues
were made aware of the study.
The place of welfare waiver cost neutrality in federalism theories is determined
by reviewing major theories, comparing characteristics of federalism features described
by theorists with American welfare system characteristics, welfare reform through
waivers, and the cost neutrality provisions applied to waivers. The place of waiver
cost neutrality in the history of welfare reform is established through review of
historical sources. The questions of waiver cost neutrality’s uniqueness and policy
implications are considered both through application of theory and through review of
events. Public and internal uses of the results are tracked. Finally, the impact, if any,
of introducing measures of statistical performance, particularly of confidence intervals,
is determined.

Use of Sampling-Based Information

Welfare reform cost savings estimation is an application of social science
research methods to a complex accounting problem. Weiss and Bucuvalas (1980) have
considered the ways in which social science research is used by decision makers. They
suggest (pp. 13-15) that researchers implicitly have a model for this use:
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1. Research produces knowledge, by which researchers mean replicable facts
and truths.
2. Use of this knowledge by decision makers will result in more rational
decisions because means will fit ends, outcomes will be more predictable, and the
whole process of decision making will be more efficient.
3. Rational decisions are more beneficial to society.
4. These benefits will be shared uniformly and equitably.
Unfortunately, as Weiss and Bucuvalas point out, research cannot remove
conflicts among competing interest groups, and this conflict characterizes political
decision making. Political rationality, based on consensus-building, compromise and
institutional stability, may overwhelm the scientific rationality of the researchers'
model (p. 21), which is based on logic, cause and effect analysis, and the scientific
method.
Consequently, research results may not be used by decision makers at all, or
may be used in ways not anticipated by the researchers. Weiss and Bucuvalas (1980)
offer these possibilities for use:
1. The decision maker may apply research results to an appropriate, specific
policy or practice that is consistent with the researchers' implicit model.
2. He/she may use it to reduce his/her level of uncertainty.
3. Research can be used by the decision maker to bolster his/her supporters.
4. It may be used to persuade or neutralize the decision maker's critics.
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5. It may be used to reinforce a commitment made previously.
6. The decision maker may refer to research in order to authenticate decisions
which have already been made.
7. The decision maker may use research to shift responsibility for unpopular
decisions to the researchers.
With the exception of the last form of use, none of these is unethical, but they
stray successively further from the researchers' implicit model. These possible usages
for cost neutrality confidence intervals are considered in this study.

Statistical Characteristics

The federal formula for estimating excess costs or savings is based on
sampling—a sample of locations for the study, samples of families within the study
location, and a random moment sample for estimating administrative costs. Like all
estimators based on sampling, there is little likelihood that the true savings are exactly
equal to the estimate. Usually, the uncertainty introduced by sampling is expressed
as a range of possible values, called a confidence or percentile interval, that has a high
likelihood (typically 95 percent) of containing the true value of the quantity to be
estimated. This interval is logically connected to the idea of hypothesis testing. In
particular, if the interval contains zero, the related test of the null hypothesis of no
savings or excess costs will result in accepting the null hypothesis. This is clearly a
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critical question, but no confidence intervals (or, therefore, hypothesis tests) were
previously available for the federal cost neutrality estimator.
This is because the federal formula is too complex for a standard variance
analysis relying on known formulae, algebra and numerical approximation. The
formula makes extensive use of ratios and products of random quantities, greatly
increasing the difficulty of obtaining an analytic formula for the confidence interval.
Instead of the standard approach, a relatively new technique called "resampling" has
been used here with Michigan data to answer the research questions. A computer
program to implement this technique was created and tested. The interval obtained
through this process is called a percentile interval, but in use it is identical to a
standard confidence interval.

Study Propositions

Following Yin’s case study research model (1989), the following propositions
concerning use of welfare waiver cost neutrality results were considered:
1. Welfare waiver cost neutrality represents a unique aspect of federalism with
significant policy consequences.
2.

Political leaders will seldom if ever mention that a sensitive estimate

contains any uncertainty if the estimate serves a useful purpose. In the case to be
studied, welfare reform cost savings estimates have proven useful to Michigan’s
governor and sensitive enough to have received considerable press scrutiny. Uses have
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included pressing his views through the news media, in Congress, and among his peers
at the National Governor’s Conference.

The extent of his knowledge of the

uncertainty in the estimate is unknown, but this information has been given to the
Director of the Department of Social Services (Lovell, 1995a).
3.

Managers responsible for computing and using the estimator, including the

author, will use confidence intervals in attempts to improve and understand the
estimation process, regardless of numerical values. (The author’s own work will not
be considered in support of this hypothesis, but any use of that work by others will
be.) Federal officials and officials in other states have expressed interest in the results
of the confidence interval calculations proposed here.
This is an exploratory study of events covering roughly the period June 1992
through May 1996.
Discussions of Michigan’s results in national media (television network news
programs, the New York Times and the Washington Posf) and local media (the Detroit
News, the Detroit Free Press and the Lansing State Journal! have been collected and
analyzed for mention of uncertainty in order to study use by political leaders.
Memoranda, reports and other internal documents provide the database to study use
by program managers in the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services and the
Michigan Department of Social Services.
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Generalizabilitv

The results of this case study should provide a useful guide to the behavior of
political leaders and managers in other states with similar technical skills and political
leadership. Techniques developed to determine a percentile interval for Michigan’s
results can be used to determine confidence intervals for other states’ results, to further
investigate the characteristics of the method used, and to consider alternatives.
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CHAPTER V

WAIVER COST NEUTRALITY AND FEDERALISM

Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) is a joint federal-state
program, and the waiver cost neutrality process is an integral part of AFDC. This
chapter begins with a description of the federal and state roles in AFDC policy-making
and financing. It then considers the role of waiver cost neutrality in the federalism of
the 1990's. Finally, consideration is given to how the AFDC program as a whole and
waiver cost neutrality in particular are viewed in contemporary prescriptive models for
reform of federalism.

Fiscal and Policy Roles of Federal, State and Local Governments in AFDC

In general, administrative costs for AFDC are shared equally by the states and
the federal government.15 Benefit costs for AFDC are shared by the states and the
federal government through a formula designed to reflect each state's ability to pay.
For Fiscal Year 1994 (October 1, 1993 through September 30, 1994) the proportion

15The federal government offers to pay more than half the cost for certain
activities it wishes to encourage, such as computer acquisition and child support
enforcement. Additional technical requirements usually apply.
84
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paid by the federal government16 varied from 50.00 percent (14 states) to 78.85
percent (Mississippi); 56.37 percent of Michigan's Medicaid and AFDC costs were
paid by the federal government.
As Elazar points out (1966, p. 148), “Through the conditional transfer of funds
to the states, the federal government gains a voice in making policy in those fields
aided by the grants while states remain responsible for day-to-day administration of the
programs, with all that responsibility implies in the way of actual policy-making.”
The federal hold on AFDC policy is in setting many of the eligibility rules, primarily
in deciding which assets and income sources must be considered in determining
eligibility, and in what efforts must be made to avoid mispayments and fraud. For
example, under federal AFDC regulations, the value of savings accounts in the name
of a child are considered when determining a family’s eligibility unless, as Michigan
has done, a waiver is requested and granted.

(Cost neutrality and evaluation

requirements apply to all such waivers.) Income from unemployment compensation
is counted, while the value of federal housing subsidies is not. In order to minimize
errors due to income not reported to the welfare agency by AFDC recipients, states
must regularly match files of AFDC recipients with files containing reports of earned
income maintained by their unemployment compensation agency.

In general,

administrative requirements such as this cannot be waived.

16This proportion is called the Federal Medical Percentage (FMAP).
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Some regulations provide options for states. For example, a state must offer
AFDC coverage to otherwise-eligible families with two parents present for six months
out of every year. At their option, states may offer year-around coverage. Once a
state offers full-year coverage, it may not be rescinded.
The states set payment standards and establish procedures. As the payment
level rises, more families will have income low enough to qualify and will be found
eligible. Since the poor have few assets and few sources of income other than earnings,
the right to set payment levels gives states considerable control over the number of
families eligible for AFDC. Payment standards vary widely, even among similar
states. In January 1994, a family of three living in Wayne County (Michigan’s most
populous county) would receive $459 per month if there were no other income
sources. Similar families in Wisconsin would have received $518; in Illinois, $377,
in Ohio, $341; and in Indiana, $288 (Michigan Department of Social Services, 1994b,
p. 22). Payment levels may vary somewhat within a state to reflect varying housing
costs.
In some states, including California and Wisconsin but not Michigan,
responsibility for procedures and financing is shared with county or city governments.
In Michigan, AFDC is said to be state administered, while it is said to be state directed
in states like California. A state administered program provides more procedural
consistency from county to county, while a state directed system may allow for greater
innovation and for procedures better tailored for local conditions.
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87
Defining Federalism

Working definitions of “federalism” vary. Glendenning and Reeves (1977, p.
6) note that “No single definition of federalism is generally accepted: different
authorities emphasize various aspects of it.” Anton (1989, p. 3) says that “Federalism
is a system of rules for the division of public policy responsibilities among a number
of autonomous governmental agencies.” This seems too restrictive, almost focusing
on the constitutional framework, with little emphasis on programs involving more than
one agency.
Political scientist Paul E. Peterson (1981, p. 67) suggests that “Federalism is
a system of government in which powers are divided between higher and lower levels
of government in such a way that both levels have a significant amount of separate and
autonomous responsibility for the social and economic welfare of those living within
their respective jurisdictions.” Applied to AFDC, this definition seems to move away
from an interdependent view of the nature of the program and toward the idea of
separate spheres of influence for the federal and state governments. This is the intent
of the reforms suggested by Rivlin, Walker and Peterson himself, (see below). Dye
(1990, p. 5) agrees with Peterson’s definition, adding the “minimal condition” that the
autonomy of the subnational governments be protected by a constitution amendable
only with the consent of both levels.
Glendenning and Reeves (pp. 7-8) emphasize the pragmatic and contractual
dimensions, defining federalism as an arrangement whereby:
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(1) the same territory and people are governed by two levels of
government, both of which derive their authority from the people and
both of which share some functions and exercise other functions
autonomously of each other;
(2) the existence of each level is protected from the other; and
(3) each may exert leverage on the other.
Coupled with their definition of intergovernmental relations, this definition
seems to encompass the AFDC program as a shared function. Intergovernmental
relations, say Glendenning and Reeves (p. 8), “are the interactions, attitudes, and
behavior of elected officials and bureaucrats of two or more units of government
functioning in their public capacities.”
Federalism, according to Chandler (1982, p. 62), means, “A structure of
government that divides power between a central government and regional
governments, with each having some independent authority.” This definition includes
the idea of allocation of power, an important feature of the AFDC program. Walker
(1995, pp. 20-21) would return to Chandler’s definition, while similarly requiring a
written constitution dividing the powers of government among levels and also requiring
long-term success in “sustaining a territorial division of powers by judicial,
operational, representational, and political means.” He finds federalism at the balance
between unitary systems and confederations. Intergovernmental relations are then a
“web of constitutional, electoral, representational, programmatic, fiscal, admini
strative, and judicial relationships.” Federalism is a legal structure while intergovern
mental relations is a functional structure. Taken together, these seem best to describe
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the AFDC program, addressing its power and financial dimensions. The choice of
“web” suggests the complexity of relations between the state and federal governments
under AFDC. However, even Walker’s definition fails to clearly presage the two-way
flow of funds that characterizes AFDC’s waiver provision and quality control system
(see below).

A Categorical Model of Federalism

Peterson, Rabe and Wong (1987, pp. 12-64) present a typology for programs
under federalism. They classify programs by purpose, by who designates the purpose,
and by the fiscal role played by the state. Two additional categorizations follow, based
on spending limits and competition.

Categorization by Broad Purpose

Joint federal-state programs serve one of two broad purposes:
1.

Programs may be developmental, intended to improve a community’s

economy.
2. They may be redistributive (intended to benefit some community members
at the expense of others).
Developmental programs generally serve large numbers of constituents, and
thus are more likely to be popular with elected officials at both the state and federal
levels. Power is largely retained at the federal level, because the types of projects
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eligible for funding are described in federal law. State and local authorities may have
some control over details like location or design.
AFDC, however, is redistributive, intended to benefit low-income families.
The waiver provision and its cost neutrality requirement may marginally inhibit or
extend AFDC’s redistributive nature, depending on the innovative policies to be
demonstrated. For example, increasing the value of an automobile exempted from
eligibility considerations increases program coverage, thus increasing its redistributive
effect, while a time limit on benefits decreases coverage.

Block Grants and Categorical Grants

In creating a program, Congress may take one of two broad approaches in
specifying the way funds from the program may be used:
1. The Congressional statement of purpose may be diffuse, allowing much
local discretion. Programs using this approach are typically called revenue sharing or
block grants.
2. The Congressional statement of purpose may be precise in designating the
purpose of the program. Programs of this type are described as categorical.
The accountability inherent in categorical programs allows the federal
government to retain significant power.

State officials are likely to prefer the

flexibility available with block grants or revenue sharing, which pass power to the
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states without adding financial responsibility. AFDC is categorical; Congress clearly
states who may receive grants in Title IV-A of the Social Security Act.
The waiver process allows some flexibility to the states in targeting AFDC, but
only at the margins of the population to be served. For example, the relatively small
group of families having two parents present and working more than 100 hours per
month total may be granted AFDC eligibility through the waiver process. However,
AFDC money cannot be diverted to create a system of settlement houses and poor
farms through waivers.

Combining programs like AFDC, Food Stamps and

Supplemental Security Income into a single anti-poverty strategy might be an attractive
option for some states, but it cannot be done under waivers. The result is that waivers
and cost neutrality transfer some power held by the federal government under a
categorical program structure to the states, but much more power would be transferred
if AFDC became a block grant program.

Lump Sums and Matching Funds

States play one of two broad fiscal roles:
1. Federal funding may be an outright grant—that is, Congress appropriates
lump sums to be paid to the states. Or
2. Some local contributions, called matching funds, may be required.
Elazar (p. 70) further divides programs requiring matching grants into two
groups:
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2a. Proportionate grants, in which the state’s share is fixed, and
2b. Percentage grants, in which the state’s share varies by state.
A single national program for poor families with children is a major policy goal
of the AFDC program. To achieve that goal while controlling state costs a formula
is used to set state matching rates at affordable levels.

In this way the federal

government uses the power of the purse to achieve a policy goal with reasonable
efficiency.

Appropriations and Entitlements

Programs not given entitlement status are funded through an appropriation
which limits total federal obligations for program costs. Under an entitlement program
the government has a legal obligation to provide cash or services regardless of the
amounts appropriated. That is,
1.

Ordinary federal appropriations limit total federal costs to the amount

appropriated.
2. “Entitlements” are “legal obligations created through legislation that requires
the payment of benefits to any person or unit of government that meets the eligibility
requirements established by law” (Wildavsky, 1987, p. 259).
AFDC is an entitlement program because any family meeting the eligibility
requirements is entitled to cash benefits. Further, because it requires matching state
contributions, it imposes an entitlement program on each state. Program changes with
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fiscal implications made at the federal level have the effect of spending state funds as
well as federal funds, and state program changes may similarly affect federal spending.
Thus, achieving entitlement status places a program’s federal and state managers in a
very powerful financial position, able to require both federal and state expenditures be
made for program changes. Support for AFDC was stronger when it was created than
it is today.

While entitlement status might not be granted if it were under

consideration today, it is difficult to change once a constituency has been created.

Competitive Grants

Finally, some programs are designed to provide funding only to some of the
qualified claimants. Grantees for these programs are selected through a competitive
process:
1. Competitive programs are not necessarily funded sufficiently to cover all
requests; applicants compete for the funds available. These programs are typically
small and may be intended as demonstration projects. For example, the Michigan
Department of Social Services received a $50,000 grant in 1995 from the U. S.
Department of Health and Human Services to provide cultural competence training to
adoption workers (Duncan, 1995). Such a grant was not available to every state.
2.

Non-competitive programs are funded sufficiently to meet all requests

meeting program requirements.
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The power of selection enhances the authority of the grant-making agency.
AFDC is non-competitive, however; all states receive matching funds for expenses
incurred while providing benefits under the provisions of federal law. Waivers are
also non-competitive, in the senses that any number of states may operate
demonstrations simultaneously, and that states may propose a demonstration identical
to one under way in another state (1994, Federal Register, Vol. 59, No. 186, p.
49249).

Placing AFDC Within a Federalism Context

AFDC is a redistributive program, because it transfers resources from the
general taxpayer to poor families with children. Since only poor families with children
are eligible for assistance from AFDC, it is a categorical program. The federal
government and the states share the cost of AFDC under a complex formula requiring
each state to provide funding proportional to federal expenditures, making it a
matching program. All states are eligible to participate at the levels they choose
individually, so it is a non-competitive program. Finally, poor families with children
are eligible for assistance regardless of federal or state budget appropriations, so
AFDC is an entitlement program.
These characteristics are likely to make AFDC, at best, moderately popular
with elected officials at the federal level and, again at best, moderately unpopular with
elected officials at the state level. Not all programs to help the poor are unpopular
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with elected officials, however. Consider, for example, the Women, Infants and
Children program (WIC) and Head Start. As Wildavsky pointed out (1987, pp. 33347), these programs have received wide political support, with expansion supported
even by politicians calling for reductions in other welfare programs. These programs
support infants and pre-school children, the most sympathetic of the poor in the eyes
of the public at large. The WIC program provides coupons similar to Food Stamps to
purchase food for young children, together with counseling and nutrition training for
low income mothers. Head Start provides federally-funded preschool classes for low
income children. Arguably, they provide the age-appropriate services most likely to
reduce future dependency, and thus the services most likely to have wide public
appeal. No state matching funds are required. Since WIC services are delivered
through local public health departments, state and local officials can take some credit
without the cost of raising taxes to cover the cost.
In a budget with many reductions in social welfare programs, House and Senate
1996 congressional budget conferees supported an increase for WIC of $260 million
over its 1995 budget of $3,729 billion. The President recommended an additional $50
million for 1997. In the same action, funding for Food Stamps was reduced $1.2
billion from its 1995 level of $28.8 billion (staff of the Economic Opportunity Report.
1995c, p. 363, and staff of the Northeast-Midwest Economic Review. 1996d, p. 14).
Head Start has also continued to receive support; its $3.5 billion 1995 budget was
unchanged 1996, even amidst congressional questions about quality consistency. It has
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a projected increase to $3.98 billion in the 1997 executive budget (staff of the
Economic Opportunity Report. 1996c, p. 103, and 1996e, p. 153; and Baily, 1996, p.
IB).
Unpopular programs are subject to frequent adjustments intended to remove
their flaws. Severe critics may declare the program irreparable and propose ending
it. AFDC has been subjected to regular incremental tinkering at both the state and
federal levels. Since income and asset discovery and reporting are the major tools of
AFDC administration, most such revisions deal with details in these areas.

The

changes represent attempts to limit or extend benefits to groups at the margin of being
among the deserving poor, or to discover and limit benefits to those who misrepresent
their circumstances to collect benefits illegally. More significant reforms are less
frequent, with the most recent being the Family Support Act of 1988 (see Chapter II).
Regular proposals for abolition and replacement of AFDC with another
approach have been issued (see Chapter III). Prior to the 1995-1996 reform effort,
incomplete as of this writing, the most recent such proposals were in President Richard
Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan17 in 1969, and President Ronald Reagan’s 1982 offer,
rejected by Congress, to fully federalize Medicaid while assigning full responsibility
for AFDC and Food Stamps to the states (Trattner, 1994, pp. 365-6). Thus AFDC,
in contrast to WIC and Head Start, appears to be relatively unpopular, as suggested by

17The Family Assistance Plan would have provided a national guaranteed
minimum income, payable to the poor through the income tax system (see Chapter II).
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the program characteristics described above. However, federal grant programs are
robust in the face of political opposition. The first grant was created in 1879 and was
intended to assist in the public education of the blind. It continues today as the
American Printing House for the Blind (Anderson, p. 177). Similarly, despite many
changes, AFDC still strongly resembles the program created in 1935.

The Role of Waiver Cost Neutrality in Federal-State Relations

Experimentation by the states is one of the expected benefits of federalism, but
detailed federal laws and regulation have had a stifling effect on welfare policy
experimentation by the states. For example, prior to enactment of Section 1115 of the
Social Security Act in 1962, states had no flexibility under federal law to vary the
financial incentive for AFDC families to obtain part-time work. The waiver process
succeeds in increasing state flexibility, even though the federal government includes
a cost neutrality requirement limiting the range of state innovations. Waivers also
succeed in reducing political pressure on the federal government to reform welfare by
transferring some of that responsibility to the states. President Clinton has clearly
made this case in successfully claiming that he is keeping his campaign promise to
reform welfare by granting waivers (in an October 1995 letter to the members of
congress reported by Jennifer Dixon of the Associated Press). This has reduced
pressure on him to agree to welfare reform on terms dictated by the Republican
congress.
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The effect of this cost neutrality provision is that state experiments carrying a
risk of significantly higher costs are still stifled. In broad terms, the cost of AFDC can
be changed by varying grant levels, the population of eligible families, the income
earned by families on assistance, or the average time families remain on assistance.
States already have the authority to set grant levels, and thus could raise or lower
payments to eligible individuals without requesting a waiver. Thus, payment levels
for these individuals can be presumed to be at the level considered optimal by the state
before any demonstration projects have begun (subject to a provision of the Family
Support Act prohibiting reductions below levels in effect in 1988). Waiver cost
neutrality, then, provides no protection for the federal government from excessive
grant levels applying to all AFDC families; the requirement for matching state funds
provides this protection.
Waivers seeking to directly limit time on assistance may also be seen as
limiting the eligible population. Thus, waivers with financial implications may be
sought to affect the eligible population or to encourage work. The effect of cost
neutrality is to inhibit states from trying riskier strategies for attaining these goals. A.
Sidney Johnson HI, executive director of the American Public Welfare Association,
argues for eliminating the cost neutrality requirement, saying, “Cost neutrality
requirements hinder innovation, quality of services, and benefits to recipients. States
should be encouraged, not discouraged, to seek better programs” (1995, p. 20). Diane
Baillargeon of the New York State Department of Social Services (Baillargeon &
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Cook, 1995, p.24) echoed these comments in arguing that “In seeking to encourage
innovation without assuming any risks, the federal government abridges and diminishes
the states’ potential for developing new ideas that could transform the welfare system
and benefit the nation.”
For example, states, through demonstration projects, could use AFDC funds
to purchase family counseling by a social worker, believing that this would ultimately
encourage work. Delivered with sufficient intensity to be effective, these services
would be expensive.18 If the strategy does not work, cost neutrality requires the state
to absorb all excess costs, rather than sharing them with the federal government. If
the strategy works, the federal and state governments share the savings according to
the standard matching proportions. Thus, high-risk strategies are discouraged.
Mark Greenberg, Senior Attorney at the Center for Law and Social Policy,
(1995, p. 16 and 1996) offers three more fundamental welfare reforms which the cost
neutrality requirement discourages. First, states could operate a guaranteed child
support payment system to largely replace AFDC. Second, day care support could be
significantly extended to remove this barrier to employment. Third, a time limit on
welfare receipt leading to a requirement to accept a job provided by the government
could be adopted as an alternative to a time limit leading to the end of all financial

18If counselors earned $20 per hour plus 50 percent for fringe benefits and 50
percent for supervision and other overhead, providing one hour of counseling per week
for each of 200,000 AFDC families in Michigan would cost over $400 million.
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assistance. All three of these strategies have risks of high costs, however, and states
may be reluctant to undertake these risks without a federal partner.
The need for federal protection from profligate or overly optimistic states, if
it exists at all, should be attenuated by the matching formula, which forces states to
share in additional costs in any case. The cost neutrality provision is effective only in
a situation in which a state decision maker finds a set of policy options attractive when
state risk is at the matching rate but not at full cost. In this situation, the options
would be rejected, because waiver cost neutrality would force the state to accept the
full risk. If the options are attractive at full risk, they would be adopted even if the
waiver cost neutrality requirement shifted all risk to the state. If they are not attractive
even at the state matching payment level, they would not be adopted regardless of the
presence or absence of a waiver cost neutrality requirement.
Katherine L. Cook of the Maryland Department of Human Resources
(Baillargeon & Cook, 1995) argues that the cost neutrality requirement forces the states
to propose reforms which create “winners” and “losers” so that costs will balance, but
this is not strictly true. For example, investments in job training can be recouped from
the recipient who received them through reduced need for AFDC payments in the
future. In this instance, both the recipient and the government are “winners.”
Welfare researcher Michael Wiseman views this coercive feature of cost
neutrality as a possible federal policy tool (1995, p. 10). States propose reforms
without sufficient information about the families to be affected or the extent of the
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problem to be solved “in a depressing number of cases.” The federal government
should budget funds to encourage “well-designed demonstrations that are consistent
with the national reform agenda.” Grants could then be made from these funds to
offset excess costs in the selected states only. The cost neutrality requirement would
protect the federal purse from excess costs generated by poorly designed
demonstrations and from demonstrations not consistent with the national agenda.
Earlier, Wiseman (1993, p. 34) ascribed policy making importance to the coordination
of AFDC, Food Stamps and Medicaid policies achieved by the cost neutrality
requirement.
A federal official present at the development of the cost neutrality concept
stated that the emphasis on cost neutrality figures presented as dollars did not reflect
the original federal intent, which was to consider them as percentages of total program
costs (Lovell, 1995c). However, the federal formula (see Chapter VI) computes
amounts in dollars, and must be modified to determine percentages. Further, dollars
must be recovered in the event of over expenditures. Finally, no matter how large this
amount is, it will have political implications because the public expects welfare reform
to save money, not to spend more.

An Evolutionary Model of Intergovernmental Relations

Wright (1987, p. 220) argues that federalism “is an honorable but muddled and
imprecise idea.” He prefers the term “intergovernmental relations” to denote the
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collection of processes under discussion, encompassing “government institutions and
officials, especially administrators, the human dimension of management, the persistent
patterns and long-term regularities of official interactions, and prominent policy
components such as finance and accountability.”
Wright

(1987,

pp.

225-48)

describes

four phases

through

which

intergovernmental relations have passed, concluding with the Calculative Phase.
According to Wright, three features characterize this period. Each can be related to
waiver cost neutrality:
1.

The cost of obtaining a federal grant may exceed its value. For example,

in 1995, Michigan’s Department of Public Health turned down a $4.9 million grant
from the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to pay for removal of
lead-based paint in 270 old homes.

John Truscott, Governor John Engler’s

spokesperson, argued that “The requirements made it more hassle than it was worth,”
(Miner, 1995). In this case Democrats in the state legislature disputed the executive
branch’s reasoning, pointing out that 55 of 56 localities eligible for this grant had
accepted it. Thus, other issues may have been involved, and, clearly, the “hassle”
could be controlled or reduced. The perception of extraneous costs related to federal
grants is now pervasive enough, however, that they may can be cited as a reason for
not participating in an otherwise-appealing project.
This is also a major reason why Michigan obtained several unrelated AFDC
waivers in a single package in 1992. Only one application process was required, and
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only one study for evaluation, cost neutrality, and cost-benefit analysis was needed.
Another reason was to manipulate the cost neutrality formula favorably (see below).
2.

Attempts are made to make financial formulae favorable to the

administrator’s organization. Two aspects of the cost neutrality formula are relevant
here. First, early versions of the formula developed by the Department of Health and
Human Services required cost neutrality separately in each fiscal year—that is, costs
incurred early in a program could not be offset with later savings. This was corrected
later at state urging. A state can thus now recover early costs of reforms, for example,
to job training programs, through offsetting savings in subsequent years (see Chapter
I). Second, states are allowed to combine several largely unrelated reforms into a
single package. In planning its 1992 demonstration, Michigan planned to offset costs
of encouraging work with savings from higher child support collections (Barnhart,
1992).
3. The high cost of compliance with intricate, technical requirements leads to
trade-offs between financial advantage and complexity and to incomplete compliance.
Perhaps the best example is the federal AFDC quality control system, which attempts
to control state operations through financial penalties. A random sample of cases are
reviewed and any discrepancies with policy noted. The benefit levels appropriate for
each case, after discrepancies are removed, are computed and compared with the
benefits actually paid. If the comparison indicates overpayments were made, the
percentage overpaid is computed and compared with a target. The federal matching
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amount of overpayments exceeding the target are then payable by the state to the
federal government. A complex implementation design involving cluster sampling,
multiple levels of stratification, re-review adjustments and corrective action plans has
developed around this system. States attempt to minimize their cost of reviewing cases
while controlling possible exposure to fiscal sanctions from sampling error (see
below).
Waiver cost neutrality calculations also display a high level of complexity (see
Chapter VI). They are due quarterly, but, due to their complexity and to competing
demands for scarce resources, Michigan has never delivered its calculations on time.
The distinguishing features of the calculative stage—concern over the cost of
federal grants, attempts to manipulate rules and formulae favorably, and concern over
the cost of technical grant requirements—are essentially conservative. Figuratively,
these concerns encourage a long look before one leaps. The waiver process, which
brings waiver cost neutrality into play, encourages planning for the “leap” of
implementing a demonstration project, but the “leap” is encouraged nonetheless. The
feature of waiver cost neutrality allowing early high costs to be offset by later savings
encourages long-term investment strategies. These are inherently risky to the extent
that they depend for success on a growing economy which extends even to low-income
citizens.
The

particular

forms

of control

characteristic

of

the

calculative

phase—administrative oversight resulting in high overhead and formulas for cost
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allocation—are only partially characteristic of AFDC and waiver cost neutrality.
Certainly, cost neutrality is based on a complex formula which may be manipulated to
the advantage of one party or the other. But the subtle control exerted by the federal
government as it encourages a limited range of innovations is not captured by the
calculative phase model.
Many features of AFDC, its waiver process, and waiver cost neutrality in
particular are thus seen to conform to Wright’s calculative stage of intergovernmental
relations. However, even with cost neutrality as a limitation, the waiver process
involves both political and financial risks not consistent with Wright’s model. Further,
the model does not address the policy control features of waiver cost neutrality.
Waivers and cost neutrality are more subtle policy tools than the administrative
oversight and cost allocation formulae of interest to Wright.

Reforming Welfare Through Administrative Reform

Perhaps the most unusual characteristic of waiver cost neutrality is the
possibility that states may be required to return federal matching funds spent in good
faith and in accordance with all other program rules. There is one other mechanism
by which the federal government may reduce AFDC matching funds otherwise
properly earned. The federal quality control (QC) system measures the rate at which
states grant benefits to families in excess of the level to which they are entitled.
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Viewed from the standpoint of federalism, this system provides an informative parallel
to the waiver process. Participation by the states in the QC system is mandatory.
The QC system is administered jointly by the states and the federal
government. States review eligibility and entitlement levels for a random sample of
AFDC cases every month. The total of all overpayments made to the sample families
in a year is divided by the total of all payments to produce the state mispayment rate.
The Department of Health and Human Services then re-reviews a small subsample of
these cases and adjusts the state mispayment rate to reflect any errors made by the state
reviewers. The result is the federal mispayment rate. When this value exceeds a
tolerance level established by the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, the
excess is projected statewide and matching funds on this amount are denied.
Brodkin (1986) uses the AFDC quality control system to illustrate a form of
state-federal interaction which may be considered a model for some aspects of
federalism. She captures well the significance of quality control tolerance levels when
she argues that what she termed “administrative reform:”
constituted an alternative to legislative means of responding to the
welfare explosion of the sixties. It was an alternative that largely
avoided the legislative process, appealed to divergent interests, and
lacked obvious political content. Nevertheless, it appears to have
produced systematic policy effects... The chief mechanism of
administrative reform was quality control... (pp. 4-5)
Certainly, mispayments declined; the national rate was 16.5 percent in 1973
and 7 percent in 1981. But Brodkin argues that even if it is effective, the initiation of
such administrative reform is inherently undemocratic and thus undesirable (p. 113).
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Further, the mechanisms available for administrative reform in the 1980's were largely
effective in limiting benefits; there was no administrative process available for
expanding coverage or services.

The waiver process was little used until the

Interagency Low Income Opportunity Advisory Board was created by President
Reagan in 1987 (DHHS, undated), although waivers were available.
Since both waivers and the quality control system can result in the return of
AFDC matching funds to the federal government, one could argue that waivers fall
within administrative reform as a model of federalism. However, other significant
features differ. The effect of waivers is to increase state administrative flexibility,
while the opposite is true of the quality control system. Further, although Michigan’s
1992 waivers were largely obtained and implemented through administrative means,
testimony was given to legislative committees describing the reforms, and extensive
public discussion occurred. For the most part, no legislation was required,19 but the
reforms could have been blocked by the legislature if there had been strong objections.
Since Brodkin describes administrative reform as fundamentally undemocratic,
waivers, and waiver cost neutrality, do not fit her model of federalism.

19Legislation was requested to implement some changes to the child support
enforcement system, but the legislation was not approved and the related waiver
requests were withdrawn.
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Reforming Welfare by Reforming Federalism

The attempts to reform the American welfare system discussed so far have
focused on reforming the AFDC system, its principal component. An alternative
approach is to reform the federal system itself, thereby forcing changes in the welfare
system thought to be beneficial.
Dye (1990, pp. 13-17) argues that the health of American federalism rests in
adopting a competitive model, in which states and the federal government compete in
providing the goods and services only they can provide, with consumer-taxpayers
choosing to live in the area which best matches their preferences. This model must be
adopted so that the self-interest of government officials will coincide with the interests
of society at large. This is the only sure way to protect minorities from the tyranny
of the majority, because constitutions are not self-enforcing (p. 2). This result, Dye
believes, can be achieved by supporting the values of individualism, competition,
efficiency, and equality against the values of hierarchy, collectivism, redistribution,
and equality of results.
To the argument that the poor in particular would be harmed by these policies
when wealthier consumer-taxpayers demand low welfare benefits as a condition of
residency, Dye responds (pp. 17-19) that Americans’ personal utility functions include
compassion as well as monetary benefits. “We feel better when others are ensured of
a decent existence,” and we are willing to pay “to mitigate the suffering of others,”
says Dye. He gives no specific welfare program recommendations, but it seems clear
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that the level of control over the states exerted by the federal government through the
AFDC program is unacceptable. Locally designed and funded programs would be
preferred.
John Shannon and James Edwin Kee argued in 1989 that, due largely to the
constraints imposed on the federal government by its rising deficit, Dye’s competitive
phase of federalism came about in the early 1980s (pp. 12 and 18). While this may
have been so in other areas of government activity, AFDC remained a joint federalstate program with competition limited to interstate differences in payment levels and
to a few limited policy choices.

Reforming Federalism hv Reassigning Responsibilities

Citing national economic and political paralysis due to confusion about the roles
of state and federal governments, economist Alice Rivlin has offered a proposal to
revive American federalism through reassignment of state and federal responsibilities
(1992, pp.7- 8 and 117-19). This reassignment would have significant impacts on the
poor, without explicitly specifying changes in the AFDC program.
According to Rivlin, the federal government must concentrate on problems of
global interdependence (p. 10) and problems which cross state lines, such as air traffic
control, pollution control, and scientific research (p. 12).

Health care finance,

including a universal health insurance program, is included in this category.
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The states must concentrate on economic productivity issues, including
education, job training and infrastructure repair and development (p.8). Rivlin argues,
however, that the federal budget deficit absorbs the savings needed for investments to
enhance productivity, so she suggests a two step process for funding this work through
state government. First, once state and federal roles are clarified as described above,
the federal government must balance its budget without significantly raising taxes.
Presumably, this could be accomplished by eliminating federal programs in the areas
assigned to the states. Second, the states are to enact a shared taxation system, perhaps
based on a value-added tax or a sales tax on services (pp. 142-47). This tax would be
shared on the basis of need.
Interestingly, Rivlin (p. 119) assigns only AFDC and certain types of
environmental protection problems jointly to both the federal and state governments.
The Food Stamps program would remain a federal responsibility (p. 122). This could
“give both levels of government incentives to try hard to reduce welfare dependency.”
That seems a thin argument, since assigning any responsibility to both levels would
have the effect of encouraging hard work by both levels to reduce problems in that
area. Why should welfare and environmental protection alone deserve this special
treatment? Why not, for example, interstate transportation as well, or even national
defense? One answer could lie in the possibility that local understanding would
improve government’s response to welfare and environmental problems, while states
could try to export them to another state, through bus tickets purchased for the poor
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or pollution dumped into rivers or the air. In any case, Rivlin does not address this
issue directly, but this appears to be what she has in mind.
As part of their responsibilities for economic development, the states would be
responsible for other services to the poor, including day care, job training and
education.

Rivlin argues that because the poor are a significant portion of the

workforce, states will not scrimp in this area. This argument seems optimistic; the
record of state spending on the poor in these areas is mixed. Michigan, for example,
has never claimed all the federal matching funds available under the 1988 Job
Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program because state appropriations have not
been sufficient to reach the required matching level.
Rivlin’s vision of a revised federalism would result in massive program changes
in every area of domestic policy except AFDC and Food Stamps.

She supports

continued state experimentation, presumably including welfare demonstration projects.
It is unclear, however, how the financial risks of these projects would be shared, so
the role of waivers and waiver cost neutrality are similarly unclear.

Federalism and Perverse Legislative Incentives

Paul E. Peterson (1995, p. 15) believes that contemporary federalism, under
which domestic policy is shared among levels of government, has benefits but exacts
a heavy price by producing regional inequalities and inefficient administration. The
first is certainly present in AFDC’s widely-varying benefit levels, while the second
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may also be present. He offers two theoretical perspectives on federalism (pp. 4-5,
14, 16). The first, called the functional perspective, argues that the American federal
system is well designed, being consistent with national economic and political needs.
In general, the national government takes responsibility for redistributive programs
while the states concentrate on economic development programs. To the extent that
this perspective matches reality, much of what Rivlin prescribes is in place (although
Rivlin assigns AFDC, a redistributive program, to both the state and national
governments).
Peterson’s second perspective, called “legislative,” is more troubling. Seen
through this perspective, perverse incentives shape politicians’ decisions. There are
rewards, in the form of votes, for weakening federalism, and there is blame for
strengthening it. Legislators seek to expand government in those areas where they can
claim credit for helping voters and seek to shift burdensome decisions to other levels
of government or to the executive branch.
In preparing his prescription for improving the federal system, Peterson (pp.
186-95) makes two assumptions. Reformers, should, first, do no harm. Second, they
should recognize the political limits imposed by the fact that legislators are elected to
bring home their district’s fair share of government spending; failure to do so may
become a campaign issue. Within these limits, Peterson recommends that responsibility
for welfare and health policy be accepted by the federal government while federal
participation in traditional pork barrel projects be reduced in favor of states accepting
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responsibility for economic development. His prescription, then, is to emphasize the
functional perspective and de-emphasize the legislative perspective.

Permissive Federalism

David B. Walker (1995, pp. 305-11) describes federalism in the 1990s as
“permissive federalism.”

Power is shared between the states and the federal

government, but the state share of power is determined by the federal government.
This system, says Walker, is not healthy. State and local governments do not have
sufficient constitutional, political or representational protections. Permissiveness is not
enough; the states must be freed to meet the challenges facing the country.
Walker then identifies five paradoxes ( pp. 306-11):
1. There is no clear answer to the question of whether a state-centered system
or a nation-centered system has been strengthened in recent years.
2.

It is not clear whether the current federal system is competitive or

cooperative.
3. It is not clear whether the current system is co-optive and centralized or
collaborative and decentralized.
4.

It is not clear whether this is a time of government activism or of

government constraint.
5. It is not clear whether the federal system is overloaded or not.
These conflicting views exist because:
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1. There is no clear consensus on the needs of the states.
2.

“Particularistic philosophic propensities,” namely, politicians who take

singular viewpoints that damage consensus, have come to dominate.
3. Governments at all levels have fiscal problems.
4. There is a “new political system” of ever expanding national pressure
groups.
5. Reformed state governments are able to take on more responsibilities, and
are demanding them.
6. The Supreme Court has issued decisions resulting in more centralization.
7. The values of egalitarianism and libertarianism are actively in conflict.
8. Similarly, the values of economic growth and protectionism are actively in
conflict.
Walker concludes (pp. 326-27) that a “Big Swap” of responsibilities is needed
to replace “permissive federalism” with “protected federalism.” His “Big Swap”
would strongly resemble Rivlin’s and Peterson’s prescriptions, with the federal
government accepting responsibility for cash assistance (except AFDC), health care,
research and development, information gathering and interstate transportation. The
states would accept responsibility for the infrastructure, job training, housing, rural
services, economic development, social services and drug control. Responsibility for
environmental protection, natural resources development, AFDC, higher education,
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and student loans and grants would be shared, although some versions of welfare
reform might modify the placement of AFDC.

Federalism Reform Efforts That Ignore Welfare

In contrast to Rivlin, Peterson and Walker, three other notable government
reform efforts of the early 1990s fail to single out welfare for special consideration.
First was the National Commission on the State and Local Public Service, sponsored
by the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute and usually called the Winter Commission after
William F. Winter, its chair. Its first report, Hard Truths/Tough Choices: An Agenda
for State and Local Reform (1993b), offered ten recommendations. The first nine are
general prescriptions for more effective and efficient government. The tenth focusses
attention on health care, inviting the federal government to “lead, follow, or get out
of the way” (p. 60), demonstrating that specific government sectors were considered
by the Commission. Health care reform was also the subject of a second volume
issued by the Commission, Frustrated Federalism: R for State and Local Health Care
Reform (1993a).
Vice President A1 Gore’s National Performance Review contains much greater
detail, offering 130 recommendations for reform. Many refer to specific government
activities, including environmental protection, trade regulation and dispute resolution.
Welfare, however, is not among these.
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Finally, the Republican Governor’s Conference issued the “Williamsburg
Resolves” at its November, 1994 meetings. “Recognizing the urgency of the need and
uniqueness of the opportunity for reform,” they stated, “we declare our common
resolve to restore balance to the federal-state relationship and renew the framers’
vision.” (staff of the Rockefeller Institute Bulletin, 1996e, p. 17). They offered a four
point agenda, mentioning welfare (along with health care and environmental
protection) only to indicate the range of programs with unfunded mandates.
These efforts, roughly representing the political middle, left and right, seem
problematic. Welfare reform was arguably the most prominent domestic issue of 1995
(replacing health care reform, the dominant issue of 1994). If welfare reform deserved
this lofty position on the national agenda, could it have been achieved suddenly in
1995? If not, how could these three thoughtful reform efforts fail to address it? This
opens at least the possibility that welfare reform’s dominance was not truly reflective
of its urgency, and that the failure of all major reform efforts reflected this underlying
lack of real urgency. Other explanations are possible, of course: the Williamsburg
Resolves are deliberately general, and the Vice President might have chosen or been
asked to leave welfare reform for the President, for example. But when the 1995-1996
reform period passes, this hypothesis should be considered.
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The Devolution Revolution

Federalism is in part characterized by the struggle between the federal
government and the states implicit in Glendenning and Reeves’ (p. 8) observation that
“each may exert leverage on the other.” The relative power of each level, then will
wax and wane with public opinion, especially as expressed in elections. The 1992
congressional elections (see Chapter II) was one such expression. Based on a general
disappointment with the federal government’s role in welfare and the early success
claimed for some waiver demonstrations, control of Congress passed to those who
would enhance the states’ role in welfare while containing federal costs. Block grants
were their chosen vehicle.
Based on House Republican intentions to create a “huge leap upward this year”
in block grants (p. 1), political scientist Richard P. Nathan declared a “devolution
revolution” (title page) to be underway (1995). This revolution is based on demands
from the governors for more authority and on the acute budget pressures faced by all
levels of government (p. 5). The “New(t)” Federalism of this period is characterized
by many block grant proposals, and is part of a national movement to limit government
(pp. 12-13).
Nathan notes (pp. 13-14) that block granting AFDC may require rewriting the
formula used to distribute the federal share of program costs. Under current policies,
the federal role in determining distribution lies in setting the level at which state
expenditures will be matched. This is done by formula and produces a matching rate
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related to each state’s economic condition. The rate falls between 50 percent and 80
percent. The states set the total to be spent by setting payment levels. Under a block
grant, the congress has responsibility for both setting the total and distributing it
among the states.
Before computers, says Nathan, formula writing was done in a political back
room. Now, everyone is watching, noting which states are winners and which losers
under each variation. This led him to three lessons:
1. “An old formula is a good formula.” The least disruptive alternative will
be considered the best.
2. Several iterations may be needed for any new approach to become effective
and politically feasible.
3. To be successful, a formula should at least sound simple.
Nathan finds the heart of the problem of AFDC’s proper location in the federal
system to be the program’s purpose (pp. 14-15). His reading of the literature of
federalism suggests that social service programs, such as job training and placement,
belong to the states, while income transfer programs belong with at the federal level.
He notes that, since the Family Support Act of 1988, AFDC’s emphasis has become
muddled. One possibility he doesn’t note is that the location might determine the
emphasis, rather than vice-versa.
Nathan (p. 23) calls for extensive state accountability under block grants. To
avoid proliferating unfunded mandates, he proposes that block grants include funding
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for data systems, regular evaluation reports, and research on post-block grant
outcomes.

These reports and research studies should not depend on prescribed

performance measures because the states will “game” these; a wider view is needed.
The federal government should support (with funding) state efforts at “goal-setting,
data-gathering and reporting systems” and “demonstration-type studies of best
practices, using rigorous research methods to examine and report on how they
worked.” This suggests that the cost neutrality methodology may continue to be
important following implementation of block grants.

Waiver Cost Neutrality as a New and Significant Aspect of Federalism

Waiver cost neutrality as a static phenomena can be understood through the
“calculative phase” of Wright’s intergovernmental relations model. This description,
though, does not adequately account for either the innovation demanded by the federal
government if waivers are to be granted or the opportunity that waiver cost neutrality
offers to the federal government as an indirect policy control mechanism.
Similarly, such federalism reformers as Dye, Rivlin, Peterson and Walker do
not anticipate the complexities of waiver cost neutrality, even though Rivlin and
Walker continue to assign responsibility for AFDC jointly to the states and the federal
government. Nathan, anticipating the replacement of AFDC by block grants and the
need for information about states’ subsequent programs, suggests federal funding of
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studies which could easily depend in part on the same methodology as waiver cost
neutrality.
Waiver cost neutrality, then, is a novel and significant characteristic of
federalism in the 1990s. It may result in the reduction of a state’s effective federal
matching rates for AFDC, an established entitlement program, even when all program
requirements have been met, a situation which arises only in the quality control system
otherwise. Federalism reformers seldom mention it as a tool, while welfare reformers
find it a faulty one. As grander reform efforts fail in the congress or are vetoed,
however, waivers and the accompanying cost neutrality requirement:
1. Increase state flexibility;
2. Transfer some pressure for reform from the federal level to the state level;
3. Protect federal financial interests from riskier reforms;
4. Serve as an intermediate model to block grants on one hand and continued
federal control of welfare policy on the other; and
5. Partially preserves AFDC as a uniform national program by preserving basic
characteristics not subject to waiver.
Under this model, the federal government retains significant power over
welfare policy making by allowing the AFDC program to become less uniform from
state to state, partially sacrificing an important policy goal in order to save the
program. States propose policy changes which the U. S. Department of Health and
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Human Services accepts or rejects, after negotiation. Cost neutrality guarantees that
there will be no change in fiscal power.
Ultimately, this model is limited and tentative. Significant improvement in the
welfare system may be possible only by spending more money, which is just what
waiver cost neutrality is designed to prevent.

Waivers depend individually on

scientific design and analysis, but the lack of coordination from state to state makes
any significant gain in knowledge unlikely.

Finally, due to limitations in the

authorizing legislation, some policy options cannot be tried under waivers. The waiver
system, then, seems an unlikely long-term support for the uncomfortable but stable
point which forces seeking welfare reform have reached.
Attempts in 1995 to convert the Food Stamps program to a block grant met
with little support. Waivers and cost neutrality apply to Food Stamps as well as to
AFDC, so they are likely to continue to be significant features of the American welfare
system even if AFDC is converted to a block grant program. Thus, even if new forces
push the federal government successfully to welfare reform, waivers and cost
neutrality will remain interesting aspects of federalism.
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CHAPTER VI

THE FEDERAL COST NEUTRALITY FORMULA

The documents approving Michigan’s welfare reform demonstration (called To
Strengthen Michigan Families, or TSMF) contained the expected requirement that “the
operation of this demonstration is to be cost-neutral to the Federal government with
respect to benefit and administrative costs for AFDC, Food Stamps, Child Support
Enforcement, and Medicaid,” (Barnhart, 1992, p. 9 of second attachment).
Instructions for calculating federal savings or excess costs were provided by DHHS
in narrative form (pp. 10-12). Michigan’s first efforts to carry out this calculation
were incorrect, and a sample calculation was FAXed by Phillip Springer to the author
(Springer, 1993) for clarification. The cost neutrality requirement was continued
without change when Michigan’s demonstration was expanded to new policy areas and
extended by two years in 1994 (Bane, p. 7 of attachment). The calculation formula
was unchanged.

Heuristic Development

The cost neutrality formula for federal costs was developed through a simple
heuristic, with two clever additions. The following example describes the calculation,
beginning with benefit cost for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC):
122
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1. Using random sampling, the average federal AFDC benefit costs per family
under the control policy and under the experimental policy are obtained.
2. The control policy average is divided by the experimental policy average to
obtain the average cost ratio.
3. The average cost ratio is multiplied by the statewide total federal AFDC
benefit costs for families covered by the experimental policies to estimate what these
costs would have been under the control policies.
4. The statewide total federal cost of AFDC benefits for families covered by
the experimental policies (the same quantity as in step 3) is subtracted from this
estimate to estimate excess costs or savings incurred for AFDC benefits by the federal
government.

In this formulation, positive results indicate savings while negative

results indicate excess costs.
The unavailability of statewide costs for administration and for other programs1
led to the first clever addition:
5. The ratios of the average values per family for the additional quantities of
interest under the experimental policies in the study sites to the average federal AFDC
benefit cost for these families are obtained.

These ratios are multiplied by the

Unavailability of these costs is an artifact of the accounting and reporting
systems used by the states and the federal government. The Food Stamps and
Medicaid programs serve many families not included in the study groups, and their
costs cannot be separated from costs incurred by families included. Similarly,
statewide administrative costs are determined for each program, but not separately for
families included and families not included.
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statewide total federal AFDC benefit costs for families covered by the experimental
policies (again, as in step 3) to estimate what these quantities were statewide under the
experimental policies. The result is multiplied by the average cost ratio (as defined in
step 2 above) to obtain statewide estimates of costs under control policies.
The second clever addition is to consistently use average costs for all families
ever included in the control and experimental study sites when computing average
costs, including families which no longer receive any welfare benefits or which never
received benefits from a particular program.2 However, a family must have received
benefits from AFDC (or, in Michigan, SFA) to enter the sample. As a result, the
sample size is the same for all programs, varying only between control and
experimental policies.
All values are computed cumulatively, beginning with the first day of the
demonstration.

A family’s assignment to control or experimental policies is

permanent, as long as they remain in one of the research sites. That is, if the family’s
case closes and then reopens, or the family becomes eligible just for Food Stamps or
Medicaid, its policy assignment is not changed, and the new costs are accumulated
along with older costs.

One consequence of this approach is that only the final

calculation, done at the end of the demonstration project, has any official standing
(although repayments may be due if early interim results indicate high excess costs).

2The error made by Michigan in its first attempt to calculate its savings was to
use separate counts of families served for each program.
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All earlier calculations are advisory only, and subject to revision.

Another

consequence is that there are no formal results for individual quarters or years,
although these may be estimated by successive differences.

The Population and the Research Sample

Offices 1, ..., ( are designated as research offices. Families in these offices
receiving AFDC (and, in Michigan, State Family Assistance, or SFA) at the beginning
of the experiment are assigned randomly to control and experimental policies, as are
families which begin receiving AFDC (or SFA) during the experiment. Data from
these offices are used in the cost neutrality calculation and in the evaluation of the
effects of the experiment on family welfare use. Families in office j fall into four
groups as shown in Table 4.
Group CN would have no members in most states implementing statewide
reforms.

However, Michigan was one of the host states for a national JOBS

demonstration project, and the terms and conditions included in Michigan’s waiver
approval required that families in that project continue to be administered under the
pre-waiver (control) policies. Groups XR and CR are empty for locations /+ 1 , ...,
L. In this notation, nLCN represents the statewide total number of families receiving
AFDC or SFA between the start of the experiment and the date on which the cost
neutrality calculation is made. Cost neutrality calculations are made quarterly, and are
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Table 4
Family Groups in Office j

Group
XR

CR

XN

CN

Families

Number
in Group

n G-l)CN+ 1 » m jXR = njXR"

•••» njXR

n G-l)CN

njXR + l ’ •••>

m jCR = njCR

njCR

' njXR

nj C R + l , . . . ,

m jXN = njXN

njXN

" nJ c R

njX N + l> •••>

m jCN = njCN

njCN

“ njXN

Description
Receive experimental policy and are in the
research sample
Receive control policy and are in the research
sample
Receive experimental policy but are not in the
research sample
Receive control policy but are not in the
research sample

(Figures are for Michigan, October 1992 through March 1995.)
When j = l, setn (j_1)CN = n ^ = 0.
Source: Meizlish, 1994, p. A l.

cumulative—that is, all costs incurred since the beginning of the experiment are
included, and once a family enters the sample it remains there.
Families who move in and out of the research sites present a special problem.
Control policies are generally not available outside of the four research sites, so all
families transferring to other offices will receive the experimental policies in their new
locations. Their experience with the experimental policies may have changed their
behavior, so they cannot return to the experiment even if they return to one of the
study offices. Families in Groups XR and CR who move away from the research sites
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are treated as if their cases had closed; no further costs are accumulated. They are
assigned to Group XN as if their cases were newly opened; they retain this status even
if they subsequently return to a research site.

This practice reduces the

representativeness of the sample because families who move their home are clearly
more mobile than those who do not, and may differ in other characteristics more
directly related to welfare use. However, it avoids the necessity of serving cases under
the control policies outside of the four research sites (an administratively cumbersome
activity). Finally, statewide case counts are not used in the cost neutrality estimator,
so the double counting which might result is of no practical consequence.
No counts of families transferring out of Michigan’s experimental sites are
available. Counts of families transferring into two of the four offices in Michigan’s
sample are, however, available. In the first ten quarters of the experiment, 1,809
AFDC families transferred into those sites, 11.5 percent of the total number of control
families, experimental families, and families transferring into the sites (Meizlish, 1995,
p. D4). These families are assigned to Group XN, receiving experimental policies but
not included in the research sample. If the same number transfer out of those sites (as
would be true of the full sample if, as assumed, it is representative of the state), up to
20.6 percent of the families in Michigan’s study could be affected by the rules
governing sampling of transfer cases only two and one-half years into a planned seven
year study (the actual percentage would be reduced by families who both transfer in
and transfer out of a site). Thus, treatment of transfer cases could become a significant
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problem as the demonstration nears completion.

Monitoring the impact of case

transfers is one of the outside evaluator’s duties.
In Michigan, families receiving SFA are also included because the
demonstration policies allow some families to receive AFDC who would be eligible
only for SFA under the control policies.

It is not possible, using the available

database, to separate these families from families who would have received SFA even
under the experimental policies, so all SFA families are included in both the control
and experimental samples.
While this appears to be an extra complication for Michigan, it has a silver
lining. Without the SFA program, some applicants would be found eligible for AFDC
under the experimental policies while identical families assigned to the control policies
would be found ineligible. To keep the control and experimental samples equivalent,
the future welfare use and income of the second group of families would have to be
tracked for cost neutrality and evaluation purposes. Including all AFDC and SFA
families in both the control and experimental groups ensures comparability without the
need to track families not on assistance.
No total count of SFA families ever served is available. However, the average
numbers of SFA families eligible during January, February and March 1995 in the
four research sites are given by Meizlish (1995, p. E18); there were 224 under control
policies and 87 under experimental policies. These figures are 2.6 percent and 1.0
percent of the sample totals respectively.
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The Michigan Sample

In Michigan, four research offices were selected3 ( / = 4). This selection was
not made at random, but purposively to force a rough match with statewide values on
four variables thought to affect the likelihood that a welfare family will have earnings:
employment rate, family size, race, and average welfare grant.
When the experiment began on October 1, 1992 random assignment of families
to the control group and to the two experimental groups was accomplished by keeping
the caseloads of individual welfare workers intact.

That is, in statistical terms,

assignment was by clusters, each cluster consisting of the group of families served by
a single worker. Since some workers specialized in particular kinds of families (those
with income, for example), care was taken to ensure that the control and experimental
samples had equal numbers of specialists. In statistical terms, the population was
stratified by worker speciality before random assignment of clusters of families took
place. The federal terms covering sample implementation permitted this approach
(Bane, pp. 5-6).
Data from the control policy group and the first experimental policy group
(called the experimental/research policy group in Michigan, but referred to hereafter
as simply “experimental”) are used in the cost neutrality calculation and in the

3Kalamazoo County, the Madison Heights district of Oakland County, and the
McNichols/Goddard and Schaefer/Six Mile Districts of Wayne County were selected.
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evaluation. The remaining experimental policy group (called the experimental/non
research policy group in Michigan) was created to force the proportions of cases in the
total sample of control and of experimental/research cases which were in Wayne
County4 to match the statewide proportion. This was accomplished by randomly
assigning 30 percent of the families in the two Wayne County research sites to the
experimental/non-research group. These two groups of families are assigned to Group
XN. The remaining clusters of families were divided evenly, at random, between
control and experimental policies.
As new families became eligible for AFDC or SFA, 30 percent of those in the
two Wayne County research sites were assigned to Group XN. The remaining new
families in the Wayne County research sites and all new families in the two outstate
research sites were randomly assigned to Groups XR and CR in approximately equal
numbers.5 Nearly all families outside of the four research sites receive the
experimental policies.6

4Wayne County contains the city of Detroit, which has consistently higher
unemployment than the rest of Michigan, and consequently has a higher concentration
of welfare recipients. This concentration and related economic factors could affect the
success of the experiment, so balance was considered important.
5Randomization of new families is accomplished through the social security
number belonging to the family member receiving benefit checks.
6Three locations in Michigan were cooperating in a national study of job
training programs for welfare recipients. All families in these locations continued to
receive the old (control) policies until the samples needed for that study had been
selected. At that time, families not in the study were assigned to the experimental
policies.
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At the end of the tenth quarter of Michigan’s demonstration, the sample sizes
were as shown in Table 5:

Table 5
Michigan Sample Sizes, October 1992 - March 1995

Group

Number in Group

XR

m XR “ E m jXR

= 11,232
CR

m CR = E m jCR2

Description
Receive experimental policy and are in the research
sample
Receive control policy and are in the research sample

= 11,005
XN

m XN = I m jXN

[Unknown]
CN

m CN = I m jCN

[Not Given]

Receive experimental policy but are not in the
research sample
Receive control policy but are not in the research
sample

Source: Meizlish, 1995, p. A1

In summary, the Michigan control and experimental samples are not simple
random samples from the statewide AFDC/SFA caseload. However, several steps
were taken to make these samples resemble simple random samples:
1. Sites were selected to produce a pool for sample selection which resembles
the statewide caseload in characteristics thought to be important for the study.
2. Excess Wayne County cases were discarded.
3. The remaining cases and all new cases were randomly assigned to control
or experimental policies.
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4. Transfer cases received special treatment.
As a result of these steps, the federal cost neutrality formula and the evaluation
design treat the control and experimental samples as if they were simple random
samples from the statewide caseload.

AFDC Calculations

Let ayk = AFDC payments due to the i111family, i = l , ..., mj1+mj2+mj3+mj4,
in the j 111office, j = 1, ..., L, under policy k; k = X for experimental policy or k = C for
control policy. Only half of the a ^ are realized; the others represent theoretical
payments under the policy family i was not assigned to receive, as shown in Table 6.
The realized ayk are the result of calculations done by welfare workers on the
same observable quantities (family size, income, assets, and location) under both
policies. Since these quantities are recorded, it might be supposed that the theoretical
entries above could simply be computed. However, the intent of Michigan’s reforms
is to modify behavior, encouraging higher earnings and thus lower welfare payments.
Simply computing the theoretical values would assume that this effect did not occur.
The theoretical control values for families in Groups 1 and 3 are of particular
interest, since they represent the costs which would have been incurred if no
experiment had taken place. The goal of the cost neutrality calculation is to estimate
the difference between the total of these values and the total of the realized
experimental values for these groups.
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Table 6
Realized and Theoretical Payments
Group

Experimental Policy (k=X )

Control Policy
(k=C )

XR

Realized

Theoretical

CR

Theoretical

Realized

XN

Realized

Theoretical

CN

Theoretical

Realized

Let
L
PA k * £
j.l

"jp
£
a ljk >
l.n ^ .1
'JK

n j0

s °-

Some of these are known (values given are Michigan’s federal AFDC costs for
the period October 1992 to March 1995; see Meizlish, 1996, pp. A1-A2):
xrAx

= Total payments received by families in Group XR (experimental
policies, research cases)
= $45,151,325

crAc

= Total payments received by families in Group CR (control policies,
research cases)
= $45,328,231

xnAx

= Total payments received by families in Group XN (experimental
policies, non-research cases)
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= $1,479,757,699.
We wish to estimate
D a = XR-^C + XN^C ■ ( x r ^ x + X N ^ x )

(2)

the savings in AFDC benefit costs attributable to using experimental policies.
This quantity exemplifies the accounting basis for the federal cost neutrality
requirement, in contrast to a research basis. A typical research question might be
“How much extra would applying the experimental policies statewide save?” DA does
not answer this question, because its formula does not contain an adjustment for the
savings from applying the experimental policies to the groups given control policies
(Groups CR and CN). Rather, the formula seeks to estimate only the additional
savings actually attained by applying the experimental policies where they were
implemented (Groups XR and XN).
These are unknown:
xrAc

= Total payments which would have been received by families in Group
XR if control policies had been applied (control policies applied to
experimental/research cases)

xjjAc

= Total payments which would have been received by families in Group
XN if control policies had been applied (control policies applied to
experimental/non-research cases)
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Thus, the last two terms on the right hand side of (2) are known, while the first
two terms are not. The federal estimator (Meizlish, 1996, pp. A1-A3) for October,
1992 - March, 1995 is :

— xrA c
Da =

---------

( xrA x +

xn A x )

- ( xrA x +

xn A x )

@)

— x rA x

m,

----- $44,412,143
• 11,005--------------------- ($45,151 ,325 .$1 ,4 4 0 ,5 1 9 ,255) - ($45,151 ,325 .$ 1 ,4 4 0 ,5 1 9 .255)
------$45,151 ,325
11,232

= 1.003918 x $1,485,670,580 - $1,485,670,580
= $5,820,978
That is, the average cost per control case in the research sample is divided by
the average cost per experimental case in the research sample. This ratio is multiplied
by the total cost of all cases receiving the experimental policy to estimate what their
costs would have been under the control policy. The total cost of all cases receiving
the experimental policy is subtracted from this result to estimate costs or savings due
to the policy change. A negative result would have indicated that the experimental
policies were more expensive than the control policies, while the positive result
obtained indicates that they were less expensive by $5,820,978.
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Food Stamps and Medicaid Calculations

Now let fjjjj and myk be defined as a ^ for Food Stamps payments and Medicaid
payments respectively. Define pFk and pMk as pAk was defined, where p represents
the group designation. Again, we wish to estimate Dp and DM defined as DA was.
However, the Medicaid and Food Stamps programs also serve families who were never
AFDC participants (or, in Michigan, SFA participants), and thus are not part of the
experiment. Available reports do not separate costs for these families from costs for
those who are part of the experiment, so xn^ x anc* xn^ x are not available.
Instructions from the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services anticipate this
problem; the federal estimator for Food Stamps becomes:

(4)

$40,482,891 ($1,485,670,580)]- $40,482,891 ($1,485,670,580)
$45,151,325
$45,151,325
$23,254,084

That is, the equation used to estimate excess AFDC cost (Equation (3)) must
be modified to estimate statewide Food Stamps costs for families receiving the
experimental policy. The ratio of Food Stamps costs to AFDC costs in the research
sites is multiplied by the statewide costs of AFDC for families receiving the
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experimental policy to obtain this estimate. (Since the sample sizes for XRFX and
xrAx

are identical (=

), no division is needed.) DM is determined similarly;

Dm = $31,319,331 (Meizlish, 1996, p. A3).

Administrative Costs

Associated with

a y k,

fjjk,

and

m yk

are

t y k, Uyk ,

and

Vyk ,

respectively,

representing the administrative costs of making these payments to the family. No
attempt is made to measure these individually, but estimates of XRTX, CRTC, and
xnTx , and of XRUX, CRUC, Xr^x> an(* c r ^ c are obtained through random moment
sampling.

These estimates are used to obtain DT, Du, and Dv using formulae

analogous to (3) and (4) above, obtaining d t = =$16,578,759, D„ = -$9,641,953, and
Dv = -$13,691,809.

Total Excess Costs and Savings

Federal waiver conditions require only that

D = DA + Dp + DM + Dx + Dy + Dv = $20,481,871

be computed for federal program costs; it is this quantity which must be repaid by the
state to the federal government if it is negative. When, as in the Michigan example,
it is positive, it may be “spent” through expanding the waiver experiment, or the
federal government will simply accept the savings.
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State Program Calculations

There is no waiver condition requiring that state excess costs or savings be
estimated. However, failure to do so leaves an incomplete accounting of the effect of
the welfare reform experiment on state expenditures. Further, the federal calculation
formulae allow a straightforward extension to stab* costs by defining Syk, Ds , and Ds
as for Food Stamps and adding additional variables for additional state programs as
needed. Complete results are given in Chapter III.
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CHAPTER VII

THE FINDINGS: CONFIDENCE INTERVAL CALCULATIONS

Confidence Intervals

The cost neutrality calculation for Michigan’s welfare reform demonstration
depends on two distinct samples. The first consists of randomly-selected families
receiving either the original (control) policies or the demonstration (experimental)
policies.

This sample is used to compare costs for the benefits provided to the

families. The second is the result of a random moment time study of the work of
assistance payments workers, the employees who determine eligibility and benefit
levels for families receiving welfare. These samples are combined to compare the
costs of welfare under the two policies, resulting in an estimate of excess costs or
savings under the experimental policies. The formula for this calculation is specified
by the federal government in the terms and conditions granting the waivers (Barnhart,
1992; Springer, 1994; and Bane, 1994). The details of this formula are discussed in
Chapter VI.
Since the estimate of excess costs or savings obtained is based on random
samples, it is subject to sampling uncertainty. This uncertainty should be considered
whenever the estimate is used. The federal terms and conditions, however, neither
139
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require a measure of the uncertainty in the resulting estimates nor suggest any way to
calculate such a measure.
One useful measure of uncertainty is the confidence interval, a range of
possible values for excess costs or savings, usually surrounding the single estimated
value. The confidence interval has an associated confidence level, which is the
probability that the interval includes the true value of the excess costs or savings.
Confidence intervals are widely used to describe uncertainty in survey results and in
other results based on random sampling. Their calculation and meaning are part of
most introductory undergraduate statistics and research methods courses, and many
newspaper and magazine reports of opinion surveys now include them, usually given
as margins of error. Thus, while their technical meaning may not be well-understood,
they can be assumed to be familiar to most data users within government.

Calculating Parametric Confidence Intervals

There is no single formula or process for calculating confidence intervals. The
choice of method depends on the nature of the data obtained and of the value to be
estimated, and on any information available about the underlying distribution for the
data. However, one straightforward example will serve to demonstrate the essential
ideas used in “parametric inference,” the most commonly used approach.
Suppose that a simple random sample of seven AFDC families has been
selected from a large group of cases (called the population) in order to estimate the
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average AFDC payment for families in the large group. The population average
payment is the “parameter” to be estimated. Table 7 describes the sample.

Table 7
Initial Sample

Sample Case

AFDC Payment

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

$100
$200
$250
$300
$300
$450
$500

The sample average provides an estimate for the average AFDC payment to
cases in the larger group. The uncertainty in this estimate can then be expressed with
a confidence interval. For this example, a 60 percent confidence interval will be
computed.7
1.

Compute the sample average. Let the payment for each family in the sample

be represented by yj, where i = 1, 2, 3, ... , 7. Then

7In most instances, confidence intervals are computed for a level of 90 percent,
95 percent, or 99 percent, with 95 percent predominating in social science work.
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—

1

Sample Average = y » —
7 i.l

(6)

= $300

2. Compute the sample variance.
7

Sample Variance = s 2 =

(7)

5 > , - y)2 ■ 19,167

(7 - 1) t r

3. Compute the standard error of the mean.

(8)

Standard Error o f the Mean = SEM

4.

Using a standard table of the Student’s t distribution with 7-1 = 6 degrees

of freedom, obtain the ordinate for the (100 percent - 60 percent)/2 = 20th percentile.8
This value is -1.44. Obtain the upper and lower 60 percent confidence bounds as
follows:

Upper Confidence Bound = $300 + 1.44 x $52.3 = $375

(9)

Lower Confidence Bound » $300 - 1.44 x $52.3 = $225

(10)

Thus, with 60 percent certainty, the true average family AFDC payment is
inferred to lie between $225 and $375. One way to interpret this statement is that if
this process is repeated many times, different values for the sample mean and the two

8This step depends on the application of the Central Limit Theorem, which in
this case suggests that the sample average has an approximately normal distribution.
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confidence bounds will be obtained each time, but 60 percent of the confidence
intervals obtained will contain the population average.

Calculating Confidence Intervals With the Bootstrap Method

The formula used to calculate the estimated excess costs or savings for waiver
demonstrations involves ratios of random quantities. Because ratios may have illbehaved distributions,9 confidence intervals for estimates of this form are not reliably
computed with standard formulae, such as that used in the example above. The
bootstrap process provides a convenient and reliable alternative.

Resampling

Resampling is a statistical technique for estimating population values from
samples.

This is accomplished by producing additional random samples from an

existing sample by repeated sampling, with replacement, from the existing sample.
By adding a technique called bootstrapping, percentile confidence intervals (equivalent
to confidence intervals) may also be estimated. This approach is particularly useful
when the estimation formula, the sample plan, or both are too complex for analytic
determination of confidence intervals.

9For example, the ratio of two normally-distributed random variables has a
Cauchy distribution. This distribution is so ill-behaved that it has no average or
variance. The conventional method of generating a confidence interval is inappropriate
for such ratios because it requires an estimate of the variance and assumes that the
sample averages themselves are approximately normally distributed.
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Example of Resampling and Bootstrapping

Suppose again that a simple random sample of seven AFDC families has been
selected from a large group of cases (called the population) in order to estimate the
average AFDC payment for families in the large group. Table 7 above describes the
sample. The sample provides an estimate of $300 for the average AFDC payment to
cases in the larger group. Although the technique described above could be used to
examine the precision of this estimate, bootstrapping may also be applied. The
bootstrap analogue of the confidence interval used here is called the percentile
confidence interval (Efron and Tibshirani, p. 170). To compute the percentile
confidence interval, the original sample of seven cases now serves as the population
for additional, repeated sampling. Each sample will contain seven families again, but
these will be selected with replacement. (In sampling with replacement, unlike in
simple random sampling, families may appear in the sample more than once.) Ten
new samples are obtained in this way, as shown in Table 8.
Table 9 repeats the 10 sample means shown in Table 8, sorting them from
lowest to highest.
Since a 60 percent confidence level is desired, 100 percent - 60 percent = 40
percent of the resampling averages must be discarded. Discarding the two lowest
sample averages (the bottom 20 percent of the 10 averages obtained) and the highest
sample average (the top 20 percent of the 10 averaages obtained) gives a 60 percentile
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Table 8
Sample Replicates Under Resampling

Sample

Sum
Average
Sample

Sum
Average

1

2

3

4

5

$300
$500
$300
$200
$500
$200
$300
$2,300
$288

$300
$250
$450
$200
$100
$450
$300
$2,050
$256

$500
$450
$500
$450
$500
$450
$450
$3,300
$413

$450
$300
$450
$450
$250
$300
$500
$2,700
$338

$300
$500
$500
$500
$100
$450
$500
$2,850
$356

6
$200
$200
$250
$200
$250
$300
$450
$1,850
$231

7
$100
$500
$250
$250
$100
$500
$100
$1,800
$225

8
$500
$300
$200
$300
$500
$500
$100
$2,400
$300

9
$500
$450
$300
$100
$450
$500
$300
$2,600
$325

10
$200
$500
$500
$100
$200
$300
$300
$2,100
$263

confidence interval from $231 to $356.10 If this process were repeated many times,
the resulting percentile confidence intervals would be expected to contain the

10The observations to be discarded need not be divided equally between the
upper and lower ranges. For example, if a percentile confidence interval describing the
smallest likely values for the population average were needed, the four smallest values
would be discarded.
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Table 9
Sample Means Obtained Through Repeated
Sampling With Replacement

Sample
Number

Average AFDC
Payment

7

$225

6

$231

2

$256

10

$263

1

$288

8

$300

9

$325

4

$338

5

$356

3

$413

population average 60 percent of the time.
The bootstrap percentile confidence interval of $231 to $356 is slightly
narrower than the parametric confidence interval of $225 to $375 obtained earlier, but
this may not always be the case. The bootstrap interval is not centered on the $300
mean as the parametric interval always is; this is a likely result. In practice, these
intervals are otherwise equivalent. They each may be expected to contain the average
AFDC payment for the population of families 60 percent of the time.
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In the example given, standard formulae might have sufficed to produce a
confidence interval. However, when the quantity to be estimated from the sample is
complex, as in welfare reform cost neutrality, estimation formulae are likely to involve
ratios of random quantities.

As noted above, standard formulae for confidence

intervals may then be inappropriate, while the resampling process described above may
still be used.

Percentile Confidence Intervals for Michigan’s Cost Neutrality Results

To implement the bootstrap process for percentile confidence interval
estimation, a large number of sample replicates must be created (2,000 were used in
this research). Replicates of both the benefit and administrative cost samples are
needed. The remainder of this chapter describes their creation and analysis.

Creating the Research Benefit File

MDSS Bureau of Information Systems staff (Thomas Wrobel and Christine
Days) prepared a file containing benefit data for all control and experimental families
from the Department’s mainframe data system. They used procedures identical to those
used in preparing data for the Department’s own cost neutrality calculations, but
slightly different results were obtained (see below). Wrobel and Days are unable to
explain the differences, but they may have resulted from back-dated corrections to the
master file as, for example, in making retroactive payments to cases with claims
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delayed pending receipt of additional information. Changes of this type could occur
after the data for the Department’s own cost neutrality calculations were obtained but
before the data used for this research were obtained. The result would be slightly
different files, as experienced.
Dennis Roberts of the Staffing and Program Evaluation Division copied this file
from the Department’s mainframe system to his PC network where it was available as
Lovell.Dat. This file consisted of a record for each family for each year, containing
a unique family identifier (called a case number), a policy identifier (experimental/
research, experimental/non-research, and control), office identifiers, and benefit costs
for AFDC, Food Stamps, Medicaid, State Family Assistance, and State Medical
Assistance.
The file was sorted (beginning with the primary sort) by year, policy and case
number. No records appeared for years in which a family received no benefits. A
series of SPSS11 steps was needed to prepare a file suitable for the Visual BASIC
programs written for the research project, and to remove the family identifier before
moving data from the Department’s computers to the researcher’s home computer.
Separate SPSS files named TSMFBobC.Sav and TSMFBobE.Sav containing the
control and experimental cases respectively were created, copied to floppy disks, and
then copied to the home computer as TSMFCon.Sav and TSMFExp.Sav.12 These files
1Statistical Eackage for the Social Sciences. SPSS for Windows Revision 6.0
was used for all work described here.
12The .Sav extension on a file name indicates an SPSS system file.
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retained the basic record structure of Lovell.Dat, with records inserted for years in
which there were no welfare payments. While Visual BASIC could have read this file,
the redundant data (records for years with no payment and repeated case descriptors)
would have slowed the program down, so ExpASCI.Sav and ConASCI.Sav were
created with a single record per family through SPSS. These were translated to ASCII
format by SPSS and saved as ExpASCI.Dat and ConASCI.Dat.

Comparing the MDSS and Research Benefit Files

The differences between the data used for the Department’s calculations and
those used for the research are shown in Table 10. The very close match on sample
sizes is tantalizing—perfect for the control sample and off by one in 11,232 in the
experimental sample. The 9.4 percent difference in average cost of State Medical
Assistance for control cases is, therefore, notable and surprising. However, it will
have little effect on overall calculations because this program has very low costs
compared to the remaining programs. The remaining nine differences are less than 2.5
percent, with two perfect to (at least) the nearest penny and four others differing by
less than 1 percent. There is no apparent bias; four differences are negative and four
are positive.
The research file could be artificially adjusted to fit perfectly (by proportional
reductions or increases, for example). This was not done because doing so might have
unwanted and hidden effects on later resampling results. Further, the MDSS results
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Table 10
Average Benefit Cost Per Family, Quarters 1 Through 10
October 1992 Through March 1995
MDSS Reports

Research File

Means of 2000 Repetitions

Control

Experimental

Control

Experimental

Control

Experimental

11,005

11,232

11,005

11,231

11,005

11,231

$4,035.63

$4,019.88

$4,129.43

$4,108.06

$4,129.40

$4,108.34

AFDC State Cost

$3,215.30

$3,199.02

$3,215.28

$3,199.23

AFDC Total Cost

$7,344.74

$7,307.08

$7,344.68

$7,307.57

Sample Size
AFDC Federal Cost

Food Stamps

$3,667.17

$3,604.25

$3,667.22

$3,602.24

$3,667.30

$3,602.31

Medicaid Federal Cost

$3,433.79

$3,349.05

$3,433.79

$3,346.62

$3,433.49

$3,346.39

Medicaid State Cost

$2,671.08

$2,602.98

$2,670.85

$2,602.80

Medicaid Total Cost

$6,104.87

$5,949.60

$6,104.34

$5,949.19

State Family Assistance
State Medical
Assistance

$324.97

$103.24

$324.97

$102.53

$324.97

$102.49

$89.58

$81.88

$81.15

$82.91

$80.99

$82.55

given here are not final; this analysis is based on results from the first ten quarters of
a planned seven year study. There seems little value in forcing an artificial fit to
interim data. The results match well enough to allow useful inferences to be made
about the original, unavailable data set.

The Benefit Bootstrap Sample

A Visual BASIC13 program was written to create bootstrap sample replicates
through sampling with replacement. Sums of the benefit costs for each program in
each year are computed for these replicates and stored in a file. Separate runs are
required for the control and experimental samples. The program is called
Bootstrap.Mak and the files are called Exp2000R.Sum and Con2000R.Sum. Averages
across these 2000 replicates are shown in Table 10. As expected, these match the
averages from the research sample extremely well, indicating that the resampling
program was successful.
Each file contains 2000 records, one for each replicate.

These must be

combined to create replicates of the full experiment (control and experimental). They
could be combined in any order not depending on their individual outcomes since each
sample is generated independently of the others. Lotus 12314 was used to remove a
header record from each file.

The files were then read by SPSS and saved as

13Visual BASIC is a programming language compatible with the Windows
operating system. Visual BASIC and Windows are copywritten by Microsoft, Inc.
14Lotus 123 for Windows version 5.0 (Lotus Development Corp.)
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Exp2000R.Sav and Con2000R.Sav.

Finally, they were combined to create

B2000R.Sav in the order generated.

Creating the Research Administrative Cost File

MDSS analyst Judith Schaus provided TSMF295a.Sav, an SPSS file containing
raw data from the TSMF cost neutrality random moment time study.

This file

consisted of a single record for each observation. The quarter, site, and policy were
encoded, and the programs being worked on at the time of the observation (up to three)
were identified.
The time study methodology allows multiple responses to the key question,
namely, which program is receiving attention.
identified at each observation.

Up to three programs could be

There are five primary programs:

AFDC, Food

Stamps, Medicaid, State Assistance (medical and cash), and all others. This allows for
ten combinations of two programs each and ten combinations of three each, for a total
of 25 possible results. Further, some kinds of work, such as training and union
activities, are not associated with a particular program. At other times, the worker
may be on a scheduled or unscheduled break, and thus is not working at all. Thus,
there are 27 possible results from any random moment observation. Only 16 actually
occurred.

SPSS was used to determine the frequency of each combination

encountered, creating TSMFCst2.Sav in the process.
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Converting Time Study Results to Administrative Costs

These frequencies estimate the probability that an assistance payments worker,
observed at any randomly chosen time during the work day, will be delivering services
related to any particular combination of programs, delivered under control or
experimental policies. As a statistical model, each random moment observation can
be considered as a multinomial random variable. Resampling for administrative costs
is accomplished by generating repeated multinomial random variables, separately for
each quarter and each office.

Estimates of administrative costs for control and

experimental families are computed for each sample replicate following the same
procedure used to compute administrative costs for the original sample.
Three systematic problems were encountered in implementing the time study,
and each must be accommodated in calculating costs. First, no observations were
obtained for the first, second or ninth quarters. Estimates for these missing data are
obtained in step 6 below. Second, data for one office in each of the third, fourth, and
fifth quarters was dropped when it was discovered that the observer in that office had
made errors which could not be corrected.

Estimates for these missing data are

obtained in step 8 below. Third, observations in the third, fourth, and fifth quarters
did not distinguish between experimental families included in the research sample and
experimental families not included. An adjustment for this problem occurs in step 7
below. Calculation of administrative cost estimates from time study observations or
replicates is accomplished in nine steps, as follows:
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1. Observations not assigned to a particular program and observations for
workers not working are dropped after resampling has occurred. The effect of this is
to spread these costs proportionately among the programs, while preserving any
contribution these observations make to the uncertainty of the estimate.
2. Multi-program observations are divided into equally sized fractional counts
and assigned to each program in the group observed.
3.

Counts for state programs and other programs are added together and

treated as a single program. The time study is not used to generate administrative cost
estimates for these programs.
4. The third, fourth, and fifth quarter counts for the two offices in Wayne
County are summed, as are counts for the two offices in the remainder of the state,
called “Outstate.” Counts are then available for each of these two strata corresponding
to the entries in Table 11.
5. Because no systematic problems resulting in dropped observations occurred
in quarters six through eight or in quarter ten, these quarters do not require a stratum
breakdown. Otherwise, Table 11 also describes the final frequency counts for these
quarters, with the addition of TN, the total number of observations on services to
experimental families not included in the research sample.
6. Divide each entry in Table 11 by Tc + TE (+ TN for quarters .6-8 and 10).
The averages of frequencies for the third and fourth quarters are used for the first and
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Table 11
Final Time Study Frequency Categories

Serving Experimental Families

Serving Control Families
Ac = AFDC Counts

Ae

= AFDC Counts

Fc = Food Stamps Counts

Fe

= Food Stamps Counts

Mc = Medicaid Counts

Me = Medicaid Counts

Oc = Other Counts, Including State Programs

0 E = Other Counts, Including State Programs

Tc = Total Count for Control Families

Te

= Total Count for Experimental Families

second quarters, while the eighth and tenth quarters are averaged to estimate the ninth
quarter.
7. The values from step 6 in quarters 1- 5 are multiplied by the proportions of
all active experimental families which are in the research sample. This step reduces
the observed frequencies to the proportion expected for experimental families in the
obtained were for experimental families included in the research sample. For those not
included in the research sample, counts were obtained separately, and totaled as TN.
8. Multiply the results from step 7 by the number of assistance payments
workers allocated to the study sites. Stratum separation is maintained for quarters 1
through 5 until these products are obtained; the strata are then added. The result at
this point is an estimate of the number of assistance payments workers working on
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each program, obtained separately for the control and experimental policies and
including time spent not working or not working on an identifiable program.
9.

Multiply the results of step 8 by the average cost of an assistance payments

worker for each program, then compute totals for each year or partial year. Although
worker salaries and benefits are identical for all programs, these costs differ because
overhead costs like supervision, policy development and computer support do vary by
program and are included. These costs are obtained through a federally-approved cost
allocation plan based on a statewide time study. Uncertainty in the cost neutrality
administrative cost calculation caused by sampling variation in this study is not
included in the estimates obtained here.
Parameters describing the systematic problems in the time study and parameters
needed to generate time study frequency replicates and compute administrative cost
estimates from them are entered onto a file named LiveTest.TS by a Visual BASIC
program named Tim_Stud.Mak.

This program allows the user to edit these

parameters, which are used by a program named Adm_Bts.Mak to generate
administrative cost replicates through resampling.

Comparing the MDSS and Research Administrative Cost Files

The average administrative costs for the Department’s calculations and those
used for this research are shown in Table 12.15

15Costs shown are shared equally by Michigan and the federal government.
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Table 12
Average Administrative Cost Per Family, Quarters 1 Through 10

MDSS Reports

Research File

Means of 2000
Repetitions

Control Experimental

Control Experimental

Control Experimental

AFDC

$957.70

$1,047.05

$976.45

$1,057.24

$974.82

$1,056.16

Food Stamps

$337.65

$364.23

$348.55

$383.16

$349.44

$384.21

Medicaid

$659.70

$738.51

$632.63

$729.95

$635.39

$716.14

Differences between costs computed from the research file and those reported
by MDSS vary from .97 percent to 5.20 percent of the MDSS costs. The MDSS
calculation process uses some manual steps which cannot be reproduced with certainty,
so the source of the differences again is indeterminate. The match, as before, is
adequate for useful inferences.

The Administrative Cost Bootstrap Sample

Based on the parameters found in LiveTest.TS, the Visual BASIC program

The time study does not support administrative cost estimates for State Family
Assistance or State Medical Assistance. Savings from reductions in State Family
Assistance administrative costs are estimated by MDSS using a separate methodology
which does not depend directly on random sampling.
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Adm_Bts.Mak creates administrative cost replicates and stores them in a file named
A2000F.AdR. Time study replicates are generated as multinomial realizations based
on the frequencies of the program combinations described above. The values needed
for the cost neutrality formula are then computed.

As shown in Table 12, averages

of these replicates match the research sample averages well, but do not match as well
as benefit replicate averages. Differences range from .17 percent to 1.89 percent.

The Bootstrap Percentile Confidence Intervals

After using Lotus 123 to remove the header record from A2000F.AdR, SPSS
was used to combine the benefit and administrative cost replicates into Fin2000R.Sav,
creating A2000R.Sav in the process. Savings (or excess costs) are projected statewide
and totaled, again by SPSS. The file is sorted by total savings and the 50th and 1951st
values are printed, forming the 95 percent percentile confidence interval. Percentile
confidence intervals for federal savings and state savings are computed in the same
way. Results are shown in Table 13.

Reliability of Percentile Confidence Intervals From the Bootstrap Estimates

The distribution of the bootstrap replicates should be approximately normal if
the number of replicates is adequate. As Figures 8, 9, and 10 show,16 the distributions

16These figures show Q-Q plots, which compare the quantiles of a sample with
those of a theoretical distribution, in this case the normal distribution. When the
sample distribution matches the theoretical distribution except for scale and location
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Table 13
Savings From Welfare Reform in Michigan, October 1992 Through March 1995
(Millions of Dollars)

Estimated
Value

Lower
Bound

Upper
Bound

Length of Percentile
confidence Interval as a
Percent of Estimated Value

Federal Savings
-41.9

-64.1

-18.4

109%

Benefits

62.8

-20.4

152.5

275%

Total

20.9

-61.1

110.9

823%

Administrative

-41.9

-64.1

-18.4

109%

Benefits

110.4

51.6

172.2

109%

68.5

6.2

132.3

184%

Administrative

-83.8

•128.2

-36.9

109%

Benefits

173.3

38.0

315.5

160%

Total

89.5

-46.5

237.8

318%

Administrative

Michigan Savings

Total

Total Savings

of federal savings, Michigan savings and total savings appear approximately normal.
The skewness and kurtosis of the replicates should be approximately zero, as they
would be for a normal distribution.

The largest value of either for the three

parameters (like the standard deviation and the mean), the Q-Q plot shows a straight
line.
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Q-Q Plot of Federal Savings
Federal Savings
$200 ,000,000
$150,000,000

$ 100,000,000
$50,000,000

$0
($50,000,000)
($ 100 ,000 ,000 )
($150,000,000)
4 .0 0

-3.00

-2.00

-1.00 0.00
1.00
Normal Distribution

2.00

3.00

4.00

B ased on 2000 replications.

Figure 8.

Comparing Total Federal Savings From 2000 Replications and the Normal Distribution.
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Q-Q Plot of Michigan Savings
Michigan Savings
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Figure 9.

Comparing Total Michigan Savings From 2000 Replications and the Normal Distribution.
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Q-Q Plot of Total Savings
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Figure 10.

Comparing Total Savings From 2000 Replications and the Normal Distribution.

distributions is .153, and none exceed 1.5 standard deviations. Thus, 2,000 replicates
appears adequate to provide useful percentile confidence intervals.

Interpreting the Results

Table 13 shows that there is considerable uncertainty in the savings earned by
Michigan’s welfare reform demonstration. It is clear that some excess administrative
costs have been incurred (between $36.9 million and $128.2 million, shared equally
by Michigan and the federal government). The percentile confidence intervals for
these quantities, shown graphically in Figure 11, do not include zero. Thus, a test of
the hypothesis that no change occurred in administrative costs would be rejected at the
5 percent level.
Michigan has saved between $51.6 million and $172.2 million in benefit costs,
resulting in a total savings of between $6.2 million and $132.2 million. Again, the
percentile confidence interval does not include zero, so these savings are statistically
significant. Total benefit costs (federal and state) have dropped between $38.0 million
and $315.5 million, also a statistically significant result. It is unclear whether federal
benefit costs, total federal costs, or total costs have risen or fallen, since their
percentile confidence intervals contain zero.
The width of the percentile confidence interval for each quantity exceeds the
estimated value for the quantity. Thus, for example, the federal cost neutrality sample
estimates $89.5 million in savings from all sources for Michigan’s welfare reform
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Michigan Cost Neutrality Results
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Figure 11. Michigan Percentile Confidence Intervals.
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demonstration, with a 95 percent percentile confidence interval ranging from -$46.5
million (a loss of $46.5 million) to $237.8 million. The width of the percentile
confidence interval is:
$237.8 million - (-$46.5 million) = $284.3 million,
318 percent of the $89.5 million estimate. This level of uncertainty is very high. The
estimated values should be used cautiously, because results from later time periods,
subject to the same high uncertainty, may appear to contradict claims based on these
early results.
These percentile confidence intervals were computed under the assumption that
the control and experimental samples were simple random samples of the statewide
caseload. This is not the case (see Chapter III). Correctly reflecting the fact that the
true sampling plan included stratification into two strata (Wayne County and all other
counties were separate strata), a sample of two clusters (counties) in each stratum, and
then random samples of cases within clusters could well increase the width of the
percentile confidence intervals. The analytic approach used accurately reflects the
federal approach, however.
After discussion of these percentile confidence intervals, Gerald H. Miller,
Director of the Michigan Department of Social Services, asked what probability could
be assigned to overall savings for Michigan, for the federal government, and overall.
This is equivalent to asking for the confidence level for one-sided confidence intervals
on these quantities which have zero as their lower bounds. Of 2,000 replicates, 26 (or
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1.3 percent) estimated negative state savings. Thus, the required percentile confidence
level is 100 percent - 1.3 percent, or 98.7 percent.

Similar calculations yield

percentile confidence level of 62.3 percent and 88.4 percent that federal savings and
overall savings respectively were achieved (Lovell, 1995a).

Dr. Miller thus shifted

the question from the size of savings to the probability that some savings existed.

Michigan’s Time Study

Analysis of Michigan's cost neutrality data revealed several problems in
understanding administrative costs:
1. Michigan had considerable trouble implementing its time study. No data
were obtained in the first two quarters, or in the ninth quarter. Further, some data
were lost when one of four data collectors misunderstood her instructions, creating
blocks of missing data in quarters 3, 4, and 5 .
2. The time study results were erratic and it was difficult to ascribe possible
policy reasons for them.
3. The time study had little diagnostic capability to help in ascribing these
policy reasons.
4. The time study results for the first 10 quarters indicated an increase of
$75.95 million in administrative costs statewide, with a statewide total of $924 million.
This is a $75.95 million / ($924 million - $75.95 million) = 9.0 percent increase over
what would have been expected without the demonstration project.

MDSS had
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independent measures of statewide administrative effort which showed no increases
(Lovell, 1995b, unpaginated).
These problems could be expected to add to the uncertainty of the time study
results. Thus, it is surprising that benefit savings appear to contribute more to the
uncertainty in total savings, based on the values in the last column of Table 13.
Sample sizes for benefit estimates will continue to grow as the demonstration proceeds,
however, so their uncertainty may decrease in the future.
Since the results of the time study could not be explained as a true increase in
administrative costs, other explanations were sought. The most promising seemed to
be that the staff in the research offices perceived the experimental cases to be more
important than the control cases, and thus shifted some administrative resources from
control cases to experimental cases. Some support for this hypothesis was found in the
Schaefer/Six Mile office, the only office to fully separate the control, experimental,
and experimental/non-research cases.

A worker assigned to experimental cases

administered 109 cases, while the workers assigned to control and experimental/non
research cases administered 138 and 156 cases respectively (Lovell, 1995b,
unpaginated). Higher caseloads mean less administrative effort per case, and thus
lower administrative costs per case, so it appears that effort was shifted from
experimental/non-research and control cases to experimental cases. This shift is only
possible in the research sites since other sites have only experimental/non-research
cases.
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Uncertainty about the meaning of the time study results led MDSS to request
adoption of an alternative strategy for computing administrative costs (Lovell, 1995d,
unpaginated). This request was granted with an effective date of October 1, 1995
(Germanis, 1995, unpaginated). From that point forward administrative costs per case
will be assumed equal, with any savings or excess costs resulting from increases or
decreases in the case closure rate. This mechanical approach has no sampling basis,
so subsequent contributions to cost neutrality uncertainty from administrative cost
estimates will not be measurable.

Summary

MDSS provided a file intended to be identical to that used for benefit
calculations for its own cost neutrality calculations, but there were small, unexplained
differences. The differences between the data used for the Department’s calculations
and those used for the research range from 0 to 9.4 percent, with 11 of 12 comparison
values differing by less than 2.5 percent. The match is adequate for useful inferences.
A program was written to create bootstrap replications of the control and experimental
benefit samples, compute the values needed for the cost neutrality formula, and save
them in a file.
MDSS also provided a file of the raw time study results used to calculate
administrative costs. Again this file was intended to be identical to the file used for
MDSS’s tenth quarter calculations, but again small differences were found. The
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average administrative costs computed from the research file compare favorably with
the MDSS cost neutrality values, but do not match exactly. As before, the match is
adequate to allow useful inferences.
As in the case of benefit costs, a program was written to create bootstrap
replications of the control and experimental administrative cost estimates, compute the
values needed for the cost neutrality formula, and save them in a file.
Administrative and benefit costs are combined and sorted to determine
percentile confidence intervals. The two thousand replicates generated were adequate
to determine useful percentile confidence intervals.

The width of the confidence

interval for each quantity exceeds the estimated value for the quantity. Thus, the
estimated values should be used cautiously, if at all.
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CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

The American Welfare System

The American system of welfare for families with children is a partnership
between the federal and state governments.

Under this partnership, the federal

government establishes the basic policies for the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program, the principal program providing cash assistance to poor
families. States are permitted to choose among some options, reporting most of their
choices to the federal government. The states set payment levels for families, within
some federal limits. Administrative costs are shared equally. The federal treasury
pays at least half of the benefit costs for AFDC; the exact federal share depends on a
formula which considers the relative wealth of each state.

AFDC Reform. 1935-1996

The AFDC program included in the Social Security Act of 1935 was clearly a
radical reform of the state- and locally-directed Mothers’ Pensions programs, then

170

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

under great stress due to the Depression. It transferred much authority over and
responsibility for welfare for families with children to the federal government. Radical
reform proposals have received serious attention regularly since 1969. Plans to
redesign or eliminate AFDC have been proposed by Presidents Nixon, Carter, Reagan,
and Clinton, and by Presidential candidate George McGovern, the 1995-96 House
Republican caucus, and the National Governor’s Association (also 1995-96).
Additionally, a variety of plans for a comprehensive redesign of federalism have
included proposals for major reform of AFDC, as noted in Chapter V. So far, no
radical reform has been enacted at the national level.
Meanwhile, many incremental changes have been implemented, either through
federal law or regulation, or through state waiver demonstration projects. These have
included extending coverage to the custodial parent, then to two-parent families;
provisions to encourage recipients to work; and provisions for job training and other
services in support of employment. On the whole, federal authority has expanded
under these incremental changes.
The Social Security Act was amended on July 25,1962 to include Section 1115
[42 U.S.C. 1315] (West, 1991, p. 528). This section permitted the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare (now the Secretary of Health and Human Services) to
grant waivers of provisions of Section 402 of the Social Security Act, covering
eligibility and payments. This provision was rarely used until 1987, when President
Ronald Reagan created the Interagency Low Income Opportunity Advisory Board
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(ILIOAB) “to accelerate efforts to make America’s welfare system more effective”
(Department of Health and Human Services, undated; circa 1988). It accepted and
passed judgement on state applications for waivers of regulations under the AFDC,
Food Stamps, Medicaid and other welfare programs.

One set of policies and

procedures applied to all proposals.
As a result, proposals from thirteen states were approved in the next 18
months. Provisions from some of these proposals presaged provisions of the Family
Support Act enacted on October 13, 1988 (see Chapter II). It would not be accurate,
however, to say that these demonstration projects provided information about the
effects of the demonstrations’ provisions suggesting that they would be effective. As
of January, 1993, few evaluation reports were available from any of them (DHHS,
1993a, p .l). Rather, what proved influential, as Mead (1992, pp. 195-98) observed,
was data showing that families spent an average of 6.6 years on AFDC in multiple
spells and that workfare programs could have some effect on reducing this level of
dependency. Thus, the Family Support Act emphasizes employment programs, setting
goals for participation for those remaining on AFDC.
The ILIOAB applied three criteria in reviewing state demonstration
applications. First, the proposal “must have a chance of reducing welfare dependency
while continuing to meet the needs of the population the program was intended to
address.”
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Second, total federal costs for AFDC, Food Stamps and Medicaid in each year
of the demonstration must not exceed those which would otherwise have occurred; this
provision came to be called cost neutrality, and is the focus of this dissertation.
Third, there must be a sound evaluation plan. Although other options would
be considered, the Board preferred an evaluation with an experimental design, which
generally means random assignment of families to control and experimental groups.
The experimental design was also expected to support the cost neutrality requirement.
With variations and elaboration, these criteria remain in place as of this writing.
In his 1992 State of the Union address, President George Bush said about
renewed interest in waivers, “We are going to help this movement. Often, state
reform requires waiving certain federal regulations. I will act to make that process
easier and quicker for every state that asks our help,” (DHHS, 1993a, p .l). This short
paragraph was enthusiastically received by the Congress and the voters. This approach
shifted the responsibility (or opportunity) to propose reforms to the states. As part of
the promised simplification, the requirement of annual cost neutrality was removed
and replaced with a requirement that cost neutrality be attained during the life of the
project. AFDC demonstration projects were approved for nine states during the Bush
administration, including Michigan’s, which was entitled To Strengthen Michigan
Families. Three of these states, Wisconsin, New Jersey and Maryland, had also
received waivers during the Reagan administration, so the unduplicated count of states
with AFDC waivers reached nineteen.
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Despite a short-lived national welfare reform proposal of his own (see Chapter
II), President Bill Clinton also supported reform through state-by-state waiver
demonstration processes.

The U. S. Department of Health and Human Services

(DHHS) continues to receive, review and approve AFDC waiver requests as this is
written.
It is impossible to predict even the immediate future of welfare reform. There
is, however, considerable evidence to support the hypothesis that welfare authority and
responsibility have reached an uncomfortable but stable point with the current system
of federal direction and state waivers. Costs are shared through long-established
formulae which reflect, at least roughly, the states’ relative ability to pay. Supporters
of state-designed systems and supporters of a single national standard can each find
features to disparage and features to extol. Some federal requirements can be waived,
providing flexibility and thereby making demonstrations to test new ideas possible.
Other requirements cannot be waived, providing a stable national base policy. The
current system has few, if any, vocal supporters; nearly all stakeholders would make
major changes given the opportunity to do so. But there is no consensus for any single
package of changes. Reluctantly, there is more support for not making any single
major change. This uneasy standoff appears likely to continue at least through the
1996 presidential election. Michael Wines of the New York Times (May 5, 1996, p.
A15) reported that the President appears positioned to take credit for any welfare
reform bill he would be willing to sign, and seems not to have suffered from his
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vetoes. If this is the case, Republicans are unlikely to seek a compromise before the
November election.
States can then be expected to continue requesting and implementing waiver
demonstration projects. Each such project faces the cost neutrality requirement, and
hence understanding the operation and implications of the requirement will remain
important to welfare policy developers and researchers.

Waiver Cost Neutrality and Federalism

Experimentation by the states is one of the expected benefits of federalism, but
detailed federal laws and regulation had a stifling effect on welfare policy innovation
by the states until the establishment of the ILIOAB in 1987. This action made
demonstration projects under Section 1115 of the Social Security Act practical. Under
that section waivers of some provisions of the Social Security Act can be obtained by
states to demonstrate alternative policies. The waiver process succeeds in increasing
state flexibility, even though the federal government includes a cost neutrality
requirement limiting the range of state innovations. Waivers also succeed in reducing
political pressure on the federal government to reform welfare by transferring some
of that responsibility to the states. President Clinton has clearly made this case in
successfully claiming that he is keeping his campaign promise to reform welfare by
granting waivers. This has reduced pressure on him to agree to welfare reform on
terms dictated by the Republican Congress.
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The effect of the cost neutrality provision is that state experiments carrying a
risk of significantly higher costs are still stifled. A. Sidney Johnson III, executive
director of the American Public Welfare Association, argues for eliminating the cost
neutrality requirement, saying “Cost neutrality requirements hinder innovation, quality
of services, and benefits to recipients. States should be encouraged, not discouraged,
to seek better programs” (1995, p. 20).
For example, through demonstration projects, states could use AFDC funds
to purchase family counseling by a social worker, believing that this would ultimately
encourage work. Delivered with sufficient intensity to be effective, these services
would be expensive. If the strategy does not work, cost neutrality requires the state
to absorb all excess costs, rather than sharing them with the federal government. If
the strategy works, the federal and state governments share the savings according to
the standard matching proportions.
Mark Greenberg, Senior Attorney at the Center for Law and Social Policy,
offers three more fundamental welfare reforms which the cost neutrality requirement
discourages. First, states could operate a guaranteed child support payment system to
largely replace AFDC. Second, day care support could be significantly extended to
remove this barrier to employment. Third, a time limit on welfare receipt leading to
a requirement to accept a job provided by the government could be adopted as an
alternative to a time limit leading to the end of all financial assistance. All three of
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these strategies have risks of high costs, however, and states may be reluctant to
undertake these risks without a federal partner (1995, p. 16 and 1996).
The need for federal protection from profligate or overly optimistic states, if
it exists at all, should be attenuated by the matching formula, which forces states to
share in additional costs in any case. The cost neutrality provision is effective only in
a situation in which a state decision maker finds a set of policy options attractive when
state risk is at the matching rate but not at full cost. In this situation, the options
would be rejected, because waiver cost neutrality would force the state to accept the
full risk. If the options are attractive at full risk, they would be adopted even if the
waiver cost neutrality requirement shifted all risk to the state. If they are not attractive
even at the state matching payment level, they would not be adopted regardless of the
presence or absence of a waiver cost neutrality requirement.
Welfare researcher Michael Wiseman views this coercive feature of cost
neutrality as a possible federal policy tool (1995, p. 10). The federal government
should budget funds to encourage “well-designed demonstrations that are consistent
with the national reform agenda.” Grants could then be made from these funds to
offset excess costs in the selected states only. The cost neutrality requirement would
protect the federal purse from excess costs generated by poorly designed
demonstrations and from demonstrations not consistent with the national agenda.
A federal official present at the development of the cost neutrality concept
stated that the emphasis on cost neutrality figures presented as dollars did not reflect
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the original federal intent, which was to consider them as percentages of total program
costs (Lovell, 1995c). However, the federal formula (see Chapter VI) computes
amounts in dollars, and must be modified to determine percentages. Further, dollars
must be recovered in the event of overexpenditures. Finally, no matter how large this
amount is, it will have political implications because the public expects welfare reform
to save money, not to cost more.
Waiver cost neutrality as a static phenomena can be described through the
“calculative phase” of Wright’s intergovernmental relations model (see Chapter V).
This description, though, does not adequately account for either the innovation
demanded by the federal government if waivers are to be granted or the opportunity
that waiver cost neutrality offers to the federal government as an indirect policy control
mechanism.
Similarly, such federalism reformers as Dye, Rivlin, Peterson and Walker do
not anticipate the complexities of waiver cost neutrality, even though Rivlin and
Walker continue to assign responsibility for AFDC jointly to the states and the federal
government. Nathan, anticipating the replacement of AFDC by block grants and the
need for information about states’ subsequent programs, suggests federal funding of
studies which could easily depend in part on the same methodology as waiver cost
neutrality.
Waiver cost neutrality, then, is a novel and significant characteristic of
federalism in the 1990's. It may result in the reduction of a state’s effective federal
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matching rate for AFDC, an established entitlement program, even when all program
requirements have been met. This situation arises only in the quality control system
otherwise. Federalism reformers seldom mention it as a tool, while welfare reformers
find it a faulty one. As grander reform efforts fail in the Congress or are vetoed,
however, waivers and the accompanying cost neutrality requirement: (a) increase state
flexibility; (b) transfer some pressure for reform from the federal level to the state
level; (c) protect federal financial interests from riskier reforms; (d) serve as an
intermediate model to block grants on one hand and continued federal control of
welfare policy on the other; and (e) partially preserves AFDC as a uniform national
program by preserving basic characteristics not subject to waiver.
Under this model, the federal government retains significant power over
welfare policy making by allowing the AFDC program to become less uniform from
state to state, partially sacrificing an important policy goal in order to save the
program. Cost neutrality guarantees that there will be no change in fiscal power.
Ultimately, this model is limited and tentative. Significant improvement in the
welfare system may be possible only by spending more money, which is just what
waiver cost neutrality is designed to prevent.

Waivers depend individually on

scientific design and analysis, but the lack of coordination from state to state makes
any significant gain in knowledge unlikely.

Finally, due to limitations in the

authorizing legislation, some policy options cannot be tried under waivers. The waiver
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system, then, seems an unlikely long-term support for the uncomfortable but stable
point which forces seeking welfare reform have reached.
Finally, even the advent of block grants may not end the importance of waiver
cost neutrality. Attempts in 1995 to convert the Food Stamps program to a block grant
met with little support. Waivers and cost neutrality apply to Food Stamps as well as
to AFDC, so they are likely to continue to be significant features of the American
welfare system even if AFDC is converted to a block grant program. Thus, even if
new forces push the federal government successfully to welfare reform, waivers and
cost neutrality will remain interesting aspects of federalism.

Cost Neutrality in Michigan. 1992-1995

Michigan began its welfare reform demonstration, called To Strengthen
Michigan Families, or TSMF, on October 1, 1992. A waiver for the federal rule for
budgeting earned income under AFDC was implemented, as were waivers expanding
eligibility for two-parent families. Families receiving AFDC were told that the state
expected, in return for their welfare grants, that they would make good faith efforts
to become independent of the welfare system. This expectation is called the Social
Contract.
With the exception of control cases needed for the TSMF evaluation and cost
neutrality calculations (and for a preexisting study of job training program options),
the experimental policies were applied to all cases statewide beginning on that date.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Four sites were selected for the evaluation. Families in these sites receiving AFDC
on the project start date were randomly assigned to control and experimental policies.
Families subsequently found eligible for AFDC were also randomly assigned to control
and experimental policies using a process based on the social security number of the
grantee.
Michigan’s cost neutrality calculations for the period from October, 1992
through March, 1995 showed that $77.5 million in state costs and $20.5 million in
federal costs were saved.

These results are detailed in Chapter III, Table 2.

Unfortunately, the federal formula produces few details concerning the sources of these
savings. The formula can be described as simply a "black box." The mechanisms
generating costs or savings are not illuminated.

The independent evaluator (Abt

Associates) reported reductions in AFDC benefits paid to families covered by the
TSMF policies in the first two years of the study (Werner and Komfeld, 1994, pp. 51
and 60-61, and 1995, pp. 61-65 and 73-75). This supports similar results from the cost
neutrality calculations. However, the cost neutrality calculation is the only source of
administrative cost data.
Estimates of the excess costs or savings resulting from Michigan’s welfare
reforms are the result of projecting the very small differences observed between costs
for control cases and costs for experimental cases in the research sites to statewide
proportions (see Chapter VI for calculation details).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

After thirty months, there was virtually no difference in the average AFDC
benefit cost between the control and experimental samples: $7,047 for control families
and $7,020 for experimental families.
There may thus be no significant differences between control and experimental
values, and the projected savings shown in Table 3 may be illusory. If so, claims of
success for Michigan's welfare reform demonstration based on results from the first
thirty months are premature. Political leaders naturally want to announce success, but
such announcements would prove embarrassing if subsequent data showed a reversal,
even if those subsequent results also were too small to be statistically significant. In
other words, incautious use of early results may prove problematic politically.
Michigan's governor and social services director chose to take this risk and made
claims of success public.
Table 3 shows that the TSMF demonstration resulted in $173.92 million in
savings from reduced benefit costs. These savings were earned, in part at least,
through increased administrative efforts, resulting in administrative cost increases.
The result is a net savings of $173.92 million - $75.95 million = $97.97 million.
While this is only 1.4 percent of the total of $7.12 billion in expenses, the result
challenges two common perceptions about the cash welfare system.

First, it is

believed by many advocates for the poor that welfare reform resulting in cost savings
will be at the expense of the poor, but TSMF did not require grant or service
reductions—in fact, service costs increased. Second, the “welfare bureaucracy” and
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out-of-wedlock childbirth are often blamed by fiscal conservatives for the cost of
welfare, but TSMF used increases in that bureaucracy to generate net savings without
restricting benefits to illegitimate children or their mothers.
Since the estimate of excess costs or savings obtained is based on random
samples, it is subject to sampling uncertainty. This uncertainty should be considered
whenever the estimate is used. The federal terms and conditions, however, neither
require a measure of the uncertainty in the resulting estimates nor suggest any way to
calculate such a measure.
One useful measure of uncertainty is the confidence interval, a range of
possible values for excess costs or savings, usually surrounding the single estimated
value. The confidence interval has an associated confidence level, which is the
probability that the interval includes the true value of the excess costs or savings.
Confidence intervals are widely used to describe uncertainty in survey results. Thus,
while their technical meaning may not be well-understood, they can be assumed to be
familiar to most data users within government.
Confidence intervals, however, are computed under assumptions about the
behavior of the estimator which may not be met by cost neutrality estimates. By
combining two statistical techniques, resampling and bootstrapping, percentile
confidence intervals (equivalent to confidence intervals) may be estimated for cost
neutrality results. Percentile values for Michigan’s October, 1992 through March,
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1995 cost neutrality results are shown in Table 13, Chapter VII, and repeated here as
Table 14.

Table 14
Savings From Welfare Reform in Michigan, October 1992 Through March 1995
(Millions of Dollars)

Estimated Value

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Length of
Percentile
Confidence
interval as a
Percent of
Estimated Value

-41.9

-64.1

-18.4

109%

Benefits

62.8

-20.4

152.5

275%

Total

20.9

-61.1

110.9

823%

Administrative

-41.9

-64.1

-18.4

109%

Benefits

110.4

51.6

172.2

109%

68.5

6.2

132.3

184%

Administrative

-83.8

-128.2

-36.9

109%

Benefits

173.3

38.0

315.5

160%

Total

89.5

-46.5

237.8

318%

Federal Savings
Administrative

Michigan Savings

Total

Total Savings
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The table shows that there is considerable uncertainty in the savings earned by
Michigan’s welfare reform demonstration. It is clear that some excess administrative
costs have been incurred (between $36.9 million and $128.2 million, shared equally
by Michigan and the federal government). The percentile confidence intervals for
these quantities do not include zero, so a test of the hypothesis that no change occurred
in administrative costs would be rejected at the 5 percent level.
Michigan has saved between $51.6 million and $172.2 million in benefit costs,
resulting in a total savings of between $6.2 million and $132.2 million. Again, the
percentile confidence interval does not include zero, so these savings are statistically
significant. Total benefit costs (federal and state) have dropped between $38.0 million
and $315.5 million, also a statistically significant result. It is unclear whether
federal benefit costs, total federal costs, or total costs have risen or fallen, since their
percentile confidence intervals contain zero.
After discussion of these percentile confidence intervals, Gerald H. Miller,
Director of the Michigan Department of Social Services, asked what probability could
be assigned to overall savings for Michigan, for the federal government, and overall.
This is equivalent to asking for the confidence level for one-sided percentile confidence
intervals on these quantities which have zero as their lower bounds. The result for
Michigan is a percentile level of 98.7 percent. Similar calculations yield percentile
levels of 62.3 percent that federal funds were saved and 88.4 percent that overall

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

savings were achieved. Dr. Miller thus shifted the question from the size of savings
to the probability that some savings existed.
Weiss and Bucuvalas (1980, pp. 13-15) offer these possibilities for the use of
research results by political decision makers:
1. The decision maker may apply research results to an appropriate, specific
policy or practice that is consistent with the researchers' implicit model.
2. He/she may use it to reduce his/her level of uncertainty.
3. Research can be used by the decision maker to bolster his/her supporters.
4. It may be used to persuade or neutralize the decision maker's critics.
5. It may be used to reinforce a commitment made previously.
6. The decision maker may refer to research in order to legitimate decisions
which have already been made.
7. The decision maker may use research to shift responsibility for unpopular
decisions to the researchers.
With the exception of the last form of use, none of these is unethical, but they
stray successively fiirther from the researchers' implicit model.

Michigan’s cost

neutrality results have been used by Governor John Engler in most of the first six
ways, but not in the seventh or in any other clearly unethical manner. In most cases,
the use has been policy-oriented, to rally support for the TSMF approach to welfare
reform and for Governor John Engler’s belief that the states should be even more free
to experiment.
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The effect of their repeated use has, however, enhanced the career of the
Governor. After two years, cost neutrality results indicated that Michigan had saved
a total of $101 million with TSMF.

This number began appearing regularly in

Governor Engler’s public pronouncements, including national television interviews.
The January 20, 1995 Detroit Free Press carried a four-column photograph of the
governor holding a graph describing cost neutrality results during his testimony before
the House Ways and Means Committee (Montgomery, p. 6A).

The Governor’s

success in welfare reform and other policy areas, including tax cuts and school finance
reform, led to speculation about a vice-presidential or presidential candidacy in The
Economist (“The next-,” 1996, p. 29), in Time (“If not,” 1996, p. 25), on the
National Broadcast Company’s “Meet the Press” (“Engler avoids,” 1996, p. 1A), and
by the Associated Press (O’Brien, 1996, p. 6D).

Conclusions

What Is the Role of Welfare Cost Neutrality in National Welfare Reform?

As shown above, waiver demonstration projects were an important feature of
President Ronald Reagan’s, welfare reform efforts and lie at the heart of those efforts
for Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton. Cost neutrality serves to significantly
limit the options states consider for waivers. Additionally, cost neutrality calculations
can be completed more quickly than evaluations, and thus provide the earliest
indicators of a demonstration’s performance.
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What Place Does it Have in Theories of Federalism? How Do Theories of Federalism
Explain the Reasons for Imposing This Requirement?

As shown in Chapter V and summarized above, waiver cost neutrality is a
novel and significant characteristic of federalism in the 1990s. As grander reform
efforts fail in the Congress or are vetoed, waivers and the accompanying cost neutrality
requirement: (a) increase state flexibility, (b) transfer some pressure for reform from
the federal level to the state level, (c) protect federal financial interests from riskier
reforms, (d) serve as an intermediate model to block grants on one hand and continued
federal control of welfare policy on the other, and (e) partially preserves AFDC as a
uniform national program by preserving basic characteristics not subject to waiver.
Under this model, the federal government retains significant power over
welfare policy making by allowing the AFDC program to become less uniform from
state to state, partially sacrificing an important policy goal in order to save the
program, with no change in fiscal power. Ultimately, however, this model is limited
and tentative.

The waiver system seems an unlikely long-term support for the

uncomfortable but stable point which forces seeking welfare reform have reached.

How Reliable Is the Federal Estimator of Cost Neutrality? Is This Reliability Great
Enough to Support the Uses Made of Cost Neutrality Results? How Does the Use bv
a Governor and His/Her Top Executives of Politically Sensitive Data Change When
the Idea of Statistical Uncertainty Is Introduced?

Percentile confidence intervals, similar to confidence intervals, were computed
for Michigan’s welfare reform savings and introduced into the policy stream. The
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intervals were broad, suggesting large uncertainty in the estimates, and thus, that care
should be taken in using the results. Interpreting these intervals for his use, Director
of the Michigan Department of Social Services Gerald Miller asked that they be
converted into statements about the probability that money was saved, thus indicating
that the amount was not as important as the direction.

How Can the Statistical Characteristics of Results Obtained With the Federal
Calculation Method for Welfare Reform Cost Neutrality Be Determined? What Are
the Characteristics of Results Obtained With the Current Method?

The approach used to compute percentile confidence intervals can be extended
to include other statistical characteristics. Together with the technical characteristics
of consistency and bias,17 percentile confidence intervals, as computed for this
dissertation, provide a standard for comparing alternative versions of the formula
prescribed for waiver cost neutrality calculation. Of two competing formulae with
approximately equivalent bias and consistency, the one more likely to have the shorter
percentile confidence interval is preferred. Results obtained for the federal formula
indicated relatively high uncertainty; other approaches to obtaining cost neutrality
estimates might produce narrower percentile confidence intervals.

17An estimator is consistent if it is equal to the true population value when the
sample size grows to the population size. Bias is the difference between the true
population value and the expected value of the estimator.
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Critique

This research is based on a single case study where the author had little control
over events. Consequently, some results have limited validity when used inferentially.
That is, when applied to the universe of similar situations.
The conclusions reached concerning the role of cost neutrality in national
welfare reform are not affected by this limitation because they are based on cost
neutrality's general characteristics, not on characteristics specific to its use in
Michigan.

Conclusions reached about the place occupied by cost neutrality in

American federalism are similarly unaffected, for the same reason.
However, conclusions reached about the statistical characteristics and reliability
of the federal cost neutrality formula would be strengthened by using data covering the
full demonstration period, from October 1992 through September 1999. Use of similar
data from other states would also improve the validity of these conclusions. Further,
obtaining the data set at the time official calculations are done is very desirable. This
would prevent the need to distinguish the research sample from the official sample.
Finally, results on the use by Governors and top state executives of politically
sensitive data with inherent uncertainty would be considerably strengthened by
reviewing more cases. Additional welfare reform cost neutrality cases would be
helpful, as would cases from other programs. Sensitive results in environmental
quality, public health, welfare error rates, and inter-census demographics are often
based on sampling, and thus are subject to uncertainty.
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Recommendations

Review Methods of Estimating Administrative Costs

As described in Chapters III and VII, Michigan encountered significant
problems in implementing and interpreting the results of a time study intended to
estimate increases or decreases in administrative costs due to its welfare reform
demonstration. The overall result, an increase of $75.95 million in costs for October
1992 through March 1995, was a change large enough to have impacted the
Department’s budget, if accurate, but no impact was discernible. One reasonable
interpretation of this result is that administrative resources were indeed transferred
from control cases to experimental cases in the research sites, but the projection to
statewide values is improper because no such transfers can take place in the remaining
offices statewide (because there are no control cases outside of the research sites).
In any case, Michigan has asked permission to abandon its time study, and
permission has been granted. The Department of Health and Human Services should
undertake a review of administrative cost methodologies in use nationwide for the
purpose of determining standards of best practice. Results from states approximating
these best practices should then be reviewed for their level of impact on final cost
neutrality calculations. It is possible that, properly computed, administrative costs are
irrelevant and should not be included in waiver cost neutrality.
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Review Use of Cost Neutrality Results bv Other Political Leaders

This dissertation considers the use of one politically-sensitive, sampling-based
result, waiver cost neutrality, by one political leader, Governor John Engler of
Michigan. Understanding of this phenomenon would be greatly enhanced by similar
case studies of how other governors’ have used waiver cost neutrality results or, more
generally, use by political leaders of significant information based on sampling and
thus inherently subject to random variation. As American society becomes more
complex and the demand for information grows, this phenomenon should become
increasingly common. It presents risks to politicians and to those they govern.

Reconsider the Federal Formula

The Department of Health and Human Services should undertake these
comparisons of other approaches to computing cost neutrality. Some alternatives to
consider include quarterly or annual calculations, instead of cumulative calculations,
and reflecting the actual sample selection design more precisely than as a simple
random sample.

The robustness of results in the presence of extreme costs for

individuals in the sample (such as unusual medical costs) and minor errors in carrying
out the experimental design should also be investigated.
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Consider a National Research Strategy

If AFDC is not converted to a block grant, welfare researcher Michael
Wiseman’s view that cost neutrality may be a federal policy tool (1995, p. 10) should
be given further consideration. One approach to the scattered and unsystematic nature
of the current collection of AFDC waiver demonstration projects is to approach the
whole collection of projects from a meta-analysis or multiple regression perspective.
Some underlying results with wide validity may be available.
Another approach is to consider them as pilot projects, and to use the period
until their expiration as a planning period. A few states, working with the Department
of Health and Human Services, could select a small number of policy options showing
the greatest promise and design a multi-state demonstration which would consider
interactions with economic conditions and interactions among policy options. The
motivation for states would be federal appropriations to cover the costs of evaluation
and administration of multiple policies.

The federal motivation would be the

development of a uniform national policy reflecting current research.
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